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INFORMAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

Wayne A. Logan*

After a thirty-year punitive binge, the nation is in the process of awakening to the vast array of negative effects flowing from its draconian crime control policies. The shift is perhaps most evident in the realm of corrections, which since the early 1980s has experienced unprecedented population growth. Driven by a number of factors, not the least of which is the enormous human and financial cost of mass incarceration, policy makers are now shrinking prison and jail populations and pursuing cheaper non-brick-and-mortar social control options.

This Essay examines another facet of the shift: increasing concern over collateral consequences, the many ostensibly non- penal sanctions attaching to convictions, which have proliferated in recent years and

* Gary & Sallyn Pajcic Professor of Law, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Jack Chin, Matthew Lister, Margaret Colgate Love, and Jenny Roberts for their very helpful comments on the paper. Thanks also to participants at the collateral consequences workshop hosted by the University of Minnesota Law School’s Robina Institute, especially Professors Anthony Duff and Susan Sered, who provided valuable insights as commentators. Finally, thanks go to Josephine Ennis, J.D. 2013, for her expert editorial assistance.


6. See Kathleen M. Olivares et al., The Collateral Consequences of a Felony Conviction: A National Study of State Legal Codes 10 Years Later, 60 FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1996, at 10, 11–15 (surveying marked increase in collateral consequences between 1986 and 1996); Michael Pinard, Reflections and Perspectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1214–15 (2010) ("At no point in United States history have collateral
impose disabilities that often dwarf in personal significance the direct consequences of conviction, such as imprisonment. Long the focus of critical scholarly commentary, collateral consequences recently drew the attention of the Supreme Court in its landmark decision Padilla v. Kentucky holding that defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to be informed of a collateral consequence (in Padilla, deportation) attaching to a guilty plea. Further testament to the national concern, the American Bar Association is now compiling a comprehensive inventory of collateral consequences imposed nationwide, casting in bold relief the many “invisible punishments” to which convicted individuals are subject.

The attention now being paid to collateral consequences is most assuredly welcome. Missing from the reappraisal, however, is attention to the range of informal consequences of conviction. Unlike formal collateral consequences, such as loss of public housing eligibility, deportation, occupational disqualification, or electoral disenfranchisement, these consequences do not attach by express operation of law. Rather, they are informal in origin, arising independently of specific legal authority, and concern the gamut of negative social, economic, medical, and psychological consequences of conviction. For instance, it is well known that a criminal conviction can legally disqualify an individual from an occupation and housing; yet, a conviction also has a very negative impact on individuals’ job and housing prospects even absent such formal disqualifications. No less significant are the negative social and economic effects felt by third

7. The category of “collateral consequences” actually encompasses two forms of non-penal disability: a “collateral sanction,” imposed by operation of law as a result of conviction; and a discretionary “disqualification,” also arising from conviction, but imposed after an individualized inquiry by a legal authority. See UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT §§ 2(2), (5), 8 (2010), available at http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf. Consistent with common usage, the broader category is used here.
10. Id. at 360.
parties of convicted individuals, especially dependents, yet these effects too have gone largely unacknowledged in the post-*Padilla* discourse.

This Essay makes the case that attention should be directed to the array of formal and informal collateral consequences alike that are associated with criminal conviction. Part I provides an inventory of informal collateral consequences, which include the negative effects for individuals of stigma, diminished housing and economic opportunities, and ways in which conviction can adversely affect the well-being of third parties, such as family members. Part II examines the meager extent to which such consequences have figured in criminal justice doctrine and policy to date, especially relative to plea advisement and negotiation, and argues for a more robust understanding. Part III offers recommendations on how this fuller understanding can be operationalized.

The task undertaken here is as timely as it is important. While the nation’s appetite for incarceration appears to be waning, 13 state, local, and federal criminal justice systems continue to adjudicate millions of cases annually, 14 and little reason exists to conclude that criminal prosecution and conviction will abate as the preferred public response to misconduct. 15 As criminal justice actors and policymakers have become sensitized to the adverse effects of the formal collateral consequences of conviction, so too should they take account of informal collateral consequences, which can have an equal if not greater effect on individuals’ lives.

I. INFORMAL COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES

A criminal conviction, while a culminating event in the criminal justice process, carries with it an array of negative consequences. The most concrete and well-known consequence involves the deprivation of

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14. See GLAZE & PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1 (noting that at yearend 2011 just under 7,000,000 individuals were under adult correctional supervision of some kind, roughly one of every thirty-four residents).

15. See WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 55–56 (2011) (tracing nation’s evolution toward view that “a healthy criminal justice system should punish all the criminals it can.”); David Cole, Turning the Corner on Mass Incarceration?, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27, 44–49 (2011) (lauding recent decreases in imprisonment rates but questioning whether they will be sustained when budgetary conditions improve, absent greater public sensitivity for the adverse human consequences of mass imprisonment).
liberty, by means of imprisonment or community supervision. Perhaps less well known, until Padilla at least, conviction very often also triggers an array of formal collateral consequences. This Part provides an overview of the many informal collateral consequences of conviction, arising outside formal operation of law, significantly affecting the lives of convicted individuals. These negative consequences, ranging from social stigma to diminished housing and employment opportunities, very often also have a spill-over effect on friends and family.

Social stigma has long been recognized as a defining consequence of criminal conviction. While in the past opprobrium associated with criminal status visibly manifested in physical branding and mutilation, over time, societies, including early America, adopted a more forgiving outlook. As the New York Court of Appeals put it in 1936, persons convicted of crimes are “not outcasts, nor to be treated as such.”

In recent decades, however, this forgiving sentiment has been replaced by a far harsher view. Today, convict status serves as a perpetual badge of infamy, even serving to impugn reputation beyond the grave. One data point highlighting this shift is found in the significantly decreased application of the executive pardon authority. Another is the current nationwide network of sex offender registration and community notification laws, which took root in the 1990s. The laws require the assemblage of conviction and personal identifying information on eligible individuals, and make the information publicly available by way of the internet and other means, often for registrants’ lifetimes.

16. See GLAZE & PARKS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 1–2 (noting that at yearend 2011 almost 7,000,000 individuals were under adult correctional supervision and that roughly seventy percent of this population was on probation or parole).
17. See supra notes 6–12 and accompanying text.
21. Perhaps the most notable example of this can be found in how, after police fatally shot an unarmed man, then-Mayor of New York City Rudolph Giuliani, in an effort to curb public uproar, stressed that the victim had a criminal record. See Eric Lipton, Giuliani Citest Criminal Past of Slain Man: Pressed on Shooting, Mayor Criticizes Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2000, at B1.
23. For discussion of the history and social and political catalysts behind the laws, see WAYNE A. LOGAN, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: CRIMINAL REGISTRATION AND COMMUNITY NOTIFICATION LAWS IN AMERICA 49–108 (2009).
24. See id. at 49–84 (discussing laws).
posited in the 2002 oral argument in Smith v. Doe, involving a constitutional challenge to registration and community notification, that targeted individuals “deserve[] stigmatization.”

Stigma can affect individual well-being in a variety of ways. Research dating back to the 1960s, for instance, highlights the significant social and psychological difficulties associated with criminal stigma. More recent research makes clear that stigma can have a self-fulfilling criminogenic effect, predisposing individuals to become the deviants they were branded to be. It is also not uncommon for convicts to be singled out for death, beatings, arson, and vandalism by fellow community members.

A criminal record can also have profound economic impact, serving in Professor James Jacobs’ words as a “negative curriculum vitae” for individuals. Criminal records, now more readily available than ever before, have been shown to significantly diminish near and long-term economic well-being. A criminal conviction often serves as a de facto informal basis for job denial, augmenting occupational bars triggered


27. See, e.g., Bruce C. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363 (2001); Terri A. Winnick & Mark Bodkin, Anticipated Stigma and Stigma Management Among Those to Be Labeled “Ex-Con,” 29 DEV. BEHAV. 295 (2008). Such outcomes, it warrants mention, are fostered by the common use by police of individuals’ criminal histories to justify searches and seizures. See, e.g., United States v. Erwin, 155 F.3d 818 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Henry, 48 F.3d 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Police resort to such information has been significantly eased by the advent of portable hand-held devices. See Wendy Ruderman, New Tool for Police Officers: Records at Their Fingerprints, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2013, at A17 (noting officer use of new handheld smartphone devices that allow for immediate access to individuals’ criminal records).


30. See id. at 177–78.


32. On the disinclination of employers to hire ex-offenders more generally, see Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire Former Offenders?: Employer Preferences, Background Checks, and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205, 209–10 (Mary Pattillo et al. eds., 2004). Research also makes clear that even employers reluctant to acknowledge a policy of not hiring ex-offenders show a marked disinclination to actually hire ex-offenders. See Devah Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk?: What Employers Say Versus What They Do, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 355 (2005). On the disparate racial effects of this phenomenon, see Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply: The Racial Disparate Impact of Pre-Employment
by formal operation of law. More subtly, conviction can function to disrupt or sever social ties that can be key to finding employment. And even when able to secure a job, convicted individuals on average enjoy much lower earning capacity than individuals without a conviction. Dashed or limited employment prospects, research has also shown, in turn fuel depression and lessen perceived self-worth, further impairing employment prospects.

Housing opportunities are also negatively affected by convict status. While statutes and regulations impose formal legal limits on public housing opportunities, landlords in the private sector often informally use criminal history as a screening device. The fact of criminal conviction, ex-convicts report, serves as the single greatest impediment to securing housing. In turn, homelessness itself, in addition to making such matters as job searches far more difficult, increases the likelihood of subsequent arrest and conviction.

Finally, conviction affects far more than the convicted individual. Family and friends endure secondary stigma and ostracism as a result of their connection to convicts, and it is not uncommon for them to experience spill-over violence and disdain. It should also come as no

35. Bruce Western et al., The Labor Market Consequences of Incarceration, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 410 (2001).
41. See, e.g., Todd R. Clear et al., Incarceration and the Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders, 47 CRIME & DELINQ. 335, 341 (2001).
surprise that the limited housing opportunities of convicts negatively affect their families and dependents,\(^\text{43}\) so too do employment barriers,\(^\text{44}\) denied access to federal government loans for education and training and eligibility for food stamps.\(^\text{45}\) And, when conviction results in incarceration, others very often feel its negative effects. Imprisonment significantly increases risk of sexual\(^\text{47}\) and physical assault\(^\text{48}\) and exposure to serious medical problems (such as HIV, tuberculosis, and hepatitis)\(^\text{49}\). It also adversely affects mental health,\(^\text{50}\) creating significant difficulties for individuals that impair their ability to function when released.\(^\text{51}\) These health-related outcomes can have a direct impact on family members, exacerbating financial hardships experienced,\(^\text{52}\) with the situation being made worse when the inmate is a sole caregiver.\(^\text{53}\)


\(^{45}\) See 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006) (rendering ineligible any student who has been convicted of an offense involving the sale or possession of a controlled substance).


\(^{47}\) See Nancy Wolff et al., Physical Violence Inside Prisons: Rates of Victimization, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 588, 595 (2007) (noting that inmate violence rate is more than ten times that of the rate in the community at-large).


\(^{50}\) Id. at 46–48, 54–56.


\(^{52}\) See Petersilgia, supra note 31, at 228–29. In some instances, of course, physical removal of a parent can have a beneficial effect. However, research establishes that even criminally active
II. TOWARD A MORE ROBUST UNDERSTANDING

The consequences surveyed above, while long known to social scientists, have to date eluded the attention of criminal justice system policymakers and actors. This Part makes the case for a needed broader, more robust understanding of collateral consequences, one inclusive of those that arise informally beyond formal operation of law.

Lack of sensitivity to the range of negative extralegal consequences of conviction is widespread in the criminal justice system. Courts, for instance, while prone to acknowledge the stigmatizing effect of conviction, typically fail to lend legal significance to its associated negative impact. The disinterest was on abundant display in the 2003 Supreme Court decision *Smith v. Doe*, where the Court concluded that Alaska’s sex offender registration and community notification law was punitive in neither intent nor effect, allowing it to be imposed retroactively consistent with the Constitution’s Ex Post Facto Clause.

According to the *Smith* majority, while public dissemination of conviction information might have “adverse consequences,” including “public shame,” “humiliation,” and “social ostracism,” with a “lasting and painful impact,” targeted individuals were not subject to additional punishment.

From a doctrinal perspective, the *Smith* majority’s conclusion that the overt shaming effects of registration and community notification do not qualify as additional punishment is subject to critique. At the same time, however, the majority’s presumption that convictions have informal punitive effect is important, and builds upon recent academic work concerning the “experience of punishment.” As Professor John Bronsteen and his co-authors establish, when considering the proportionality of a given sanction, attention must be paid to the range of negative hedonic consequences that predictably attend conviction, even when not resulting from formal operation of law.

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55. 538 U.S. 84 (2003).

56. *Id.* at 103–04.

57. *Id.* at 99–101.

58. See LOGAN, supra note 23, at 136–41.


60. Bronsteen et al., *Experience of Punishment, supra* note 59, at 1486.

61. Such a fuller legal understanding, it should be noted, does not require adoption of an unduly
Even more significant as a possible objection is the potentially contingent and individualized experiential nature of disabilities, a matter now the subject of lively debate among penal theorists. While in some instances the psychological, physical, social, and economic hardships of conviction discussed above might be mitigated or avoided altogether as a result of individual circumstances, this reality does not alter the baseline of convict experience. An individual’s unusual personal charisma or relative educational attainment, for instance, might lessen the difficulty of securing employment, but the extralegal disability itself, not shared by the non-convict population at large, is worthy of recognition.

A similar point might be made with respect to criminal stigma. It too can have a variable quality, depending on the nature of the underlying offense, and perhaps even among certain individuals and sub-populations. Yet even accepting this, its derogatory nature can scarcely expansive view of state agency as punisher. While the consequences discussed here are not expressly prescribed by legal code, they trace to conviction, a quintessential act of government. Nor, from a policy and prudential perspective, does their extralegal quality make them any less real and debilitating to those affected. Of late, the question of “who” imposes punishment has been a central point of contention for a number of contemporary retributivist theorists, who maintain that experiences must be intentionally imposed by authorized state agents to qualify as punishment. See David Gray, Punishment as Suffering, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1619, 1650–51, 1664 (2010); Dan Markel et al., Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 605, 619–20 (2011). I take no position on whether extra-legal harms should justify, from a retributivist perspective, a punishment “sentencing adjustment” as such. See Markel et al., supra, at 619. Indeed, collateral consequences, including those of an informal nature, are as a technical matter non-punitive in character. Just the same, the disavowal of state responsibility reflects a troubling indifference to the ramifications of government action. As the Court unanimously noted in the context of a challenge to Alabama’s forced disclosure of NAACP membership lists:

It is not sufficient to answer, as the State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of names . . . may have . . . follows not from state action but from private [action]. The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that private action takes hold.

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958); see also Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 93 (1982) (noting that there need only be a “reasonable probability” that the compelled disclosure of names would subject individuals to “threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or private parties” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976))).


63. Convictions for sex offenses, in particular, generate perhaps the most ill will of all. On the reasons thought to account for this, see LOGAN, supra note 23, at 91.

64. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Can Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 748 (1998) (“An offender has to care what others think about him; otherwise, shame can get no grip on him. The broader and deeper [an offender’s] attachments, the greater will be his shame. If he lacks the requisite attachments . . . he will . . . be ‘shameless’ . . . .”) (footnote omitted).

65. See id. at 749 (asserting that shaming will have less “retributive bite” if an individual’s “attachments run to a criminal subculture, in which case ‘shaming’ him may perversely become a source of pride”).
be questioned. As Professor Alexandra Natapoff recently observed, “for a person who has been publicly transformed from law-abiding citizen into criminal, a significant psycho-social line has been crossed.”

Likewise, the fact that not all convicts will experience an informal disability, and that its onerousness might be individualized, should not diminish the need to acknowledge such effects. Indeed, purely as a matter of statistical likelihood, the empirical commonality of their occurrence affords principled basis for their consideration. More significant, notwithstanding the indisputably wholesale nature of the modern adjudicatory process, defendants enjoy a retail-level right to individualized justice, one sensitized to such variable effects.

Despite the foregoing, the justice system has been reluctant to attach importance to post-conviction disabilities. Courts have only occasionally taken into account harm suffered by third parties when assessing the propriety of punishments, almost always in the federal white-collar context, and as a rule ignore the reputational harms suffered by those ensnared in the criminal process. And, until Padilla, courts typically refused to require pre-plea advisement of formal collateral consequences.


68. See supra notes 18–54 and accompanying text.

69. See, e.g., In re Dir. of Assigned Counsel Plan of N.Y.C., 603 N.Y.S.2d 676, 686 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1993) (noting that the “right to individualized justice . . . is a hallmark of our constitutional and democratic system”).

70. See Darryl K. Brown, Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1383, 1390–91 (2002). This solicitude, Professor Brown concluded from a review of judges’ sentencing explanations, is due in significant part to “defendants and third parties in those settings more often prompt[ing] empathy.” Id. at 1421.


Padilla, along with the Court’s more recent opinions in Missouri v. Frye73 and Lafler v. Cooper,74 also evincing critical concern over the workings of the nation’s plea-driven criminal justice system,75 signal a welcome reality-based understanding of the system’s extralegal quality.76 Padilla in particular might also signal a desire on the part of the Court to do away with the long-criticized doctrinal divide between direct and collateral consequences more generally,77 requiring courts, as Professor Bibas recently urged, to “focus[] on the importance of particular consequences rather than their criminal or civil labels.”78 Already, the influence of Padilla is showing tangible effect in decisions that extend its logic beyond the context of deportation,79 highlighting the need to conceive of the challenge at hand in terms of “mass conviction, not (just) mass incarceration.”80

III. OPERATIONALIZING CHANGE

Presuming that informal collateral consequences warrant attention, the practical question arises of how they can be made more salient in the day-to-day criminal justice process. This Part outlines the ways in which this can occur, focusing in particular on the institutional roles of the chief actors in the nation’s plea-dominated system.

Without question, responsibility for highlighting the informal

although unmentioned in Padilla itself, concern over collateral consequences actually did figure in prior decisions of the Court, shaping constitutional criminal procedure in areas including the right to counsel and jury trial. Id. at 1822–25.

73. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012) (holding that defense counsel’s failure to inform a client of a favorable plea offer constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).

74. __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (holding that defense counsel’s mistaken legal understanding, inducing a client to reject a plea offer, constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel).

75. Id. at 1388 (noting that over ninety percent of convictions in state and federal courts result from guilty pleas).

76. See Josh Bowers, Two Rights to Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1133, 1133 (2013) (noting that the three cases cement a “right to extralegal counsel [that] applies exclusively to the comparatively unstructured domains of the plea-bargain and guilty plea” (emphasis added)).


78. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1147 (2011); see also id. (“The Sixth Amendment test should be not whether a consequence is labeled civil or collateral, but whether it is severe enough and certain enough to be a significant factor in criminal defendants’ bargaining calculus.”).


80. Chin, supra note 72, at 1803.
collateral consequences of conviction will fall chiefly upon defense counsel. Any suggestion, however, of adding more duties to defense counsel—especially already overburdened and underpaid public defenders—will likely prompt immediate objection. Indeed, Padilla, while lauded by the defense bar in principle, has triggered concern for the added counseling burdens it imposed on defenders. Deportation, at issue in Padilla, affords a foremost example, requiring an understanding of a highly specialized and complex body of statutes and regulations. The consequences at issue here, however, do not require sophisticated legal expertise. Nor will apprising clients of such consequences impose much in the way of added time commitment, a particular concern to already overburdened public defenders. Counsel will simply be obliged to highlight to clients the adverse economic, social, and personal consequences possibly resulting from conviction, in keeping with increasingly accepted holistic lawyering norms.

Other institutional actors, however, can and should also play a role. As for prosecutors, acknowledgment of the full consequences of conviction aligns with their core duty to “seek justice” in individual cases. At the same time, consistent with the teachings of procedural justice, appearing to do justice by being open and transparent affords broader public legitimacy benefit. As Robert Johnson, former head of

81. See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 50 (1995) (“It is the responsibility of defense counsel to inform a defendant of the advantages and disadvantages of a plea agreement . . . .”).
83. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 369 (2010); see also id. at 378 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting that it is often “not an easy task” to determine whether conviction for a particular offense will trigger deportation).
84. See Wayne A. Logan, Litigating the Ghost of Gideon in Florida: Separation of Powers as a Tool to Achieve Indigent Defense Reform, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 885 (2010) (discussing state and national data regarding enormous public defender caseloads and litigation mounted to help ameliorate the situation).
86. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt. 1 (2010); Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function § 3-1.2(c) (1993); see also Catherine A. Christian, Collateral Consequences: Role of the Prosecutor, 54 How. L.J. 749, 750 (2011) (“[A] just and fair prosecutor will consider the collateral consequences that may apply . . . and take them into account when considering a disposition.”).
the National District Attorneys Association has stated, when prosecutors fail to disclose the full consequences of a brokered conviction they risk “suffer[ing] the disrespect and los[ing] the confidence of the very society we seek to protect.”

With informal collateral consequences put on the table, so to speak, the parties will be better positioned to efficiently negotiate outcomes based on what Padilla called “informed consideration” of the nature and scope of the consequences of conviction. It can also be hoped that with fuller awareness of the actual consequences of conviction, the balance of negotiating power will be affected, resulting in increased use of diversion and deferred prosecution arrangements, avoiding the negative effects of conviction altogether.

Ultimately, greater understanding of the range of consequences associated with conviction could likewise mitigate what has been called “plea bargaining’s innocence problem”: the possibility of legally innocent defendants pleading guilty to a lesser offense in order to avoid being subjected to much harsher punishment as a result of trial. Such susceptibility is perhaps especially at play with individuals charged with minor offenses, who possibly plead guilty simply so that they can be released from detention.

Finally, judges can and should play a role. Already, in the wake of Padilla, consideration is being given to expanding Rule 11 plea colloquy expectations of judges. While not a substitute for particularized advice

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91. See Margaret Colgate Love, Alternatives to Conviction: Deferred Adjudication as a Way of Avoiding Collateral Consequences, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 6 (2009).

92. See Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (2013). In an effort to redress scholarly uncertainty over the extent of the problem’s occurrence, the authors report the results of a clinical study in which over half of the study’s innocent participants were willing to falsely admit guilt in return for a reduced punishment. Id. at 36–37.

93. See id. at 38 (noting that the study’s results in this regard conform with prior work raising concern over factually innocent low-level offenders pleading guilty).

by counsel, the sentencing court can reinforce to a pleading defendant the informal collateral consequences of conviction. Judicial advisement will have particular benefit, again, for the large number of defendants charged with minor offenses, who if indigent lack access to publicly provided counsel at the plea negotiation stage as a result of constitutional doctrine or procedural rule. Indeed, public acknowledgement of such consequences by judges in open court will have the salutary effect of highlighting the broader human consequences of the nation’s penchant for criminal convictions.

While the focus here has been on the duties of defense counsel, prosecutors, and judges, it should be noted that these actors need not go it alone. Indeed, the path can be paved by bar associations and other entities that can provide instruction and training on informal collateral consequences, much as they have done already in the wake of Padilla with respect to the immigration consequences of conviction.

CONCLUSION

When it comes to criminal justice, we live in promising times. At long last, draconian sentencing policies are being reconsidered and the collateral consequences of conviction, triggered by formal operation of statutes and regulations, are attracting the critical attention of courts and

immigration consequences of conviction).


96. This reinforcement, it should be noted, is particularly important because, unlike formal collateral consequences, informal collateral consequences are not susceptible of back-end administrative or judicial relief. See Love, supra note 79, at 121–26 (describing current and possibly future avenues of relief from formal collateral consequences).


99. This Essay, it should be emphasized, has focused solely on individual defendant-level effects. Research, however, has made clear that mass convictions and incarceration have major negative social, political, and economic effects on poor and minority communities as a whole. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1271 (2004). For an argument that such impact should be considered by sentencing judges in particular cases, see Anne R. Traum, Mass Incarceration at Sentencing, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 423 (2013).

policymakers. While surely a positive development, this shift in consciousness has been lacking in a fundamentally important respect: it has ignored the range of informal collateral consequences also attending conviction yet not arising by formal operation of law, which can have equal if not greater negative effect on individuals.

This Essay has sought to redress this deficit and make the case that informal, and not just formal, collateral consequences should figure in the nation’s post-*Padilla* effort to achieve a fairer and more transparent criminal justice system. While without question *Padilla* marks a critically important development in the Supreme Court’s willingness to regulate the nation’s plea-dominated system,101 it is unlikely that the change urged here will come about as a result of constitutional mandate. Rather, the change will of necessity result from the work of front-line criminal justice actors determined to ensure that individuals facing criminal conviction are sensitized to their prospective membership in what has been aptly called “a stigmatized caste, condemned to a lifetime of second-class citizenship.”102

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101. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 78, at 1118 (noting that *Padilla* “marks a watershed in the Court’s approach to regulating plea bargains”).