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RIVISITING ROOKER-FELDMAN: EXTENDING THE DOCTRINE TO STATE COURT INTERLOCUTOR ORDERS

Dustin E. Buehler
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits lower federal courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. After decades of confusion, the Supreme Court recently clarified the scope and proper application of the doctrine in two cases, Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis. However, the Court left a key question unanswered: which state court “judgments” trigger the protection of Rooker-Feldman? Does the doctrine prohibit lower federal courts from reviewing only final state court judgments? Or does it also prohibit review of state court interlocutory orders, such as stays, preliminary injunctions, rulings on pretrial motions, and discovery orders? The circuits are split on this issue. This Article examines the evolution and purpose of Rooker-Feldman and concludes that the doctrine should protect all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. This is the only approach that respects interests vital to the interaction between state and federal courts, including separation of powers, federalism, and parity.
I. INTRODUCTION

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final state court judgments.\(^1\) By comparison, under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal district courts can only exercise "original jurisdiction,"\(^2\) not appellate jurisdiction.\(^3\) In *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*\(^4\) and *District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*,\(^5\) the Supreme Court interpreted these two statutes and held that lower federal courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.\(^6\)

At first blush, this rule seems logical and straightforward. Over the years, however, an "impermeable cover of jurisprudential kudzu has grown" from this seemingly simple rule.\(^7\) Judges and scholars have heaped scathing criticism on the "so-called *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine."\(^8\) They argue that the doctrine is confusing,\(^9\) that it serves no useful purpose,\(^10\) and that it gets conflated with abstention and

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3. See id.
4. 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
6. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416.
9. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 7, at 643.
10. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Comment, *Comments on Rooker-Feldman or Let State Law Be Our Guide*, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1999) (*The Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is an oddity in the law. In fact, I have been unable to think of another legal doc-
Some even argue that the doctrine should be abolished outright. After the Supreme Court recently emphasized the narrowness of the doctrine, a few critics gleefully announced that *Rooker-Feldman* was finally dead. Alas, to the annoyance of those intent on hauling *Rooker-Feldman* off for burial, the corpse keeps shouting, "I am not dead yet!" Lower federal courts continue to use the doctrine as a "docket-cleaning workhorse." During the year following the Supreme Court’s most recent *Rooker-Feldman* decision, lower federal courts invoked the doctrine more than 500 times and used it to bar federal jurisdiction in approximately seventy percent of those cases. Despite the wishful thinking of the doctrine’s many detractors, these numbers highlight an inconvenient truth—the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is alive and here to stay.

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12. See, e.g., Barry Friedman & James E. Gaylord, *Rooker-Feldman, from the Ground Up*, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129, 1133 (1999) ("Our conclusions may be summarized simply: *Feldman* itself should be overruled. The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine should be abolished."); Thompson, supra note 10, at 862 (calling for “the end to recognition of *Rooker-Feldman* as an independent doctrine of federal court jurisdiction”).


15. The author confesses this is a not-so-subtle reference to Broadway’s *Spamalot*, and, reaching farther back, to *Monty Python and the Holy Grail*.


17. A Westlaw search of all federal cases in which the word “Rooker” and “Feldman” appeared in the same sentence showed that between February 22, 2006, and February 22, 2007—the year immediately following the Supreme Court’s decision in *Lance v. Dennis*—lower federal courts cited *Rooker-Feldman* in 682 decisions and addressed whether the doctrine was applicable in 524 of those decisions. Lower federal courts used *Rooker-Feldman* to bar jurisdiction for at least some of the litigants’ claims in 381 cases, representing 72.7% of the cases in which the doctrine was analyzed.

18. See, e.g., *O’Callaghan v. Harvey*, 233 F. App’x 181, 183 (3d Cir. 2007); *Chapman v. Oklahoma*, 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006).
If we are stuck with Rooker-Feldman, we should at least understand what it is and what role it plays. Unfortunately, this is not an easy task. Lower federal courts disagree on the doctrine's scope and proper application and often confuse it with preclusion doctrines, especially res judicata. Given how frequently courts use Rooker-Feldman to bar federal jurisdiction, it is surprising how muddled it is and how infrequently scholars analyze it.

The Supreme Court attempted to clarify Rooker-Feldman in two recent decisions—Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp. and Lance v. Dennis. In these cases, the Court held that the doctrine is confined to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." In other words, entry of a state court judgment triggers the doctrine. After the state court files its judgment, the losing party must appeal through the state court system and cannot attempt to overturn the judgment by filing a new lawsuit in federal district court.

Unfortunately, the Supreme Court left a key question unanswered: which state court "judgments" trigger the protection of Rooker-Feldman? Does the doctrine prohibit federal district courts from reviewing only final state court judgments? Or does it also prevent federal district courts from exercising appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory decisions, such as stays, preliminary injunctions, rulings on pretrial motions, and discovery orders? Federal cir-

19. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. et al., Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1440 (5th ed. 2003) ("The lower courts, which have often found the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relevant and even dispositive, have not agreed on its proper scope or application."); Adam McLain, Comment, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: Toward a Workable Role, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1555, 1573 (2001) ("Courts are confused and consequently are misapplying the doctrine."); Thompson, supra note 10, at 880 ("Lower court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.").

20. See, e.g., Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[W]here a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding . . . , subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion."). abrogated by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (characterizing Rooker-Feldman as "a combination of the abstention and res judicata doctrines").

21. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1175-76 ("Federal courts scholars and casebook authors, most likely taking their cue from the Supreme Court's lack of attention to the doctrine, have themselves given it little or no attention.").


24. Id. at 464; Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284.

circuit courts are split on this question, and scholars have not analyzed the issue in depth. There is no resolution on this aspect of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, despite its importance.

This Article bridges that gap. Part II examines the evolution of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine from the Supreme Court’s decision in *Rooker* to its recent decisions in *Exxon Mobil* and *Lance*. This analysis shows that the Supreme Court has clarified the scope of Rooker-Feldman, but it has not addressed whether the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or also to state court interlocutory orders. We must look beyond existing case law for an answer.

Part III of this Article examines the purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The doctrine enforces separation of powers and the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, advances interests of federalism by protecting state court judgments, and advances interests of parity by recognizing that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims. This portion of the Article concludes that courts should reason from these underlying principles when analyzing unanswered questions about Rooker-Feldman.

Part IV examines the current circuit split on whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars suits in federal district court that challenge state court interlocutory orders. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use a narrow approach, applying Rooker-Feldman only to final state court judgments. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits use a broad approach, extending Rooker-Feldman to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. The First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use an intermediate approach, applying Rooker-Feldman to some—but not all—state court interlocutory orders.

26. E.g., compare *TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc.*, 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005) (emphasizing that Rooker-Feldman protects only final state court judgments), and *Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors*, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003) (same), and *FDIC v. Meyerland Co. (In re Meyerland Co.)*, 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (same), with *Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell*, 336 F.3d 311, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (same), and *Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc.*, 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (applying Rooker-Feldman to state court interlocutory orders), and *Richardson v. D.C. Court of Appeals*, 83 F.3d 1513, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (same), and *Campbell v. Greisberger*, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).


28. With federal courts invoking Rooker-Feldman in more than 500 cases each year, supra note 17, any split in circuit authority on the doctrine’s scope has far-reaching consequences for hundreds of litigants.
Finally, Part V concludes that the Supreme Court should resolve this circuit split by adopting the broad approach, extending *Rooker-Feldman* to state court interlocutory orders. The broad approach is the only rule that is consistent with the purposes of the doctrine. It keeps lower federal courts within the boundaries of their statutory jurisdiction, advances principles of federalism, and recognizes that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims. By adopting this approach, the Supreme Court can ensure that *Rooker-Feldman* reflects the limits of the statutory jurisdiction of federal courts. Under those statutes, lower federal courts lack appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, including those judgments that are interlocutory in nature.

II. EVOLUTION OF THE *ROOKER-FELDMAN* DOCTRINE

The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine arises from two cases decided sixty years apart, in which the Supreme Court held that federal district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.29 After more than twenty years of confusion in the lower federal courts,30 the Supreme Court clarified the doctrine’s scope in its recent decisions in *Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.*31 and *Lance v. Dennis.*32 However, these decisions fail to address whether the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or also protects state court interlocutory orders.33

A. A Simple Rule Erects a Gate Against Jurisdiction: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Rooker

The Supreme Court laid the cornerstone of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine in its 1923 decision in *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*34 Dora and William Rooker owned real estate in Indiana.35 Financial embarrassment from the prohibitive cost of improvements to their property36 led the Rookers to deed their land to Fidelity Trust Company in exchange for a loan that they failed to repay.37 The result of

29. D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); see also infra Parts II.A., Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
32. 546 U.S. 459 (2006) (per curiam); see also infra Part II.D.
33. See infra Part II.E.
34. 263 U.S. at 415-16.
37. *Rooker*, 131 N.E. at 771-72. Under the arrangement, Fidelity, as trustee, was to advance moneys for [the Rookers'] benefit, assist in procuring advances from others, protect the title, ultimately sell the land, use the proceeds in satisfying such mortgages or liens as might be superior to the rights of the trustee and in
this transaction was twenty-four years of litigation in state and federal courts.38

After two rounds of litigation in Indiana state courts,39 the Rookers filed an action in federal district court, seeking to have the state court judgment “declared null and void.”40 The Rookers argued that the state court decision violated the U.S. Constitution because it gave effect to an unconstitutional state law and contradicted prior state court rulings.41 The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the suit.42

On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case.43 The Court held that federal district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments.44 First, the Court drew a negative inference from its own statutory grant of appellate jurisdiction.45 Because the statute explicitly vests only the Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over final state court

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Rooker, 261 U.S. at 115.

38. See generally McLain, supra note 19, at 1560-63 (describing the factual and procedural history of the Rooker litigation). The Rookers first filed suit in Indiana circuit court on October 30, 1912. See Rooker, 109 N.E. at 768. More than twenty-four years later, the final disposal in the litigation occurred when the Indiana Court of Appeals denied Dora Rooker’s appeal from a judgment striking her complaint from the files. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 5 N.E.2d 140, 140-41 (Ind. Ct. App. 1936) (en banc).

39. The first round of state court litigation focused on whether the contract was a trust agreement or mortgage, with the Indiana Supreme Court ruling that a trust had been created. Rooker, 109 N.E. at 768-70. In the second round of state court litigation, the trial court applied the law of trusts, holding that Fidelity had “faithfully performed its duties as trustee” and had a right to sell the property and distribute the proceeds according to the terms of the contract. Rooker, 131 N.E. at 773. After the Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, id. at 776, the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the judgment on writ of error, concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, and dismissed the case. See Rooker, 261 U.S. at 118.


41. Id. The Rookers argued that the Indiana state court judgment violated the Contracts Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. See id.

42. See id. at 415.

43. Id. (“T[he suit is so plainly not within the District Court’s jurisdiction as defined by Congress that the motion to affirm must be sustained.”).

44. Id. at 416.

45. See id. At the time of the Rooker opinion, section 237 of the Judicial Code was the statutory basis for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over final state court judgments. See Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726 (1916) (“A final judgment or decree in any suit in the highest court of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, implicating a federal question[,] may be reexamined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court upon a writ of error.”); Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (citing Judicial Code, section 237, as amended Act. of Sept. 6, 1916). Today, the relevant grant of statutory jurisdiction formerly conveyed by section 237 of the Judicial Code is contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006). Gayle Gerson, Note, A Return to Practicality: Reforming the Fourth Cox Exception to the Final Judgment Rule Governing Supreme Court Certiorari Review of State Court Judgments, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 789, 794-95 n.33 (2004).
judgments, federal district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over such judgments.46 Second, the Court drew another inference from the statutory grant of jurisdiction for federal district courts, which is “strictly original.”47 Because the statute conveys only original jurisdiction, district courts cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction.48 In other words, if Congress wanted federal district courts to have appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, it would have said so. Congress did not convey such jurisdiction, so no jurisdiction exists.

For sixty years, courts and commentators largely ignored the Rooker decision or conflated its simple rule with other doctrines.49 The Supreme Court cited the case only twice, both times while applying res judicata.50 Lower federal courts cited the rule from Rooker infrequently,51 and when they did, they often confused it with res judicata52 or Younger abstention.53 The only significant academic article

46. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (“Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify [state court] judgment[s] . . . .”).


48. See Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416 (“To [allow district courts to review state court judgments] would be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.”).

49. E.g., FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1437 (Rooker was “largely forgotten” until 1980); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1133 (“Rooker . . . for the most part lay dormant for sixty years.”); Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1087 (1999) (hereinafter Sherry, Judicial Federalism) (“For six decades, lower courts applied Rooker sporadically, often using it interchangeably with doctrines of preclusion—which were themselves in some disarray.”); McLain, supra note 19, at 1563 (noting that before the Feldman decision, “Rooker was not particularly influential, and it was cited infrequently over subsequent decades”).

50. The Court cited Rooker in a decision holding that res judicata barred relitigation of a union’s collective bargaining agreement. Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 282-83 (1946). Justice White also cited Rooker in a case in which the petitioner argued that res judicata precluded federal court review of a state court judgment. See Fla. State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960, 961 (1971) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Given this context, it is not surprising that lower federal courts conflated Rooker and res judicata. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1180 (“[Rooker] was cited sporadically in the following years, and was often mentioned interchangeably with res judicata.”).

51. See Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1133.

52. See, e.g., Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Hanley v. Four Corners Vacation Props., Inc., 480 F.2d 536, 538 (10th Cir. 1973); Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228, 1231-32 (1st Cir.
to analyze the Rooker case during this period argued that the doctrine had a scope identical to res judicata.54

B. Extending the Rooker Principle: The Supreme Court’s Decision in Feldman

With little warning, the dormant Rooker doctrine erupted in 1983 when the Supreme Court decided District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman.55 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied two applications seeking waivers from a bar admission rule that made it difficult for graduates of unaccredited law schools to sit for the bar exam.56 The rejected applicants, Marc Feldman57 and Edward Hickey,58 each filed suit in federal district court, contending that the ruling by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals violated federal constitutional rights and antitrust laws.59 The district court dis-

53. See, e.g., Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 251-53 (5th Cir. 1973) (invoking Rooker to support its holding that Younger abstention bars plaintiff’s federal action); Aristocrat Health Club of Hartford, Inc. v. Chaucer, 451 F. Supp. 210, 218-19 (D. Conn. 1978) (citing the rule from Rooker as one of several reasons for applying Younger abstention); Sole v. Grand Jurors, 393 F. Supp. 1322, 1331 n.17 (D.N.J. 1975); see also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971) (establishing abstention doctrine based on “the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances”).

54. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1337, 1341 (1980) (“Because any claim that the federal district courts would lack jurisdiction to hear under Rooker also would be barred by a previous judgment under principles of res judicata, the scope of claim preclusion is identical under the two doctrines.”).


56. See id. at 464-72. The rule required applicants for the District of Columbia bar exam to submit certificates verifying that they graduated from an accredited law school. Id. at 464-65. Alternatively, an unaccredited law school graduate could sit for the bar exam “only after receiving credit for 24 semester hours of study in a law school that at the time of study was approved by the American Bar Association and with Committee approval.” Id. at 465 n.1.

57. Rather than attending law school, Feldman completed an alternative program offered by the Commonwealth of Virginia in which he worked in an attorney’s office in Charlottesville, audited law classes at the University of Virginia, and served as a law clerk for a federal district court judge. Id. at 465. He passed the Virginia bar exam and began working as a staff attorney for a Baltimore legal aid bureau. Id. Although Maryland had a rule similar to the one used by the District of Columbia, Feldman had obtained a waiver and passed the Maryland bar exam. Id.

58. Hickey attended unaccredited Potomac School of Law in Washington, D.C. after spending twenty years in the Navy. Id. at 470. While Hickey was a student, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals granted waivers of the bar exam rule to graduates of another unaccredited law school, leading him to believe that he too would receive a waiver. Id. Immediately before Hickey graduated, however, the Court of Appeals announced that it would no longer grant such waivers. Id.

59. Id. at 467-69, 471-72.
missed both cases, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review an order of the highest court of the District of Columbia.\footnote{60}{See id. at 470, 473.}

The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the district court with regard to the constitutional claims.\footnote{61}{Feldman v. Gardner, 661 F.2d 1295, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (reversing and remanding the district court’s dismissal of the constitutional claims). The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Feldman and Hickey’s antitrust claims. \textit{Id.} at 1308.}
The circuit court acknowledged that “[r]eview of a final judgment of the highest judicial tribunal of a state is vested solely in the Supreme Court of the United States.”\footnote{62}{\textit{Id.} at 1310. Interestingly, the circuit court did not cite the \textit{Rooker} decision in its opinion, and the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in \textit{Feldman} cites \textit{Rooker} only once as part of a string citation. \textit{See Feldman}, 460 U.S. at 476. The “\textit{Rooker-Feldman} doctrine” label did not surface until three years later in a Second Circuit decision. \textit{See Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co.}, 784 F.2d 1133, 1142 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). The Supreme Court’s reversal of this decision gave Justice Scalia an opportunity to label the pairing as the “so-called \textit{Rooker-Feldman} doctrine.” \textit{Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc.}, 481 U.S. 1, 18 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).}
However, it held that the federal district court did have jurisdiction because the prior proceedings in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were not judicial in nature.\footnote{63}{\textit{Id.} at 1310. After concluding that the district court had jurisdiction, the circuit court also concluded that res judicata did not preclude the suit. \textit{Id.} at 1319-20.}
The circuit court reasoned that Feldman and Hickey had merely petitioned for waiver of an admission requirement—“[t]hey did not seek review by the Court of Appeals of the decision of any other body or individual; they did not request the court to invalidate any rule; nor did they ask for anything as a matter of right.”\footnote{64}{\textit{Id.} at 1320.}

The Supreme Court vacated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over several of the federal claims.\footnote{65}{See \textit{Feldman}, 460 U.S. at 486-87. The Court also denied Feldman and Hickey’s cross-petitions for certiorari as to the antitrust claims. \textit{Id.} at 474 n.11.}
The Court initially stated that “the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings.”\footnote{66}{\textit{Id.} at 476. Although the District of Columbia is not a state, its court of appeals is considered the equivalent of the highest court of a state for purposes of the U.S. Supreme Court’s statutory jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(b) (2006) (“For the purposes of this section, the term ‘highest court of a State’ includes the District of Columbia Court of Appeals.”).}
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, “[r]eview of such determinations can be obtained only in this Court.”\footnote{67}{\textit{Feldman}, 460 U.S. at 476; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).}
Next, the Court concluded that the proceedings before the District of Columbia Court of Appeals were judicial in nature.\footnote{68}{\textit{See Feldman}, 460 U.S. at 479.}
Although court action on Feldman and Hickey’s initial petitions “did not assume the form commonly associated with judicial proceedings,”\footnote{69}{\textit{Id.} at 482.} it nonetheless “involved a ‘judicial
inquiry’ in which the [District of Columbia Court of Appeals] was called upon to investigate, declare, and enforce ‘liabilities as they [stood] on present or past facts and under laws supposed already to exist.’”

The Court attempted to define circumstances in which a litigant improperly seeks review of a state court judgment. It held that district courts “have subject-matter jurisdiction over general challenges to state bar rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial proceedings, which do not require review of a final state-court judgment in a particular case.” However, the Court held that district courts lack jurisdiction “over challenges to state-court decisions, in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.” In other words, federal constitutional claims requiring review of a final state court decision in a particular case are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment and may be appealed only to the U.S. Supreme Court.

Applying this test, the Supreme Court concluded that Feldman and Hickey’s due process and equal protection claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ decisions. The district court did not have jurisdiction over these claims because they were as-applied challenges arising from the denial of the waiver petitions. However, the Supreme Court held that district court jurisdiction was proper for Feldman and Hickey’s general challenges to the constitutionality of the bar admission rule, because those claims did not require review of a judicial decision in a particular case.

The Feldman decision clarified and expanded the rule from Rooker. First, the Supreme Court confirmed that the principle from Rooker—that federal district courts cannot hear appeals from state court judgments—is a jurisdictional bar. Second, this jurisdictional rule

70. Id. at 479 (first alteration added) (quoting Prentis v. Atl. Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908)).
71. See id. at 482-86.
72. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 486-87.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 487. However, the Court “expressly [did] not reach the question of whether the doctrine of res judicata forecloses litigation on these elements of the complaints.” Id. at 487-88.
78. See id. at 482 (“[T]o the extent that Hickey and Feldman sought review in the District Court of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals’ denial of their petitions for waiver, the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over their complaints.”); see also Rowley, supra note 11, at 324 (explaining that Feldman “upheld the idea that Rooker was a doctrine grounded in jurisdictional theories”).
prohibits district courts from reviewing state court judicial decisions, but it does not prevent review of state court administrative or legislative rulings. Third, Feldman prevents district courts from hearing not only blatant appeals of state court decisions (as in Rooker), but also claims that a party raises for the first time in federal district court that are inextricably intertwined with prior state court judgments. After Feldman, plaintiffs could no longer make an end run around Rooker merely by recasting an appeal as a “new” claim in federal district court.

C. Fleeting References and Widespread Confusion: Federal Courts Apply (and Misapply) the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

The expanded Rooker-Feldman rule caused mass confusion in the lower federal courts. For more than two decades, the Supreme Court provided little guidance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Two Supreme Court decisions were marginally helpful. In Johnson v. De Grandy, the Court narrowly characterized Rooker-Feldman and

79. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1182-83.

80. See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16; see also Rowley, supra note 11, at 325 (“By adding this additional inquiry, the Feldman court extended the Rooker doctrine from issues that were actually decided by the state court proceedings, to also include claims that were not litigated in the state court, and are inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state court.”).

81. See Thompson, supra note 10, at 875 (“[I]f plaintiffs who lose in state court recast their claims in federal court under the guise of federal constitutional claims that were not raised or actually decided by the state court, Rooker and Feldman will nonetheless preclude jurisdiction if the constitutional claims are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the merits of the state court judgment.”).

82. See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1183 (“Unfortunately, nothing in Feldman explains the rationale for the language [‘inextricably intertwined’] or gives any indication of its proper scope.”); Friedman & Gaylord, supra note 12, at 1136 (“Feldman muddied more waters than it cleared.”); Jones, supra note 7, at 651 (“After Feldman, district courts were left wondering how to apply its new standards—how to differentiate between general and particular challenges, and especially, how to identify when a claim is inextricably intertwined with a challenge to a state court judgment.”).

83. Between its 1983 decision in Feldman and its 2005 decision in Exxon Mobil, the Supreme Court briefly mentioned the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in only six cases. See Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 370 n.16 (1990); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 784 n.21 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting); ASARCO Inc. v. Kadi sh, 490 U.S. 605, 622-23 (1989); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1987); id. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 21 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 28 (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 31 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).

84. 512 U.S. 997 (1994). Johnson involved a challenge to a Florida state legislative reapportionment plan. See id. at 1000-01. Plaintiffs argued that the legislative districts violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 by unlawfully diluting the voting strength of Hispanics and blacks. Id. at 1001-02; see also Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006)). The Florida Supreme Court reviewed the plan, as required by the state constitution. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1001. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court. Id. at 1000-02. The U.S. Supreme Court held, in part, that the Florida Supreme Court decision did not preclude the plaintiffs’ federal suit. See id. at 1004-05.
seemed to suggest that only parties to the underlying state court proceeding could invoke the doctrine in federal court. The Court also implied that the doctrine bars suits only if the federal plaintiff lost in state court and complained of an injury caused by the state court judgment itself, rather than a prior injury caused by an adverse party. Similarly, a footnote in Verizon Maryland, Inc. v. Public Service Commission of Maryland downplayed the role of the doctrine, stating that it “merely recognizes that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is a grant of original jurisdiction, and does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, which Congress has reserved to this Court.” The Court did note, however, that “[t]he doctrine has no application to judicial review of executive action, including determinations made by a state administrative agency.” Although these decisions used dicta to hint at Rooker-Feldman’s proper scope, they gave little guidance on how lower courts should apply the doctrine.

Despite the lack of Supreme Court elaboration, there was an “explosive growth” of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in the lower federal

85. See Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1006 (“[T]he invocation of Rooker/Feldman is just as inapt here, for unlike Rooker or Feldman, the United States was not a party in the state court.” (emphasis added)).

86. See id. (“[A] party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.” (emphasis added)).

87. 535 U.S. 635 (2002). Verizon involved litigation under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which required existing local-exchange carriers to share their networks with competitors by entering into interconnection agreements and reciprocal compensation agreements with new market entrants. See id. at 638. The Act required carriers to submit these agreements to a state utility commission for approval. Id. at 639. A dispute arose as to whether Internet Service Provider traffic was “local traffic” subject to an existing reciprocal compensation agreement. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). WorldCom filed a complaint with the Public Service Commission of Maryland, which ruled against Verizon. Id. After unsuccessfully appealing the Commission’s order in state court, Verizon filed suit in federal district court, naming the Commission and WorldCom as defendants. Id. at 639-40. The Court held in part that the Telecommunications Act did not divest the federal district court of its jurisdiction to review the Commission’s determination. Id. at 641-42.

88. Id. at 644 n.3.

89. Id. The Court presumably was emphasizing a distinction made in the Feldman decision, which held that Rooker-Feldman only bars federal court review of decisions rendered in state court proceedings that are judicial in nature. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (“[T]he United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings.”).

90. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1440 (“[T]he Supreme Court, which has applied the doctrine only twice (in the Rooker and Feldman cases themselves), has done virtually nothing to give [lower federal courts] guidance.”); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Rooker-Feldman: Worth Only the Powder to Blow It Up?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1081, 1083 (1999) (noting “the lack of focused Supreme Court attention since the Feldman decision in 1983”).
Confusion was prevalent on many issues. Not surprisingly, courts disagreed on the meaning of the phrase "inextricably intertwined." Some circuits conflated Rooker-Feldman with preclusion doctrines (especially res judicata), while others insisted that Rooker-Feldman is a distinct and independent doctrine. Many courts concluded that Rooker-Feldman applies only to litigants who were parties to the prior state court proceedings, while other courts applied the doctrine to suits by nonparties. Although most circuits held that

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91. See McLain, supra note 19, at 1573.
92. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 1440 (“The lower courts, which have often found the Rooker-Feldman doctrine relevant and even dispositive, have not agreed on its proper scope or application.”); McLain, supra note 19, at 1573 (“[C]ourts are confused and consequently are misapplying the doctrine.”); Thompson, supra note 10, at 880 (“Lower court interpretations of Feldman have been mixed.”).
93. See Jones, supra note 7, at 643 (“Supreme Court opacity concerning what it means to be inextricably intertwined has resulted in significant incongruity in the lower federal courts . . . .” (citation omitted)).
94. See, e.g., Moccio v. N.Y. State Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 199-200 (2d Cir. 1996) (“ ‘[I]nextricably intertwined’ means, at a minimum, that where a federal plaintiff had an opportunity to litigate a claim in a state proceeding . . . , subsequent litigation of the claim will be barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if it would be barred under the principles of preclusion.”), abrogated by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005); Davis v. Bayless, 70 F.3d 367, 376 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[O]ur Circuit has not allowed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to bar an action in federal court when that same action would be allowed in the state court of the rendering state.” (citing Gauthier v. Cont'l Diving Serv. Inc., 831 F.2d 559, 561 (5th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995) (characterizing Rooker-Feldman as “a combination of the abstention and res judicata doctrines”); Robinson v. Aiyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468, 1472 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[W]e have read Rooker not as a jurisdictional barrier but as an application of res judicata.” (citing Williams v. Washington, 554 F.2d 369, 371 (9th Cir. 1977); Hutcherson v. Lehtin, 485 F.2d 567, 569 (9th Cir. 1973); Francisco Enters., Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481, 485 (9th Cir. 1973))), vacated on other grounds, 477 U.S. 902 (1986).
95. See, e.g., Centres, Inc. v. Town of Brookfield, 148 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 1998) (“Although the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and principles of preclusion may be easily confused with each other because they both define the respect one court owes to an earlier judgment, the two are not coextensive.” (citing GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)); Garry v. Geils, 92 F.3d 1362, 1365 (7th Cir. 1996) (“We have consistently emphasized the distinction between res judicata and Rooker-Feldman and insisted that the applicability of Rooker-Feldman be decided before considering res judicata.”); Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 n.1 (8th Cir. 1995) (“We note that Rooker-Feldman is broader than claim and issue preclusion because it does not depend on a final judgment on the merits.”).
96. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodrigues (Orozo), 226 F.3d 1103, 1109 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine should not be applied against non-parties.”); Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1224 (9th Cir. 1998) (“[S]ince the new plaintiffs were not parties to the state suit, their suit is not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”); Owens, 54 F.3d at 274 (“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to a suit in federal court brought by a party that was not a party in the preceding action in state court.” (citing Valentini v. Mitchell, 962 F.2d 288 (3d Cir. 1992))); Roe v. Alabama, 43 F.3d 574, 580 (11th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he plaintiffs in this case are not, by the admission of all parties, parties to the circuit court action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply to such circumstances.” (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994))).
97. See, e.g., Kennen Eng'g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 478 (10th Cir. 2002), overruling recognized by Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 n.10 (2006) (“Rooker-Feldman bars any suit that seeks to disrupt or ‘undo’ a prior state-court judgment, regardless of whether
Rooker-Feldman applies to lower state court judgments, they vigorously debated whether the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or whether it also protects interlocutory orders.

These divergent approaches demonstrate that two decades of near silence from the Supreme Court caused mass confusion regarding Rooker-Feldman. Scholars begged the Court to weigh in on the doctrine, with the hope that it would clarify the scope and proper application of the doctrine.

the state-court proceeding afforded the federal-court plaintiff a full and fair opportunity to litigate her claims. (citing Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 544 (10th Cir. 1991); Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 264 (10th Cir. 1986))); Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488, 495 (8th Cir. 2000) (“[L]ower federal courts are simply without authority to review most state court judgments—regardless of who might request them to do so.” (citing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at 1112-23)); Garry, 82 F.3d at 1367 n.8 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[U]nder res judicata we must determine whether the party against whom the defense is raised had a full and fair opportunity to pursue its claim in the previous state proceeding. . . . Rooker-Feldman does not contain analogous limitations.” (citation omitted)).

98. See, e.g., Gisslen v. City of Crystal, 345 F.3d 624, 628-29 (8th Cir. 2003) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine does not apply exclusively to decisions from a state’s highest appellate court of right, but also applies with equal force to decisions from a state trial court.”); Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 336 F.3d 458, 463 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e do not believe that lower federal courts should be prohibited from reviewing judgments of a state’s highest court but should somehow have free rein to review the judgments of lower state courts.”); Rolleston v. Eldridge, 848 F.2d 163, 165 (11th Cir. 1988) (using Rooker-Feldman to dismiss federal suit challenging state trial court judgment and noting that an “appeal in the state courts is the proper channel through which [plaintiff] was entitled to seek relief”); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions: Federal Courts’ Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 141-42 (1998) (“Although it could be argued that Rooker-Feldman only bars federal court action as to decisions that have been ruled upon by a state’s highest court, courts and commentators have generally applied Rooker-Feldman to decisions by lower state courts as well.” (citations omitted)).

99. E.g., compare Pieper, 336 F.3d at 462 (holding that Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from reviewing state court interlocutory orders), and Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000) (same), and Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996) (same), with Cruz v. Meleco, 204 F.3d 14, 21 n.5 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that interlocutory state court judgment lacking finality does not trigger Rooker-Feldman doctrine), and H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); see also Sternlight, supra note 98, at 142 (“[I]t is not entirely clear whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies only to final judgments, or also to interlocutory rulings.”).

100. See Susan Bandes, Judging, Politics, and Accountability: A Reply to Charles Geyh, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 947, 958 n.55 (2006) (“Since the [Supreme] Court had almost nothing to say about [Rooker-Feldman] from 1983 to 2005, the courts had ample room to improvise.”). Indeed, in a classic example of the strange “improvisation” by lower federal courts, at one point the Eighth Circuit mistakenly confused Rooker-Feldman with the Erie doctrine and refused to apply state law in a diversity case. See Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at 1088 n.17 (citing First Commercial Trust Co. v. Colt’s Mfg., 77 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1996)).

101. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 90, at 1084 (“[T]he proliferation of lower court case law with many different emphases and some highly questionable decisions suggests that the time may be nigh for the Supreme Court to take an opportunity to clarify the doctrine.” (citation omitted)).
D. Clarification of a Narrow Doctrine: The Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in Exxon Mobil and Lance

The Supreme Court finally stepped in to clarify the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in its 2005 decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.\(^{102}\) In July 2000, Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC) sued two ExxonMobil subsidiaries in Delaware state court, seeking declaratory relief in a royalties dispute.\(^{103}\) Two weeks later, ExxonMobil and its subsidiaries countersued SABIC in federal district court.\(^{104}\) In March 2003, a jury rendered a verdict in the state suit in favor of ExxonMobil’s subsidiaries.\(^{105}\) At the time of the state trial court judgment, the parallel federal suit was on appeal before the Third Circuit.\(^{106}\) The Third Circuit held that the suit was a “paradigm situation in which Rooker-Feldman precludes a federal district court from proceeding” because the federal and state claims were identical.\(^{107}\) The Third Circuit also concluded that it was irrelevant that the federal suit had been filed before entry of the state court judgment.\(^{108}\)

The Supreme Court reversed.\(^{109}\) The Court made several observations in an attempt to clear up confusion in the lower federal courts.\(^{110}\) It initially stated that Rooker-Feldman is a narrow doctrine, “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the dis-


\(^{103}\) Id. at 289. Two ExxonMobil subsidiaries had formed joint ventures in 1980 with SABIC to produce polyethylene in Saudi Arabia. Id. (citing Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. ExxonMobil Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384 (D.N.J. 2002)). The dispute focused on SABIC’s royalties for sublicenses for a polyethylene manufacturing method. Id. (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 364 F.3d 102, 103 (3d Cir. 2004)).

\(^{104}\) Id.

\(^{105}\) See Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Mobil Yanbu Petrochemical Co., 866 A.2d 1, 10-11 (Del. 2005). In January 2005, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the jury’s verdict. Id. at 40.

\(^{106}\) Exxon Mobil, 364 F.3d at 102-03 (Third Circuit decision submitted on March 24, 2004); Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 194 F. Supp. 2d at 378 (district court judgment rendered on April 3, 2002); Mobil Yanbu, 866 A.2d at 11 (state trial court jury verdict returned on March 21, 2003).

\(^{107}\) Exxon Mobil, 364 F.3d at 104 (quoting E.B. v. Verniero, 119 F.3d 1077, 1090-91 (3d Cir. 1997)).

\(^{108}\) See id. at 104-05. The Third Circuit stated that “[t]he only timing relevant is whether the state judgment precedes a federal judgment on the same claims.” Id. at 105. The court expressed its concern about the policy effects of a ruling to the contrary—if it held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply to federal actions filed prior to the state court’s final judgment, it “would be encouraging parties to maintain federal actions as ‘insurance policies’ while their state court claims were pending.” Id.

\(^{109}\) Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 294.

\(^{110}\) See id. at 291 (“We granted certiorari to resolve conflict among the Courts of Appeals over the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.” (citation omitted)); Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 3 (“Sweeping extensions and conflicting interpretations of Rooker-Feldman finally led to a clarifying Supreme Court decision last year in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp.”).
District court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. The doctrine does not bar jurisdiction if the federal plaintiff presents “some independent claim.” The Court also stated that the Rooker-Feldman analysis is separate from preclusion and abstention doctrines. Finally—and most relevant to the facts of Exxon Mobil—“[w]hen there is parallel state and federal litigation, Rooker-Feldman is not triggered simply by the entry of judgment in state court.” Parallel state and federal suits are governed by preclusion law, not Rooker-Feldman. Applying these principles, the Court noted that ExxonMobil filed suit in federal district court “well before any judgment in state court.” Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine “did not emerge to vanquish jurisdiction after ExxonMobil prevailed in the Delaware courts.”

The following year, in Lance v. Dennis, the Supreme Court once again emphasized the narrow scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. In May 2003, Colorado’s attorney general filed suit in state court challenging the General Assembly’s congressional redistricting plan. After the General Assembly intervened as a defendant, the Colorado Supreme Court struck down the plan on state constitutional grounds. Several Colorado citizens who were unhappy with the state court judgment then filed suit in federal district court. The district court held that Rooker-Feldman barred the plaintiffs’ federal suit. The Court’s rationale recognizes that a more expansive reading of the scope of Rooker-Feldman would infringe on the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal courts. See id. (“[N]either Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related question while the case remains sub judice in a federal court.”).

111. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. at 284.
112. Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th Cir. 1993)). An independent federal claim will foreclose application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine even if it “denies a legal conclusion that a state court has reached.” Id. (quoting GASH Assocs., 995 F.2d at 728).
113. See id. at 284.
114. Id. at 292. The Court’s rationale recognizes that a more expansive reading of the scope of Rooker-Feldman would infringe on the concurrent jurisdiction of the federal courts. See id. (“[N]either Rooker nor Feldman supports the notion that properly invoked concurrent jurisdiction vanishes if a state court reaches judgment on the same or related question while the case remains sub judice in a federal court.”).
115. See id. at 293.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 294. The Supreme Court also rejected the policy rationale behind the Third Circuit’s decision. See id. at 294 n.9 (“The Court of Appeals criticized ExxonMobil for pursuing its federal suit as an ‘insurance policy’ against an adverse result in state court. There is nothing necessarily inappropriate, however, about filing a protective action.” (citations omitted)).
120. See id. at 1243. The Colorado Supreme Court struck down the General Assembly’s redistricting plan after concluding that Article V, Section 44, of the Colorado Constitution limited redistricting to once every ten years. Id. at 1242-43.
121. Lance, 546 U.S. at 461. The federal plaintiffs alleged that the Colorado Supreme Court’s interpretation of Article V, Section 44 of the Colorado Constitution violated the Elections Clause of Article I, Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. Id.
Applying Tenth Circuit precedent, the district court stated that *Rooker-Feldman* can bar suit when the federal plaintiff was a party in the state court proceedings or stands in privity with the state court loser. Although the federal plaintiffs had not been parties to the state court suit, the court held that they stood in privity with the General Assembly because redistricting is a “matter of public concern.”

The Supreme Court disagreed, vacating the district court’s judgment. As in *Exxon Mobil*, the Court initially emphasized the narrowness of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. It then emphasized that *Rooker-Feldman* is independent from preclusion law. Rejecting the Tenth Circuit’s privity analysis, the Court stated that “[t]he *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine does not bar actions by nonparties to the earlier state-court judgment simply because, for purposes of preclusion law, they could be considered in privity with a party to the judgment.” The doctrine did not apply in *Lance* because “plaintiffs were plainly not parties to the underlying state-court proceeding.”

Thus, *Exxon Mobil* and *Lance* clarified several aspects of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. First, the *Rooker-Feldman* analysis is completely separate from preclusion law and the abstention doctrines. In particular, the Supreme Court emphasized in *Lance* that “*Rooker-Feldman* is not simply preclusion by another name.” Second, the doctrine applies only if the federal suit is filed after the state court renders its judgment. In other words, *Rooker-Feldman* does not bar federal suits that a party files while state court proceedings

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123. See id. (“[T]he Tenth Circuit has permitted the [*Rooker-Feldman*] doctrine to be used against parties who were in privity with parties to the original state-court suit.” (citing Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 481 (10th Cir. 2002), partial overruling recognized by Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1256 n.10 (10th Cir. 2006)).
124. See id. at 1125.
127. Id. at 466.
128. Id. (footnote omitted).
129. Id. at 465.
130. See id. at 466; *Exxon Mobil*, 544 U.S. at 284; see also Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 17 (noting that federal courts should avoid “general resort to preclusion law even as an aid in determining applicability of *Rooker-Feldman*”).
131. See Lance, 546 U.S. at 466.
132. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284; see id. at 293.
are still ongoing. Finally, *Rooker-Feldman* is inapplicable when the federal plaintiff was not a party to the state suit. After *Lance*, privy is not enough in most cases.

E. The Supreme Court Has Not Addressed Whether Rooker-Feldman Protects State Court Interlocutory Orders

Even though *Exxon Mobil* and *Lance* clarified the scope of *Rooker-Feldman*, the Supreme Court did not specify which state court “judgments” trigger the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. In particular, the Court did not address whether the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or also protects state court interlocutory orders. There is no doubt that *Rooker-Feldman* bars a federal district court from exercising appellate jurisdiction over a final state court judgment on the merits. But does *Rooker-Feldman* also prevent federal district courts from reviewing stays, preliminary injunctions, rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders, and other interlocutory decisions rendered by state courts?

There is no easy answer. None of the Supreme Court’s *Rooker-Feldman* decisions involve an attempt by a federal district court to review a state court interlocutory order. One can interpret isolated dicta from the Court’s opinions either way. The *Feldman* decision re-

133. See id. at 293-94.


135. Id. at 466. The Supreme Court qualified its holding in *Lance*, stating that “we need not address whether there are any circumstances, however limited, in which *Rooker-Feldman* may be applied against a party not named in an earlier state proceeding,” and it gave the example of an estate taking a de facto appeal in district court from an earlier state court decision involving a decedent. Id. at 466 n.2.

136. See *Rowe & Baskauskas*, supra note 27, at 21-23; *Sherry, Logic Without Experience*, supra note 25, at 144.

137. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, it is also worth noting that after *Exxon Mobil* and *Lance*, the role of the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry is uncertain as well. See *Rowe & Baskauskas*, supra note 27, at 3-4. Although *Exxon Mobil* mentioned the language “inextricably intertwined” while giving background on the *Feldman* decision, see 544 U.S. at 286 & n.1, it played no role in the Court’s holding. Id. at 293-94. *Lance* mentioned the phrase “inextricably intertwined” only while describing the flawed rationale of the district court in that case. 546 U.S. at 462-63. Scholars disagree on whether the “inextricably intertwined” inquiry remains a meaningful part of the *Rooker-Feldman* analysis. Compare *Sherry, Logic Without Experience*, supra note 25, at 121 (“The Court [in *Exxon Mobil*] appeared to abandon the ‘inextricably intertwined’ part of the doctrine.”), with *Rowe & Baskauskas*, supra note 27, at 11-12 (suggesting that the “inextricably intertwined” concept occupies a secondary role in the *Rooker-Feldman* analysis, but noting that “we do not think it appropriate to conclude that the phrase can be entirely discarded”).

138. The *Rooker* decision itself confirms this. In *Rooker*, the federal suit challenged a final state court judgment on the merits—the Indiana Supreme Court had previously affirmed the state trial court’s judgment that the trustee had a right to sell the Rookers’ property and distribute the proceeds. See *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413, 414-15 (1923) (holding federal district court had no jurisdiction to review Indiana Supreme Court’s judgment); *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 131 N.E. 769, 773, 776 (Ind. 1921) (affirming trial court’s decision on the merits).
fers to the doctrine as a bar against federal district court review of "final" state court decisions. However, other language casts Rooker-Feldman as a more expansive prohibition against lower federal court review of state court "judgments." Contradictory language in Exxon Mobil exacerbates this problem. In the first part of its opinion, the Court holds that Rooker-Feldman bars federal suits filed "by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Under this language, the doctrine conceivably protects interlocutory orders that a state court enters before the commencement of a similar federal action. However, Exxon Mobil later states that the Rooker and Feldman cases exhibit the limited circumstances in which the doctrine bars jurisdiction—"[i]n both cases, the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended." This language suggests that Rooker-Feldman may protect only final state court judgments.

Given the lack of clarity in the Supreme Court's language, it would be a mistake to overread Exxon Mobil as restricting Rooker-Feldman to final state court decisions. The Court did not define when state court proceedings have "ended" for purposes of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and the distinction between final and interlocutory state court orders was not at issue in the case. Indeed, the decision itself notes that ExxonMobil filed suit in federal district court "well before any judgment in state court." Exxon Mobil simply

139. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) ("The District of Columbia Circuit properly acknowledged that the United States District Court is without authority to review final determinations of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in judicial proceedings." (emphasis added)).

140. See, e.g., Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 644 n.3 (2002) (noting that Rooker-Feldman "does not authorize district courts to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments" (emphasis added)); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (noting that under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court" (emphasis added)); Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415 ("If the [state court] decision was wrong, that did not make the judgment void, but merely left it open to reversal or modification in an appropriate and timely appellate proceeding." (emphasis added)).

141. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284 (emphasis added).

142. See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (noting that "[a] state-court ‘judgment’ might be construed to include the likes of a grant of a preliminary injunction, which could be viewed as a non-final judgment").

143. Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added).

144. Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22.

145. Id. at 22-23.

146. See Sherry, Logic Without Experience, supra note 25, at 144.

147. Instead, the Court analyzed a fact pattern in which a state trial court judgment was issued after the commencement of a suit in federal district court. See Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 289.

148. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
holds that *Rooker-Feldman* does not apply when a litigant files suit in federal court *before* the state court enters a judgment. It does not address whether the doctrine bars federal suits filed *after* entry of state court interlocutory orders.

In sum, the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine generally holds that federal district courts have no appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments. The Supreme Court’s decisions in *Exxon Mobil* and *Lance* provide clarification to some questions relating to the scope of the doctrine. However, these decisions fail to indicate which state court “judgments” trigger *Rooker-Feldman*, and the Court has not addressed whether the doctrine applies only to final state court judgments or also protects state court interlocutory orders. We must turn elsewhere for an answer.

III. PURPOSE OF THE *ROOKER-FELDMAN* DOCTRINE

Given the lack of clarity in existing case law, the best way to discern whether *Rooker-Feldman* protects state court interlocutory orders is to reason from the principles underlying the doctrine itself. There are three fundamental principles behind *Rooker-Feldman*. First, the doctrine enforces constitutional separation of powers and the limited jurisdiction of federal courts. Second, *Rooker-Feldman* advances interests of federalism by protecting state court judgments. Third, the doctrine recognizes that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims.


Courts have recognized that “the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is rooted in the principle of separation of powers.” Congress has ex-

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149. *Id.*
150. Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 27, at 22 (“Arguing from [Exxon Mobil’s] fine linguistic differences, . . . does not seem . . . to be a fruitful exercise. It makes sense instead to start from a foundational principle undergirding *Rooker-Feldman*: the only federal court to which Congress has given any statutory authority to review state-court judgments is the Supreme Court.” (footnotes omitted)).
151. This analysis is not meant to be exhaustive. Commentators have cited other worthy purposes behind *Rooker-Feldman*. *See*, e.g., Chang, supra note 54, at 1350 (noting that *Rooker-Feldman* protects “finality in the judicial system”); George L. Proctor et al., *Rooker-Feldman and the Jurisdictional Quandary*, 2 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 113, 114 (2000) (recognizing that the doctrine “protect[s] the integrity of state court judgments”); Sherry, *Judicial Federalism*, supra note 49, at 1117 (arguing that the doctrine is a “forum-shifting device”). By examining the primary purposes behind the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, this Article aims to contribute significantly to existing literature on the subject.
152. *See infra* Part III.A.
153. *See infra* Part III.B.
154. *See infra* Part III.C.
clusive authority to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, and those courts cannot hear a case unless Congress has affirmatively granted jurisdiction by statute. This principle has been the driving force behind Rooker-Feldman since the Rooker decision itself. The doctrine ensures that federal courts stay within the boundaries of their limited statutory jurisdiction.

It is important to stress the statutory nature of Rooker-Feldman. Congressional legislation granting federal district courts appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments almost certainly would be within the constitutional limitations of Article III. When Alexander Hamilton discussed the constitutional limitations of federal judicial power in The Federalist, he perceived “no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the state courts to the subordinate national tribunals.” The Fifth and Tenth Circuits cite this language as evidence that Rooker-Feldman is a statutory limitation, rather than a constitutional requirement. In other words, Congress could pass a statute granting lower federal courts appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments, which would abolish the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

But Congress has not done so. Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 created lower federal courts and defined their jurisdiction, “they were not given any power to review directly cases from state courts, and they have not been given such powers since that time.” The language of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 is clear: only the U.S. Supreme Court may review state court judgments. The grant of jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C.

158. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) ("Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for errors of that character . . . . The jurisdiction possessed by the District Courts is strictly original." (emphasis added) (citation omitted)); Rebecca Schmucker, Possible Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to State Agency Decisions: The Seventh Circuit's Opinion in Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 333, 333 (1997) ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an extension of the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . .").
159. See Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 ("The federal district courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction which Congress determines is appropriate. Congress has yet to give the lower federal courts jurisdiction to review state court judgments." (citation omitted)); Rebecca Schmucker, Possible Application of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine to State Agency Decisions: The Seventh Circuit’s Opinion in Van Harken v. City of Chicago, 17 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 333, 333 (1997) ("The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an extension of the principle that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction . . . .").
161. See Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006); In re Meyerland Co., 910 F.2d 1257, 1261 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990).
163. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) ("Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of certiorari . . . .") (emphasis added); see also Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335.
§ 1331 is equally clear: federal district courts can only exercise “original jurisdiction,” not appellate jurisdiction. ¹⁶⁴

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine keeps lower federal courts from straying outside these statutory boundaries. Because the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to expand federal court jurisdiction, it would be wholly inappropriate for courts to do so on their own initiative. ¹⁶⁵ As Professor Williamson Chang argues, “[s]uch a delicate issue of fundamental federal-state relations must be left to a representative forum, such as Congress, where the justifications for state judicial sovereignty can be fully represented.”¹⁶⁶ Entrusting Congress with decisions regarding federal court jurisdiction is not only a good idea—it is constitutionally mandated.¹⁶⁷ Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine enforces separation of powers and recognizes that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.

B. Rooker-Feldman Preserves Federalism by Preventing Lower Federal Courts from Reviewing State Court Judgments

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is also based on principles of federalism.¹⁶⁸ Loosely defined, “federalism” is a system which divides sovereignty between two or more political units, each of which governs

¹⁶⁴ 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” (emphasis added)); see also Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Congress has empowered the federal district courts to exercise only original jurisdiction.” (quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000))); McLain, supra note 19, at 1572 n.111 (“If a district court lacks appellate jurisdiction under § 1331 . . . , then clearly it cannot hear ‘appeals’ from lower state courts.”). But see Beer- mann, supra note 10, at 1229 (arguing that Rooker-Feldman misinterprets § 1331, which is “permissive, not restrictive” and that “[s]ection 1331’s use of the word ‘original’ should be understood merely to direct plaintiffs to the proper court to file their cases”).

¹⁶⁵ See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189 (“Congress has the responsibility for determining the precise contours of federal jurisdiction and Rooker-Feldman is premised on the notion that Congress has defined those contours, through 28 U.S.C. § 1257 and § 1331, to preclude lower federal courts from hearing appeals from state court decisions.” (footnote omitted)); Chang, supra note 54, at 1376 (“Just as the lower federal courts may not on their own enlarge their jurisdiction, the Supreme Court may not, without congressional permission, share its exclusive jurisdiction with the lower courts.” (citation omitted)).

¹⁶⁶ 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006) (“The Supreme Court of the United States shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all cases, at law or in equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States; . . . .” (emphasis added)).

¹⁶⁷ See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 7-9 (describing the “Madisonian Compromise,” in which the Constitutional Convention agreed that Congress would have the power to create lower federal courts).

the same populace. As Justice Anthony Kennedy notes, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution “split the atom of sovereignty” by creating a system in which “our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other.” In other words, the basis for the concept of federalism is the coexistence of two sovereign entities and the competing concerns of state and federal power.

The derivative concept of judicial federalism recognizes the independence and sovereignty of the state and federal court systems. State and federal courts are separate legal systems that proceed independently of each other, with ultimate review in the U.S. Supreme Court. As one federal circuit court bluntly stated, “[j]udicial errors committed in state courts are for correction in the state court systems, at the head of which stands the United States Supreme Court; such errors are no business of ours.” State courts have a long tradition of jealously guarding their independence.

Assertion of jurisdiction and entry of judgment by a court are exercises of sovereign power, and tension arises when lower federal courts intrude upon the sovereignty and independence of state courts. This tension is inevitable to some extent because state and federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over many claims.

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169. See, e.g., William H. Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance 11 (1964) (“A constitution is federal if (1) two levels of government rule the same land and people, (2) each level has at least one area of action in which it is autonomous, and (3) there is some guarantee (even though merely a statement in the constitution) of the autonomy of each government in its own sphere.”).


171. See, e.g., Sherry, Judicial Federalism, supra note 49, at 1085 (“Judicial federalism is the aggregation of issues arising from the existence of two sets of American courts, state and federal.”).


174. Professor Chang makes this observation:

Today, when refiling a claim in federal court may be almost an automatic response to an unsatisfactory state court result, it is easy to forget how reluctantly the states acquiesced to any federal review of state court judgments. The power of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions, first challenged in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, has been attacked repeatedly.

Chang, supra note 54, at 1345 (footnotes omitted).

175. Id. at 1375 (“The effect of allowing the lower federal courts to act as the appellate courts of the state not only contravenes the statutory grants of jurisdiction to the federal courts but undermines state judicial sovereignty.”).

176. For example, federal courts can entertain state-law claims when the parties are citizens of different states. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006) (allowing federal district courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction); see also James William Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present, and Future, 43 Tex. L. Rev. 1, 15 (1964) (“The traditional view is that diversity jurisdiction was established to provide a forum for the determination of controversies between citizens of different states which would be free from lo-
However, our dual judicial system would cease to function “if state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case.”\textsuperscript{177} Congress was well aware of this inherent tension, and it passed jurisdictional statutes establishing “lines of demarcation between the two systems.”\textsuperscript{178}

Rooker-Feldman enforces one of these lines of demarcation. The doctrine preserves the delicate balance of judicial federalism by preventing lower federal courts from reviewing state court judgments.\textsuperscript{179} Rooker-Feldman “ensures that the federal and state systems remain sovereign, with the Supreme Court the sole federal court with the power to rule on federal questions raised in either forum.”\textsuperscript{180} Thus, at its core the doctrine is “an obligatory, statutorily-based expression of federalism”\textsuperscript{181} that recognizes the “competing concerns of state judicial sovereignty and federal power.”\textsuperscript{182}

C. Rooker-Feldman Recognizes that State Courts Are Fully Competent to Adjudicate Federal Claims

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine also acknowledges that state courts are just as capable of deciding federal claims as federal courts.\textsuperscript{183} Scholars often describe this concept as “parity” between state and federal courts.\textsuperscript{184} Several Supreme Court cases—including Feldman itself—emphasize that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate
federal constitutional issues. In Stone v. Powell, the Court noted that “[s]tate courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safeguard personal liberties and to uphold federal law.” Endorsing the concept of parity, the Court said it was “unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States.”

Proponents of expansive federal court jurisdiction contest this assumption and argue that state courts underenforce federal rights. Professor Burt Neuborne advances three reasons why federal courts generally are more sympathetic to federal claims. First, the federal judiciary supposedly attracts judges with greater technical competence because the position is better paid and more prestigious. Second, “[a]s heirs of a tradition of constitutional enforcement, federal judges feel subtle, yet nonetheless real pressures to uphold that tradition.” Third, the life tenure of federal judges insulates them from “majoritarian pressures,” allowing them “to enforce the Constitution without fear of reprisal.”

Advocates of parity respond with two arguments. First, the structure of Article III suggests that parity is an indispensable concept in our federal system, if not constitutionally mandated. The Constitution gave Congress complete discretion to establish (or not establish) lower federal courts. From this premise, scholars have argued that

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187. Id. at 494 n.35 (citing Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-44 (1816)).
188. Id.
189. Chemerinsky, supra note 184, at 233-34 (citations omitted).
191. See Neuborne, supra note 190, at 1121-22.
192. Id. at 1124.
193. Id. at 1127 (citation omitted).
195. U.S. Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850) (“Congress may withhold from any court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.”); see also FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 160, at 401 (concluding “that the
"[s]ince Congress need not create any lower federal courts at all, Article III must be indifferent whether adjudication occurs in state or federal court." Thus, the Constitution seems to assume that parity exists between state and federal courts on matters of federal law. Second, several empirical studies suggest that there is no meaningful difference between state and federal courts when it comes to the adjudication of federal claims.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine relies heavily on the concept of parity. By prohibiting lower federal court interference with state court judgments, the doctrine assumes that state courts will fully and fairly adjudicate federal claims. Proponents of Rooker-Feldman argue that state appellate courts "have a record equal to that of the federal courts in protecting constitutional rights." Ultimately, when errors are made in either the state or federal court systems, discretionary review by the U.S. Supreme Court is available, even if it is rare in either case.

In sum, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine advances the important interests of separation of powers, federalism, and parity, and courts analyzing unanswered questions about the doctrine’s scope should reason from these underlying principles. Unfortunately, federal courts have not always made this inquiry. As Professor Susan Bandes notes, "Courts have too often used the jurisdictional stature of the doctrine as a convenient way to avoid reasoning through the policies underlying it." As we shall see, nowhere is this more apparent than the current split among federal circuit courts as to whether Rooker-Feldman protects state court interlocutory orders.

organs of the national judiciary should be one supreme court and as many subordinate courts as congress should think proper to appoint").


197. See FEDERALIST No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 160, at 402 ([T]he inference seems to be conclusive that the state courts would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the laws of the union, where it was not expressly prohibited.). Indeed, the presumption that state courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims is further supported by the fact that Congress did not grant statutory federal question jurisdiction to the lower federal courts until 1875. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 19, at 828-29.


199. See Schmucker, supra note 159, at 336; Smith, supra note 168, at 636.

200. Chang, supra note 54, at 1366 (footnote omitted).


IV. CIRCUITS ARE SPLIT ON WHETHER ROOKER-FELDMAN PROTECTS INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS

The circuits are split on whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars suits in lower federal courts that challenge state court interlocutory orders. The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use a narrow approach, applying Rooker-Feldman only to final state court judgments. The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits use a broad approach, extending Rooker-Feldman to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. The First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits use an intermediate approach, applying Rooker-Feldman to some—but not all—state court interlocutory orders.

A. The Narrow Approach: Rooker-Feldman Does Not Extend to State Court Interlocutory Orders

The Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have held that Rooker-Feldman protects only final state court judgments. Courts in other circuits occasionally have applied this narrow rule as well. See, e.g., H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 203 F.3d 610, 612-13 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting that abstention principles rather than Rooker-Feldman apply when there are ongoing state proceedings and no final state court judgment (citation omitted)). In these
circuits, the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine does not prevent federal district courts from exercising de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory orders, nor does it protect state court judgments that are either subject to modification or appealable in state court. The Eleventh Circuit even requires a final state court judgment on the merits before it will consider *Rooker-Feldman*.

Two rationales support this narrow approach. First, some argue that *Rooker-Feldman* should protect only those final state court judgments that are reviewable by the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. Because the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine itself arose from judicial interpretation of § 1257, "denying jurisdiction based on a state court judgment that is not eligible for review by the United States Supreme Court simply would not follow from the jurisdictional statute that invigorated the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine in the first place." Thus, "the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is only necessary to effectuate the negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257—it is needed only to prevent lower federal courts from considering cases that the

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211. See, e.g., *TruServ*, 419 F.3d at 591 (stating that because *Rooker-Feldman* only applies after the state proceedings ended, "an interlocutory ruling does not evoke the doctrine or preclude federal jurisdiction"); *Main St. Bank & Trust v. Saltonstall*, No. 06-1114, 2006 WL 2385274, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Aug. 17, 2006) ("[A]n interlocutory state court order does not evoke the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine because the state court proceedings are still pending.") (citing *TruServ*, 419 F.3d at 591).

212. *In re Hodges*, 350 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006) (stating that although state court had entered a judgment of foreclosure prior to the federal suit, *Rooker-Feldman* did not preclude federal jurisdiction because the foreclosure judgment was modifiable by the trial court until the sale was confirmed).

213. See, e.g., *Rowley v. Wilson*, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006) (“The state case was on appeal to the Louisiana appellate court. Accordingly, the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is inapplicable.”); *In re Meyerland Co.*, 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that *Rooker-Feldman* did not apply because “[t]wo higher courts within the state judiciary could hear appeals” of the state court judgment).

214. The Eleventh Circuit applies *Rooker-Feldman* only if four conditions are met, including the requirement that "the prior state court ruling was a final or conclusive judgment on the merits." *Amos*, 347 F.3d at 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003). Eleventh Circuit decisions after *Exxon Mobil* continue to use the *Amos* test. See, e.g., *Burt Dev. Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs*, 230 F. App’x 910, 912-13 (11th Cir. 2007); *Morris v. Wroble*, 206 F. App’x 915, 918 & n.3 (11th Cir. 2006); *Force v. Kolhage*, 198 F. App’x 827, 829 (11th Cir. 2006); *Herskovitz v. Reid*, 187 F. App’x 911, 913 (11th Cir. 2006); *Ransom v. Georgia*, 181 F. App’x 776, 777 (11th Cir. 2006).

215. See, e.g., *In re Meyerland Co.*, 960 F.2d at 516.


The Supreme Court is permitted to hear under the statute."²¹⁸ The Fifth Circuit relies on this reasoning.²¹⁹

Second, courts cite language from *Exxon Mobil* for the proposition that *Rooker-Feldman* is limited to federal suits that are filed "after the state proceedings ended"²²⁰—in other words, federal suits challenging final state court judgments.²²¹ As noted above, the Supreme Court stated in *Exxon Mobil* that the *Rooker* and *Feldman* cases demonstrate the rare circumstances in which the doctrine bars jurisdiction.²²² The Court noted that "[i]n both cases, the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended."²²³ Although this language from *Exxon Mobil* is pure dictum,²²⁴ the Fifth and Seventh Circuits nonetheless give it binding effect and refuse to apply *Rooker-Feldman* unless state proceedings have ground to a complete halt.²²⁵


²¹⁹ See *In re Meyerland Co.*, 960 F.2d at 516 (implying that the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is inapplicable unless there is a “final state court judgment[ ]” under § 1257 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The First Circuit also initially tied the scope of *Rooker-Feldman* to appealability under § 1257. See *Cruz*, 204 F.3d at 21 n.5; *Hill v. Town of Conway*, 193 F.3d 33, 40-41 (1st Cir. 1999). However, the First Circuit changed course after *Exxon Mobil* and stated that appealability under § 1257 was no longer necessary to trigger *Rooker-Feldman*. See *Federación*, 410 F.3d at 26-27.


²²¹ See, e.g., *Rowley v. Wilson*, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006); *TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc.*, 419 F.3d at 591 (7th Cir. 2005).

²²² See *Exxon Mobil*, 544 U.S. at 291.

²²³ Id. (emphasis added).

²²⁴ As noted earlier in this Article, there were absolutely no state court interlocutory orders at issue in *Exxon Mobil*. See *Rowe & Baskauskas*, supra note 27, at 22 ("Arguing from these kinds of fine linguistic differences, in an opinion in which the Court was not focusing on the final-versus-interlocutory distinction, does not seem to us to be a fruitful exercise."). Indeed, when the Court did hold that *Rooker-Feldman* was inapplicable, it merely noted that ExxonMobil had filed its federal suit "well before any judgment in state court." *Exxon Mobil*, 544 U.S. at 293 (emphasis added).

²²⁵ See, e.g., *Rowley*, 200 F. App’x at 275 ("*Exxon Mobil* tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine: when the state proceedings [have] ended." (quoting *Exxon Mobil*, 544 U.S. at 291) (alteration in original)); *TruServ*, 419 F.3d at 591 ("The doctrine only applies to cases like *Rooker* and *Feldman* where the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended . . . ." (quoting *Exxon Mobil*, 544 U.S. at 291)).
B. The Broad Approach: Rooker-Feldman Protects State Court Interlocutory Orders

The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and District of Columbia Circuits extend the protection of Rooker-Feldman to interlocutory orders and decisions by lower state courts. Courts within these circuits have applied this broad approach even after the Supreme Court’s decision in Exxon Mobil. As a result, Rooker-Feldman has been used to prevent federal collateral attacks on a variety of state court interlocutory orders, including stays, preliminary injunctions, rulings on pretrial motions, and discovery orders.

Several arguments support this broad approach. First, some courts reject the premise that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.

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226. See Doctor’s Assoc’s, Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 138 (2d Cir. 1997); Campbell v. Greisberger, 80 F.3d 703, 707 (2d Cir. 1996); Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1995); Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1986), rev’d on other grounds 481 U.S. 1 (1987).


230. Before Exxon Mobil, the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits also held that Rooker-Feldman protected state court interlocutory orders and lower state court decisions. See Schmitt v. Schmitt, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003); Kenmen Eng’g v. City of Union, 314 F.3d 468, 474-75 (10th Cir. 2002), abrogation recognized by Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2006); Doe & Assocs. Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001); Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990). These circuits abandoned the broad approach after Exxon Mobil. See supra Part IV.A and infra Part IV.C.


232. E.g., Pieper, 336 F.3d at 459, 464-65 (order staying litigation pending arbitration); Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 319-20 (denial of motion to stay judicial proceedings).

233. E.g., Kenmen, 314 F.3d at 473-75 (grant of temporary and permanent injunctions).

234. E.g., Gentner v. Shulman, 55 F.3d 87, 89 (2d Cir. 1995) (sua sponte order disqualifying attorneys from representing clients due to ethical constraints).

235. E.g., Gilbert v. Ferry, 401 F.3d 411, 418 (6th Cir. 2005) (denial of motion for reconsider); Stillwell, 336 F.3d at 319-20 (denial of motion to compel arbitration); Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 202 (4th Cir. 2000) (denial of motion to compel arbitration).

236. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 297 (8th Cir. 1990) (grant of motion to compel production of documents during discovery).
only when Supreme Court review is available under § 1257. For example, the Sixth Circuit reasons that "the statement that lower federal courts should not have jurisdiction where the Supreme Court has jurisdiction (the Rooker-Feldman doctrine) does not logically imply that lower federal courts should always have jurisdiction when the Supreme Court does not." If anything, "a natural reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 suggests that no federal court (neither inferior nor Supreme) has jurisdiction over appeals from non-final state-court orders or from orders and decisions of lower state courts.

Second, courts applying a broad rule note that Rooker-Feldman’s purpose is intertwined with principles of federalism, parity, and judicial economy. Under this rationale, the doctrine recognizes that "state courts are just as obligated and competent as federal courts to decide federal constitutional questions." Additionally, courts reason that "a path is available through the state appellate system to the Supreme Court" under the existing federal structure. Finally, these courts emphasize that the doctrine avoids "waste of judicial resources and unnecessary friction between state and federal courts [that] might ensue if a federal district court intervened to overrule a state court decision."

C. The Intermediate Approach: Rooker-Feldman Protects Some (but Not All) State Court Interlocutory Orders

The First, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits follow an intermediate approach, extending Rooker-Feldman to some—but not
all—state court interlocutory orders. This approach has its origins in _Federación de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico_,250 a First Circuit case decided less than two months after the Supreme Court’s decision in _Exxon Mobil_.251

_Federación_ involved a suit in federal district court challenging an interlocutory judgment by the Puerto Rico appellate courts.252 A labor union had filed an unfair labor practices grievance before the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board against an employer.253 The employer moved to dismiss, contending that the Board lacked jurisdiction because the National Labor Relations Act preempted Puerto Rico labor law.254 After the Board denied the motion, the employer unsuccessfully appealed the interlocutory order in the Puerto Rico courts.255 Undeterred, the employer filed suit in federal district court, seeking “an injunction ordering the Board to terminate its proceedings for lack of jurisdiction.”256 The district court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the _Rooker-Feldman_ doctrine.257 Although the employer argued that _Rooker-Feldman_ does not apply to interlocutory orders,258 the First Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment.259

In its analysis, the First Circuit started from the premise that “_Exxon Mobil_ tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the _Rooker-Feldman_ doctrine: when ‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’”*260 Elaborating on the meaning of this dictum from _Exxon Mobil_, the court held that state proceedings have “ended”


250. 410 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 2005).


252. _Federación, 410 F.3d at 19-20._

253. _Id. at 19._

254. _Id._

255. _Id. at 19-20._

256. _Id. at 20._

257. _Federación de Maestros de P.R., Inc. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 265 F. Supp. 2d 186, 188-89 (D.P.R. 2003)._ 

258. _Federación, 410 F.3d at 20._

259. _Id. at 29._

260. _Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005)).
under *Rooker-Feldman* in three situations. First, state proceedings have ended “when the highest state court in which review is available has affirmed the judgment below and nothing is left to be resolved.” In other words, *Rooker-Feldman* undoubtedly applies when there is a final state court judgment under § 1257. Second, state proceedings have ended “if the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks further action.” For example, *Rooker-Feldman* applies when the losing party does not timely appeal a lower state court judgment, even though the judgment may not be sufficiently final to trigger Supreme Court review under § 1257. Third, state proceedings have ended when they “have finally resolved all the federal questions in the litigation, but state law or purely factual questions (whether great or small) remain to be litigated.” This third situation relies on *Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn*. In *Cox Broadcasting*, the Supreme Court outlined four situations in which nonfinal state court judgments are considered “final” for purposes of § 1257 because all federal issues have been resolved. The First Circuit applied this test to the facts of *Federación* and held that *Rooker-

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261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 25.

In the first category are those cases in which there are further proceedings—
even entire trials—yet to occur in the state courts but where for one reason or
another the federal issue is conclusive or the outcome of further proceedings
preordained. . . .

Second, there are cases . . . in which the federal issue, finally decided by the
highest court in the State, will survive and require decision regardless of the
outcome of future state-court proceedings. . . .

In the third category are those situations where the federal claim has been
finally decided, with further proceedings on the merits in the state courts to
come, but in which later review of the federal issue cannot be had, whatever
the ultimate outcome of the case. . . .

Lastly, there are those situations where the federal issue has been finally de-
cided in the state courts with further proceedings pending in which the party
seeking review here might prevail on the merits on nonfederal grounds, thus
rendering unnecessary review of the federal issue by this Court, and where re-
versal of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of any further
litigation on the relevant cause of action rather than merely controlling the na-
ture and character of, or determining the admissibility of evidence in, the state
proceedings still to come. . . . [And,] a refusal immediately to review the state-
court decision might seriously erode federal policy. . . .

*Cox Broadcasting*, 420 U.S. at 479-83.
Feldman barred the employer’s federal suit because the Puerto Rico judgment fell within one of the Cox Broadcasting situations.269

Two rationales support Federación’s intermediate approach. First, the First Circuit repeatedly emphasizes that a state court proceeding can “end” under Exxon Mobil even when the Supreme Court does not have appellate jurisdiction under § 1257.270 This echoes the rationale of circuits that use the broad approach.271 Second, the First Circuit gives binding effect to Exxon Mobil’s dictum that state proceedings must have “ended” for Rooker-Feldman to apply.272 This mirrors the rationale of those circuits that use the narrow approach.273 Federación resolves any tension between these two rationales by stating that “appealability under § 1257 is not necessary to satisfy the Exxon Mobil ‘ended’ test, [but] it will almost always be sufficient.”274 In other words, “if a state court decision is final enough that the Supreme Court does have jurisdiction over a direct appeal, then it is final enough that a lower federal court does not have jurisdiction over a collateral attack on that decision.”275

In sum, the circuits are split on whether Rooker-Feldman bars federal suits challenging state court interlocutory orders. Circuits using the narrow approach apply Rooker-Feldman only to final state court judgments. Circuits using the broad approach extend the doctrine to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. Circuits using the intermediate approach apply Rooker-Feldman to some—but not all—state court interlocutory orders.

269. Federación, 410 F.3d at 28-29.
270. See id. at 24 (holding that, under Federación’s second situation, a proceeding has “ended” under Exxon Mobil “if the state action has reached a point where neither party seeks further action,” even though it may not be an appealable final judgment under § 1257); id. at 26 (“[W]e hasten to repeat that a proceeding may have ‘ended’ under Exxon Mobil even when § 1257 jurisdiction would not have been available.”).
272. See Federación, 410 F.3d at 24 (“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005))).
273. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006) (“Exxon Mobil tells us when a state court judgment is sufficiently final for operation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: when ‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’ ” (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)); TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The doctrine only applies to cases like Rooker and Feldman where ‘the losing party in state court filed suit in federal court after the state proceedings ended . . . .’ ” (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 291)).
274. Federación, 410 F.3d at 26-27.
275. Id. at 27.
V. THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT ROOKER-FELDMAN PROTECTS STATE COURT INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS

When an appropriate case presents itself, the Supreme Court should resolve the split in circuit authority by holding that Rooker-Feldman extends to all state court judgments, including interlocutory orders. Under this interpretation, the doctrine would prohibit federal district courts from exercising de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court preliminary injunctions, stays, rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders, and other interlocutory decisions.\(^{276}\) The Court should adopt this broad approach because it is the only rule that is consistent with the fundamental purposes underlying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. First, the broad approach requires lower federal courts to enforce separation of powers by staying within the boundaries of their limited statutory jurisdiction.\(^{277}\) Second, the broad approach advances principles of federalism by requiring litigants to seek appellate review of state court decisions in the state court system.\(^{278}\) Third, the broad approach recognizes that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate federal claims.\(^{279}\)

A. Extending Rooker-Feldman to State Court Interlocutory Orders Ensures Separation of Powers by Keeping Lower Federal Courts Within Their Limited Jurisdictional Role

The most important reason why lower federal courts should not exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory orders is that Congress has not given explicit authority for such jurisdiction.\(^{280}\) The Constitution entrusts Congress with the exclusive power to set the jurisdictional boundaries of the lower federal

\(^{276}\) See supra Part IV.B.

\(^{277}\) See infra Part V.A.

\(^{278}\) See infra Part V.B.

\(^{279}\) See infra Part V.C.

\(^{280}\) See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Congress has empowered the federal district courts to exercise only original jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added) (quoting Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge, 211 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2000)); Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 464 n.5 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[A] natural reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1257 suggests that no federal court (neither inferior nor Supreme) has jurisdiction over appeals from non-final state-court orders.”) (emphasis added); Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335 (“Because Congress gave only the Supreme Court the explicit right to review the decisions of a state court, Congress meant to deny all other federal courts that power.”).
As a result, “[f]ederal district courts have no power to hear a case unless expressly authorized to do so.”

The Supreme Court currently is the only federal court with the authority to exercise any jurisdiction over state court judgments. Congress has granted the Supreme Court limited jurisdiction over certain state court judgments—specifically, under 28 U.S.C. § 1257, “[f]inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had” that involve a federal question. Because this grant of jurisdiction is limited to the Supreme Court, lower federal courts “possess no power whatever to sit in direct review of state court decisions.”

This conclusion is further supported by Congress’ limited grant of “original” jurisdiction to federal district courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Professor Chang notes that “[a]s used in the statutes, the term ‘original’ jurisdiction is employed in direct contrast to ‘appellate’ jurisdiction.” Because Congress did not expressly grant appellate jurisdiction to federal district courts, those courts simply lack jurisdiction to review state court decisions, regardless of whether the state court decisions are final judgments or interlocutory orders.

The narrow and intermediate approaches—which allow lower federal courts to review some or all state court interlocutory orders—misinterpret these jurisdictional statutes and violate the constitutional separation of powers. Both approaches mistakenly allow federal district courts to exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over some or all state court interlocutory orders, even though Congress has granted no such jurisdiction. The narrow approach’s error is rooted in its overly restrictive interpretation of Rooker-Feldman, un-


282. Funkhouser et al., supra note 157, at 774; accord Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 (“The federal district courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction which Congress determines is appropriate.”).


286. Chang, supra note 54, at 1346.

287. See, e.g., Guttmann v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006); Dornheim v. Sholes, 430 F.3d 919, 923-24 (8th Cir. 2005); TruServ Corp. v. Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005); Amos v. Glynn County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 347 F.3d 1249, 1265 n.11 (11th Cir. 2003).

288. See Atl. Coast Line R.R., 398 U.S. at 286; Schmucker, supra note 159, at 335.
der which the doctrine protects only “final” state court judgments that are reviewable by the Supreme Court under § 1257. 289 In other words, courts using the narrow approach presume that federal district courts have jurisdiction over suits challenging state court judgments unless the judgment qualifies for Supreme Court review.

This assumption is irrational because it implies that “the Supreme Court’s lack of jurisdiction essentially ‘creates’ jurisdiction for the lower federal courts.” 290 Under well-established principles, lower federal courts cannot hear a case unless Congress affirmatively grants jurisdiction by statute. 291 The idea that federal district courts somehow automatically have jurisdiction over cases that the Supreme Court cannot hear turns this principle on its head. 292 If anything, the absence of Supreme Court jurisdiction over most state court interlocutory orders means that federal district court jurisdiction is “even less appropriate.” 293

Although the intermediate approach recognizes this flaw in the narrow approach, it nonetheless errs by falling prey to the seductive song of Exxon Mobil’s dictum. In Federación, the First Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman bars federal district courts from reviewing some state court judgments that are not appealable under § 1257. 294 However, the Federación Court erred by assuming that Exxon Mobil restricts the doctrine to cases in which “‘the state proceedings [have] ended.’” 295 Reliance on this dictum led the First Circuit astray. Under Federación’s intermediate approach, federal district courts can exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory orders, except in those rare situations when the state action grinds to

289. See, e.g., In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1992).
291. Funkhouser et al., supra note 157, at 774; see also Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).
292. See Pieper, 336 3d at 464 (noting that a congressional grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court “does not logically imply that lower federal courts should always have jurisdiction when the Supreme Court does not”).
293. 18B Wright et al., supra note 239, § 4469.1, at 146-47; accord Pieper, 336 F.3d at 463 (“The Supreme Court’s lack of jurisdiction . . . seems . . . actually to be a stronger argument against lower federal-court jurisdiction than in favor of it.”).
294. See Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 2005) (noting that “a proceeding may have ‘ended’ under Exxon Mobil even if § 1257 jurisdiction would not have been available”); id. at 26-27 (stating that “appealability under § 1257 is not necessary to satisfy the Exxon Mobil ‘ended’ test, [but] it will almost always be sufficient”).
295. Id. at 24 (alteration in original) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 291 (2005); see also Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006); Mothershed v. Justices of the Supreme Court, 410 F.3d 602, 604 n.1 (9th Cir. 2005). As noted above, this language from Exxon Mobil is pure dictum. See supra Part II.E.
a complete halt or the state judgment is sufficiently “final” to qualify for Supreme Court review under § 1257.\textsuperscript{296}

This intermediate approach is nothing more than old wine in new bottles. \textit{Federación} offers a more nuanced analysis,\textsuperscript{297} but its effect is virtually the same as the narrow approach—the vast majority of state court interlocutory orders are subject to appellate review in federal district court, even though Congress has not granted such jurisdiction. Instead of reasoning from established jurisdictional principles—under which Congress alone has the power to define the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts\textsuperscript{298}—the intermediate approach offers a convoluted analysis, based on Supreme Court dictum, which ultimately allows federal district courts to stray outside of the enumerated statutory authority authorized by Congress.

The bottom line is that, subject to a few exceptions, Congress has not granted federal court appellate jurisdiction over state court interlocutory orders.\textsuperscript{299} The broad approach—which uses \textit{Rooker-Feldman} to prohibit federal district courts from reviewing both final and interlocutory state court judgments—is the only rule that enforces separation of powers by ensuring that courts stay within their jurisdictional boundaries.

\textbf{B. Applying Rooker-Feldman to State Court Interlocutory Orders

\textbf{Advances Principles of Federalism}}

Extending \textit{Rooker-Feldman} to state court interlocutory orders preserves the delicate balance of judicial federalism.\textsuperscript{300} Preventing federal district courts from reviewing \textit{all} state court judgments meet-

\textsuperscript{296} See \textit{Federación}, 410 F.3d at 24-27. As explained above in Part IV.C, the First Circuit outlined three situations in which state proceedings have “ended” for purposes of the \textit{Rooker-Feldman} doctrine: (1) the highest state court has rendered a final judgment that qualifies for Supreme Court review under § 1257; (2) neither party seeks further action in state court; or (3) the state judgment qualifies for Supreme Court review under § 1257 through one of the \textit{Cox Broadcasting} situations. See id.; see also \textit{Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn}, 420 U.S. 469, 479-83 (1975).

\textsuperscript{297} For example, \textit{Federación} correctly recognizes that § 1257 allows Supreme Court review of some technically nonfinal state court judgments. See 410 F.3d at 24-27 (citing the Supreme Court’s analysis from \textit{Cox Broadcasting}).

\textsuperscript{298} See Bandes, supra note 16, at 1189 (“Congress has the responsibility for determining the precise contours of federal jurisdiction . . . .”); Chang, supra note 54, at 1349 (“The federal district courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, have only that jurisdiction which Congress determines is appropriate.” (citation omitted)); see also Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 207 (1993); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449 (1850).

\textsuperscript{299} The exceptions include Supreme Court review of nonfinal state court judgments that qualify under \textit{Cox Broadcasting} and federal district court review of state court judgments in the limited contexts of bankruptcy, habeas corpus, and Indian child custody proceedings. See supra note 283.

\textsuperscript{300} See, e.g., Am. Reliable Ins. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003).
ing the *Exxon Mobil* criteria is the only way to ensure that judicial review occurs separately in our two sovereign and independent court systems, with ultimate review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Entry of judgment by a state court—including issuance of an interlocutory order—constitutes an exercise of sovereign power. A federal lawsuit challenging a state court interlocutory order is just as much of an “end run” around the state court system as a suit challenging a final state court judgment. Both equally undermine the concept of federalism.

Extending *Rooker-Feldman* to state court interlocutory orders also avoids antagonism between the state and federal systems. The Supreme Court has emphasized that our dual judicial system would cease to function “if state and federal courts were free to fight each other for control of a particular case.” This harmful tension between state and federal courts is inevitable if federal district courts can exercise de facto appellate jurisdiction over state court preliminary injunctions, stays, rulings on pretrial motions, discovery orders, and other interlocutory decisions.

For these reasons, the Supreme Court should reject the narrow and intermediate approaches used by several circuits. The narrow

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302. See, e.g., *Stillwell*, 336 F.3d at 316 (“The *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine... preserves a fundamental tenet in our system of federalism that... appellate review of state court decisions occurs first within the state appellate system and then in the United States Supreme Court.” (citing *Plyler v. Moore*, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)); Port Auth. Police Benevolent Ass’n, Inc. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J. Police Dep’t, 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[D]ismissal of the complaint [challenging a state court preliminary injunction] was appropriate under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, which instructs us that the only courts empowered to review for constitutional error the New York trial court’s preliminary injunction are the appellate New York courts and, ultimately, the Supreme Court of the United States.”).

303. See *Schmitt v. Schmitt*, 324 F.3d 484, 487 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[F]iling suit with the district court [after an intermediate state-court interlocutory order] was the type of end run around an adverse state court ruling that we have explicitly rejected.” (citing *Maple Lanes, Inc. v. Messer*, 186 F.3d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1999)); see also *Brown & Root, Inc. v. Breckenridge*, 211 F.3d 194, 198 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that “[t]he independence of state courts would surely be compromised” if state court interlocutory orders “merely rang the opening bell for federal litigation of the same issues”).


306. See supra Part IV.A; see also *TruServ Corp. v. Flegles*, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 591 (7th Cir. 2005) (using narrow approach in which “an interlocutory ruling does not evoke the [*Rooker-Feldman*] doctrine”).
approach, under which *Rooker-Feldman* protects only final state court judgments, ignores concerns relating to federalism. The intermediate approach, under which the doctrine protects some state court interlocutory orders, does not go far enough. The broad approach is the only rule that preserves the essential attributes of judicial federalism by protecting final and interlocutory state court judgments from collateral attack in federal courts.

### C. Extending Rooker-Feldman to Interlocutory Orders Recognizes the Competence of State Courts on Federal Issues

The broad approach also is the only rule consistent with the concept of parity between state and federal courts. Although scholars debate whether state courts underenforce federal rights, the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that state courts are competent to decide federal claims. The concept of parity underlies the entire *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine—by prohibiting federal district courts from reviewing state court judgments, the doctrine assumes that state courts will fully and fairly adjudicate federal claims.

In light of this rationale, *Rooker-Feldman* should bar federal district courts from reviewing state court decisions, regardless of whether those decisions are final judgments or interlocutory orders. If state courts are competent to issue final judgments in cases involving federal claims, it defies logic to suggest that they are somehow not com-

307. See Part IV.C; see also Federación de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 23-25 (1st Cir. 2005) (using intermediate approach in which some, but not all, interlocutory orders trigger *Rooker-Feldman*).

308. As noted above, the narrow approach has two rationales, neither of which involve principles of federalism. First, courts assume that *Rooker-Feldman* “is only necessary to effectuate the negative implication of 28 U.S.C. § 1257—it is needed only to prevent lower federal courts from considering cases that the Supreme Court is permitted to hear under the statute.” Pieper v. Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Inc., 336 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (summarizing argument for narrow interpretation). Second, courts mistakenly treat the “state proceedings ended” dicta in *Exxon Mobil* as binding. See, e.g., Rowley v. Wilson, 200 F. App’x 274, 275 (5th Cir. 2006); *TruServ*, 419 F.3d at 591.

309. Like the narrow approach, the failing of the intermediate approach stems from its mistaken treatment of the *Exxon Mobil* “state proceedings ended” dicta as binding language. See *Federación*, 410 F.3d at 24.

310. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 891 (9th Cir. 1986) (stating that the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is based in part on the rule that “state courts are as competent as federal courts to decide federal constitutional issues” (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 610-11 (1975))).

311. E.g., compare Neuborne, *supra* note 190, at 1121-28 (arguing that federal courts are more sympathetic to federal claims than state courts), with William B. Rubenstein, *The Myth of Superiority*, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 599, 599-600 (1999) (arguing that state courts offer institutional advantages for protecting federal rights).


313. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 484 n.16 (1983); Schmucker, *supra* note 159, at 336; Smith, *supra* note 168, at 636; see also supra Part III.C.
petent to issue interlocutory orders in those same cases. The broad approach is the only rule that makes sense because it treats state court decisions in a uniform manner.

VI. CONCLUSION

Courts have mangled the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine since its inception. Given this tradition of confusion, it is perhaps not surprising that circuits currently disagree on whether *Rooker-Feldman* protects state court interlocutory orders.

This Article ends with a bold proposition: this particular facet of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is not as complicated as it first appears. A state court judgment is an exercise of sovereign power, regardless of whether it is final or interlocutory in nature. The premise of our federal system is the notion that both state courts and federal courts are competent to adjudicate federal claims. The Constitution allows federal courts to review state court judgments only if Congress has expressly conveyed jurisdiction to do so. Under existing statutes, the only federal court with appellate jurisdiction over state court judgments is the Supreme Court, which can (and occasionally does) correct errors that occur in both state and federal courts.

The bottom line is that Congress has not granted lower federal courts jurisdiction to review state court judgments. As long as *Rooker-Feldman* guarantees that federal courts respect the true meaning of this congressional silence, it is more than worthy of its place among jurisdictional doctrines.