Grassroots Originalism: Rethinking the Politics of Judicial Philosophy

Mary Ziegler
Florida State University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles

Part of the Law and Philosophy Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Mary Ziegler, Grassroots Originalism: Rethinking the Politics of Judicial Philosophy, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 201 (2012), Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/331
GRASSROOTS ORIGINALISM: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
ARGUMENTS, THE ABORTION DEBATE, AND THE
POLITICS OF JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY

Mary Ziegler*

I. INTRODUCTION

How has originalism become so politically successful?¹ In answering
this question, leading scholarship has focused on the ways in which
political leaders, judges, and lawyers have cultivated popular support for
originalism. In one account, legal academics, politicians, and judges have
explained the legal merits of originalism as a method of interpretation: its
political neutrality and its democratic legitimacy.² In a second version,
political leaders—in particular, the Reagan Administration and the judges it
ominated—made apparent that originalism would often produce outcomes
that social conservatives found satisfactory.³ With some exceptions, leading
studies primarily address the contributions made by elites to rhetoric about
and justifications for originalism, including those rationales based on
judicial activism and judicial legitimacy.⁴

¹ I would like to thank Joel Goldstein, Roger Goldman, Anders Walker, and Eric Miller for their
help with earlier drafts of this piece.

² See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, T HE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 137–38 (1996)
(summarizing the view that originalism’s appeal lies in the failure of liberals to introduce a “principled
alternative”); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
2–8 (1971) (“Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the value to be preferred, there is no
principled way to prefer any claimed human value to any other.”); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The Appeal of
Politics in Transforming Moral Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1525 (1989) (“The appeal of
originalism is that the moral principles so applied will be the foundational principles of the American
Republic—principles we can all perceive for ourselves and that have shaped our nation’s political
character—and not the political-moral principles of whomever happens to occupy the judicial office.”).

³ See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 662 (2009); Stefanie A. Lindquist et al.,
The Rhetoric of Restraint and the Ideology of Activism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 103, 104–06 (2007)
(offering empirical evidence that “restraintist” judges are guided by ideological commitments to
federalism and to a strong Executive Branch); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political
Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 545–46 (2006); Neil S. Siegel,

⁴ See, e.g., supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that the term “grassroots,” used here
By focusing on arguments about the backlash against *Roe v. Wade,* this Article shows that an important justification for originalism—one based on the political consequences of “judicial activism”—emerged from interactions between activists, judges, and political leaders. However, these consequentialist contentions for originalism and against *Roe* emerged not in the academy or in the courts, but through dialogue between the elites, social-movement members, and the Grassroots Right. In 1980–1981, antiabortion advocates began arguing that *Roe* should be overruled because of the consequences of the Court’s activism: the creation of the antiabortion movement, the polarization of debate, and the effective preclusion of any meaningful legislative compromise.

As we shall see, these were not justifications for originalism as such but rather arguments against judicial activism and *Roe.* But as this Article will show, by the mid-1980s, Reagan Administration officials had seized on these consequence-based justifications and transformed them into arguments for originalism. Later, these contentions featured in the work of first-generation originalist scholars. As this Article shows, the politics of originalism have been conducted from the bottom up as well as from the top down.

There is a good deal at stake in understanding the role of social-movement activists and the Grassroots Right in creating consequence-based justifications for originalism. First, scholars sometimes adopt consequence-based attacks on *Roe* as accurate descriptions of movement responses to the decision. As this Article shows, by contrast, claims about backlash to *Roe*

---

7 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 6, at 159, 169, 193, 234; Graglia, supra note 6, at 439–40.
8 William Eskridge and John Ferejohn argue, for example, that, because of *Roe,* “Pro-life traditionalists
emerged from dialogue between New Right and antiabortion movement members and political leaders. We should be cautious about the historical validity of claims that have served so political a purpose.

Second, by so often focusing on the academics, politicians, and judges who have popularized consequence-based justifications for originalism, we have not fully captured the distinctiveness or importance of popular, judicial activism-based justifications for originalism. Some movement claims may appear to echo first-generation originalist arguments that activist decisions are undemocratic or even illegitimate. On closer examination, as this Article contends, grassroots claims against judicial activism have a distinctive language, and their purpose and rhetoric differ considerably from the arguments articulated by politicians and professors. As we shall see, these claims drew on the kind of natural law thinking rejected by first-generation originalists, invoking religious and moral concerns as much as democratic ones. Scholars should be more attentive to the uses, meaning, and purpose of these grassroots and movement claims.

For this reason, the materials assembled here suggest that the battle for the future of constitutional interpretation will not be won by whoever has the best theory. The politics of judicial philosophy have involved an unpredictable and highly contingent give-and-take between grassroots activists and the political and judicial elites. This will likely continue to be the case in the future.

My argument proceeds in three segments. Part II.A briefly sets out leading scholarship on the politics of originalism. Part II.B challenges current accounts by closely examining how a consequence-based justification for overruling *Roe* evolved in the 1980s. Drawing on the history, Part II.C examines the implications of this history for current studies of originalism. Part III briefly concludes.
II. ANALYSIS

A. From the Top to the Right: Conventional Accounts of Political Originalism

The political appeal of originalism is at the center of at least three important scholarly debates. Of course, as Reva Siegel has written, “There is not one theory of originalism, but many.”9 My purpose here is not to argue for or against any kind of originalism or for or against originalism writ large. Instead, my focus is on why the public, and the Grassroots Right in particular, has been so receptive to a stylized, oversimplified version of originalism: Originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation that emphasizes text, history, and authorial intent and rejects the idea of a “living Constitution” that changes over time.

One body of scholarship on this question addresses the operation and appeal of originalism. Antonin Scalia, Michael McConnell, and other defenders of either first- or second-generation originalism assert that the appeal of the philosophy is primarily legal, and legitimacy-based claims for originalism are appealing in principle.10 For these scholars, ordinary citizens are attracted to originalism and its anti-activism justifications because it is the only democratically legitimate and politically neutral interpretive method.11 McConnell explains that originalism, and legitimacy-based arguments for it, are seductive, because originalism “supplies an objective basis for judgment that does not merely reflect the judge’s own ideological stance.”12 Scalia has described the attraction of originalism and the anti-judicial activism arguments supporting it by drawing attention to the flaws of its alternatives, which, in his words, focus on what the Constitution “ought to mean.”13

The suggestion in this scholarship is that originalism and concerns about judicial activism enjoy popular support because it is the most principled alternative available. In 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Scalia further suggested that, in the

---

9 Siegel, supra note 6, at 1403. For a recent account of the different brands of originalism, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009).
10 See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Kalman, supra note 2, at 137–38.
abortion context, the public has expected and even demanded that the Court adhere to originalism. By contrast, if the Court claimed that “the ‘liberties’ protected by the Constitution are . . . undefined and unbounded,” then the people would and should rise up. As Scalia framed it, popular demand for originalism and popular hostility toward judicial activism simply reflect an interest in democracy and apolitical judging.

For some time, scholars have questioned the legal merits of originalism. But as Jamal Greene has observed, the academic attacks on originalism do not appear to have made a dent in its popularity in the courts or with the general public. This phenomenon has led those skeptical of originalism to seek alternative explanations of its appeal. In a 2006 Fordham Law Review article, Robert Post and Reva Siegel argued that “[t]he current ascendancy of originalism does not reflect the analytic force of its jurisprudence, but instead depends upon its capacity to fuse aroused citizens, government officials, and judges into a dynamic and broad-based political movement.” In the context of gun rights, for example, Siegel has shown that justifications for originalism emerged from a give-and-take between social-movement organizations, political leaders, and the courts.

Following Post and Siegel, two bodies of scholarship have questioned what it means to describe originalism as a political practice. One body of work has presented and analyzed originalism and the judicial-activism arguments for it as a form of popular constitutionalism. Much of this scholarship identifies one of two sources of this popular engagement. One body of work describes the role of the Reagan Administration in

---

15 Id. at 1001.
18 Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 549.
19 See generally Greene, supra note 1, at 6 (“American originalism is an instrument through which a domestic, sociopolitical movement seeks to validate its political commitments and to influence our courts.”); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 215–16 (2008); Siegel, supra note 6, at 1401 n.3.
popularizing originalism. In particular, Post and Siegel have highlighted the role of former Attorney General Edwin Meese in drawing citizen attention to the issue of judicial philosophy.

Reagan’s judicial nominees are also thought to have publicized originalist claims and anti-judicial activism claims for it. For example, in studying the conservative groundswell that greeted the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, Siegel claims that Scalia defended originalism and warned grassroots conservatives “that if they did not mobilize to protest the Court’s decision in Lawrence, then the Lawrence opinion would soon be read to authorize gay marriage.” Other scholars have broadened this contention, focusing on the role of Republican politicians or judicial nominees in spreading popular arguments for originalism.

Using originalism as an example, a related body of scholarship seeks to identify what makes any judicial philosophy a political success. This work has both descriptive and prescriptive dimensions: it helps to explain the current prominence of originalism and judicial-activism talk and identifies ways in which a truly competitive alternative might be developed.

Threaded through each of these debates, as we have seen, are important claims about the ways in which elites have popularized various arguments for a jurisprudence of original intent. These leaders may be scholars and judges highlighting the legal strengths of originalism, or they may be political figures hinting at the outcomes that philosophy will produce.

Scholars like Greene and Siegel acknowledge that the political appeal of originalism arises through interactions between the grassroots and the elites. Nonetheless, current scholarship primarily analyzes the role played by the elites in popularizing originalism. In the case of Roe, important legitimacy-based arguments for originalism were not spread by experts to lay audiences but rather were created in a discussion between activists, professors, and politicians. The dialogue that helped to produce these arguments was complicated and fluid. It is important to stress that popularizing a particular theory of constitutional interpretation has not been

---

21 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 659–60; Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–61.
22 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–51.
24 Id. at 1346.
25 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
26 See, e.g., Greene, supra note 3, at 660–61.
27 Id.
28 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
30 See infra Part II.B.
and likely will not be a matter of simply persuading ordinary citizens. The process will be dynamic, unpredictable, and interactive.

Second, the history considered here suggests that too little is known about the vocabulary, aims, and strategies of grassroots opponents of judicial activism. By focusing on elite efforts to cultivate support for originalism, current studies have assumed that grassroots activists make the same kinds of claims about originalism as do the political leaders or academics who explain it to them. In truth, in the abortion debate, lay advocates critical of progressive activist judging have contentions and aims of their own.

How did the Grassroots Right participate in the creation of arguments for originalism? Part II.B turns next to this question.


As we shall see, the popularization of originalism, or something like it, began with politicians and academics. In the political context, during the 1968 presidential campaign, Richard Nixon promoted “strict constructionism,” whereby courts apply only the meaning of a legal text as it was written. During Nixon’s two terms in office, there was some public interest in what “strict constructionism” meant. In announcing the January 1970 nomination of southern judge G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court, Nixon promised to seek judges who would “interpret” but not “make” law. He elaborated further on the meaning of strict constructionism during the successful nomination of William Rehnquist. Then, Nixon asserted that the alternative to a strict constructionist judge was one who would “twist or bend the Constitution in order to perpetuate his personal political and social views.” During his hearings, Rehnquist echoed Nixon’s arguments and further explained that “constructionist” judges would rely exclusively on the “language used by the framers [of the

---

31 See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 3.
33 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 32, at 282–83.
35 Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William H. Rehnquist To Be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 337 PUB. PAPERS 1054 (Oct. 21, 1971).
Constitution], the historical materials available, and the precedents which other Justices of the Supreme Court have decided in cases involving a particular provision.\(^{36}\)

The failed Carswell nomination and the direction taken by the Burger Court diminished interest in strict constructionism and in judicial philosophy more generally.\(^{37}\) The month Nixon announced Carswell’s nomination, leaders of the civil rights movement went on the attack. Former NAACP legal advisor L. D. Clark informed the New York Times that "strict constructionism" was "open[ly] [and] blatant[ly] segregationist."\(^{38}\) During Carswell’s hearings, NAACP advocates revealed that, in 1948, the judge had made a speech extolling the virtues of white supremacy.\(^{39}\) Nixon’s proposed philosophy had become inextricably linked with the politics of race.

What was more, once on the Court, Nixon’s nominees appeared to be more similar to the justices who had come before them than Nixon might have wanted. A series of sweeping decisions penned or joined by Nixon nominees, including Roe, appeared as far-reaching as anything issued by the Warren Court.\(^{40}\) Whatever Nixon had been talking about, the Supreme Court seemed to be doing something else entirely.

The most developed discussion of judicial activism had emerged several decades earlier in the legal academy. Writing in 1959, in framing his now-famous criticism of Brown v. Board of Education,\(^{41}\) Herbert Wechsler presented an argument against judicial activism, contending that "[t]he man who simply lets his judgment turn on the immediate result may not, however, realize that his position implies that the courts are free to function as a naked power organ, that it is an empty affirmation to regard them . . . as courts of law."\(^{42}\) After the early 1950s, members of the legal process movement—a school of scholars who praised decisions based on the plain meaning of a text, on constitutional design and institutional competence, or


\(^{38}\) See Carswell Seen as Perfect “Strict Constructionist,” supra note 34.


on the presumed neutrality of procedural or process-based solutions—also stressed claims against judicial activism.43

In the 1970s, first-generation originalist scholars took up similar criticisms. In 1971, in setting out a jurisprudence of original intent, Yale law professor Robert Bork revived attacks on judicial activism, focusing on claims that judicial overreaching was unprincipled and illegitimate.44 As Bork argued, the marital privacy right described in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court’s first substantive due process case in the modern era, was unprincipled, since the judge in such a case would have “no basis other than his own values upon which to set aside the community judgment embodied in the statute.”45 The only way to avoid this kind of overreaching, Bork went on, was to “stick close to the text and the history [of the Constitution] . . . and not construct new rights.”46 Other originalist scholars highlighted arguments against judicial activism. In several books attacking the Supreme Court’s decisions on school integration, Lino Graglia criticized “judicial policymaking.”47 In 1977, Raoul Berger published a book-length defense of originalism, condemning as undemocratic the activist decisions of the Warren Court.48 In 1976, then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist offered similar arguments in favor of a “dead Constitution.”49

During the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan and the members of his staff began to popularize arguments against judicial activism.50 As we shall see, however, these claims were less forceful and less developed than the ones that would appear in the decades to come. In particular, in the early years, Reagan and his allies did not defend

---


45 See Bork, supra note 2, at 10. For the decision in Griswold, see 381 U.S. 479, 482–86 (1965).

46 See Bork, supra note 2, at 8.

47 See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Disaster by Decree: The Supreme Court Decisions on Race and the Schools passim (1976).

48 See generally BERGER, supra note 44.

49 See Rehnquist, supra note 44, at 693, 699.

50 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–61.
originalism as much as they attacked what they described as judicial activism.\footnote{See generally id. at 555–56.}


While Weyrich provided political strategy for these groups, Richard Viguerie and his direct-mail organization offered lobbying and fundraising
services. In 1980, Viguerie raised between $35 and $40 million for his clients.

Allied with Weyrich and Viguerie was the newly powerful Religious Right. Although the Religious Right of the 1970s is primarily associated with evangelical Protestantism, the movement attracted conservative Catholics, Mormons, and Jews. The Religious Right also unified a variety of Protestant groups that had previously disagreed on issues ranging from abortion to the civil rights movement. New socially conservative organizations included the fundamentalist Baptists like those to whom Jerry Falwell preached, Pentecostals like those loyal to Pat Robertson, and both northern and southern Baptists. Historians point to a number of long- and short-term trends that contributed to the rise of this form of social conservativism: for example, the fragmentation of the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, the rapid demographic growth of populations naturally attracted to evangelical Christianity, and the migration of a significant number of Americans to states in the Sunbelt.

Members of the Religious Right themselves claimed to have been inspired by important cultural, social, and economic changes of the 1960s and 1970s. A list offered in the promotional materials put out in 1980 by one organization, the Moral Majority, may be representative: the Supreme

---


59 Sandbrook, supra note 55, at 329. For further discussion of Viguerie’s direct mail empire, see, for example, Gillian Peele, American Conservatism in Historical Perspective, in Crisis of Conservatism?: The Republican Party, the Conservative Movement and American Politics after Bush 15, 22 (Joel D. Aberbach & Gillian Peele eds., 2011).

60 See Sandbrook, supra note 55, at 357.

61 See Joel Kotkin, Ready on the Right: Christian Soldiers Are on the March, WASH. POST, Aug. 25, 1979, at A10. Jerry Falwell, the head of the Moral Majority, a leading Religious Right organization, stressed the diversity of his own organization and of social conservatives more generally. Id.

62 Id.

63 See Williams, supra note 57, at 5–6. Notably, there had previously been disagreements between Billy Graham’s National Association of Evangelicals (“NAE”) and mostly southern fundamentalist groups about the propriety of clergy involvement in the civil rights movement. See id. There were also differences of opinion on abortion. For example, as early as 1973, both fundamentalist groups and the NAE opposed Roe. Id. at 114–16. By contrast, between 1971 and 1976, the position of the Southern Baptist Conference was that abortion should be permitted when there was evidence of rape, incest, severe fetal deformity, or a “likelihood of damage to the emotional, mental, [or] physical health of the mother.” See id. at 115–16.

Court had banned school prayer and had legalized abortion, the women’s movement had won influential allies in criticizing some aspects of the traditional family, and gays and lesbians had become more visible and more vocal in demanding equal treatment.65 Between 1956 and 1977, the spread of Christian television broadcasting reinforced concern about these social changes: among others, Pat Robertson founded the Christian Broadcasting Network ("CBN") in 1970, and Jerry Falwell began broadcasting The Old Time Gospel Hour in 1956.66

Falwell’s Moral Majority seemed be part of an important religious and cultural shift. By 1976, both Time and Newsweek reported on polling data from the American Institute of Public Opinion that led George Gallup Jr. to proclaim 1976 as the “Year of the Evangelicals.”67 In a 1976 Gallup Poll, 34% of respondents claimed to have had a born-again religious experience, and nearly half of all Protestants polled agreed that the Bible “is to be taken literally.”68

By the mid- to late 1970s, as this Article will show, the Religious Right had become a political force—a grassroots movement with a highly structured and professional leadership. One influential group, Christian Voice, was founded in 1978 as part of the Heritage Foundation.69 By 1979, the organization had 100,000 members and a governing board that included fourteen members of Congress.70 The Moral Majority, another Religious Right organization, had a $3 million budget in its first year, one-third of which was raised in one month alone.71 Described by Falwell as a “coalition capable of steering America away from liberal, humanist and secular tendencies,” the Moral Majority was also quickly establishing its political

66 On the CBN, see DIAMOND, supra note 64, at 12–15. For an account given by Falwell’s wife of the founding of The Old Time Gospel Hour, see MACEL FALWELL & MELANIE HENRY, JERRY FALWELL: HIS LIFE AND LEGACY 45–46 (2008).
68 See Religion: Counting Souls, supra note 67.
70 See, e.g., Kotkin, supra note 61.
71 See id.
influence. By December 1979, Falwell was reaching an audience of 2.5 million and was raising $1 million a week in mail contributions.

Founded in 1979 by former Colgate Palmolive salesman Ed McAteer, a third organization, the Religious Roundtable, was focused on encouraging conservative Christians to become politically involved. The group came to include many of the best-known televangelists, including Falwell and Robertson. During the Reagan Administration, when Christian conservatives angrily protested the nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Court, Ronald Reagan’s White House was obliged to assuage the concerns of Roundtable members, both in private sessions and in the media.

During Reagan’s presidential campaign, to an unprecedented extent, the antiabortion movement allied itself with both the New Right and the Religious Right. For example, having failed for several years to secure a vote against the Equal Rights Amendment (“ERA”), in 1977, the National Right to Life Committee (“NRLC”), the nation’s largest antiabortion group, finally passed a resolution condemning the Amendment. The same year, those at the helm of major antiabortion organizations like the NRLC and March for Life appeared at a “pro-family” event led by Phyllis Schlafly, and the leaders of these groups joined in condemning not only abortion but also the ERA and publicly funded daycare.

Between 1977 and 1980, a number of self-identified evangelical Protestant antiabortion groups became prominent, including the influential Christian Action Council (“CAC”). At the same time, mainstream groups like the NRLC begin stressing openly religious arguments against abortion. In the early 1970s, mainstream antiabortion leaders routinely

---

72 Id.
75 See SANDBROOK, supra note 55, at 359–60.
79 See Klemesrud, supra note 78.
insisted that their movement had nothing to do with religion. For example, in 1974, the NRLC vigorously objected to claims that “the rationale for abortion laws is related only to the religious convictions of individual citizens, and to the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church in particular.”

By contrast, by October 1977, the NRLC had passed a resolution describing the organization as a religious (although not exclusively Catholic) organization, asserting that the “Right to Life Movement is founded upon the belief that God creates LIFE.” Other groups founded in the late 1970s, like Judie Brown’s American Life League (“ALL”), openly proclaimed a Catholic pro-life message.

At the same time, however, the leaders of the mainstream movement committed to a new pragmatism. As Keith Cassidy has documented, in the immediate aftermath of Roe, the movement focused primarily on passing a human life amendment that would have recognized rights to life from conception to natural death. The appeal of an amendment was twofold. First, such a measure would have banned many more abortions than even the restrictions in place in many states before Roe. Almost as importantly, as movement members saw it, an amendment would symbolize and communicate the movement’s ideological commitments and refusal to compromise. In 1973, for example, Joseph Witherspoon, an antiabortion activist and professor at the University of Texas School of Law, argued that an amendment was necessary not only to ban abortion but also to “assert[] a great moral and legal truth.” Indeed, the movement almost uniformly opposed amendments that would have overturned Roe and returned the abortion issue to the states. Activists described these measures as

---

83 For an official description of the ALL, see About Us, ALL, http://www.all.org/nav/index/heading/MTQ/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2012).
85 For proposals of constitutional amendments of this kind, see, for example, Letter from Nellie J. Gray 1 (Sept. 24, 1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, supra note 77; Memorandum from Joseph P. Witherspoon, Commitment to Pub. Policy Comm., to NRLC Exec. Comm. 1–7 (Aug. 14, 1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, supra note 77; Memorandum from Dennis Horan, NRLC Legal Advisory Comm., to NRLC Exec. Comm. (Sept. 5, 1973), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, supra note 77 (summarizing the views of antiabortion attorneys surveyed by the NRLC).
86 See Memorandum from Joseph P. Witherspoon, supra note 85, at 2–6.
87 See, e.g., Leo J. Tibesar, Report to the NRLC Policy Advisory Comm., Weighing the Merits for a States’ Rights Amendment 1–4 (Apr. 1974), in The American Citizens Concerned for Life Papers, supra
compromises that would permit states like New York to legalize abortion. 88

As Fordham law professor and antiabortion activist Robert Byrn explained in 1973: “[W]e are a right to life movement. I rather doubt that our people will come out in vast numbers to support an amendment which by inference says that unborn children have no right to life.” 89

By contrast, in the early 1980s, those who came to lead groups like the NRLC were more willing to compromise, especially in the context of a human life amendment to the Constitution. This became apparent after late September 1981, when Utah Senator Orrin Hatch proposed a federalism amendment that would return regulation of abortion to the states. 90

Although the measure was proposed as a practical middle-ground solution, mainstream antiabortion groups came out in favor of it. After a bitter debate, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops endorsed the proposal in November 1981. 91 Archbishop John Roach of Minneapolis, the President of the Conference, implied that the Bishops had endorsed a states’ rights amendment primarily because it was seen to be more politically feasible. 92

Similarly, in mid-December, a divided NRLC voted to endorse the Hatch amendment. 93 Indeed, Dr. John Willke, a leader of the organization, described it as part of a long-term, incremental strategy to chip away at Roe. 94 For the Reagan campaign, the movement mainstream had become an interesting and complicated potential partner. At the same time that the movement had become more socially conservative and even religious in its rhetoric, antiabortion leaders had made apparent a willingness to put

---

88 See id. at 2–3 (summarizing the views of William Ball, an attorney for the United States Catholic Conference, that a states’ rights amendment would “permit a state such as New York to have a statute which is very permissive with respect to abortion”).


92 See, e.g., Bishops Take a Risk, supra note 91; Steven V. Roberts, Catholic Bishops for Amendment Allowing States to Ban Abortions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1981, at A1.


94 There was disagreement within the movement about the desirability of incrementalism. For example, the American Life League, an anti-contraception, antiabortion organization, went further, labeling the proposal a “betrayal of the movement’s] supporters, as well as babies.” Beware of False Friends!, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES (Am. Life League), Oct. 1981, in The Wilcox Collection (on file with the University of Kansas); Down The Hatch!, A.L.L. ABOUT ISSUES (Am. Life League), Jan. 1982, in The Wilcox Collection, supra.
political success and strategic savvy before the abstract principles the movement espoused.

The summer 1980 platform announced at the Republican National Convention was designed in part to attract these antiabortion leaders, as well as their allies in the New Right. At first, the Reagan campaign avoided the kinds of arguments made against judicial activism in the courts or in the academy, instead stressing the kind of natural-law proposal many first-generation originalists had found objectionable. In particular, the platform proposed “the appointment of judges at all levels of the judiciary who respect traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.” The judicial selection plank immediately won praise from social conservatives. Jerry Falwell stated that the platform could hardly have been better if leaders of the Religious Right had written it themselves.

By October 1980, the judicial selection plank had drawn criticism from lawyers in both political parties, as well as from the American Bar Association House of Delegates, which had voted to oppose Reagan’s proposal to select judges “on the basis of particular ideological or political philosophies.” Initially, Reagan defended the platform, arguing: “We all ought to have a compassion for innocent human life.” Over time, however, the Reagan campaign revised its judicial selection proposal, balancing the interests of social conservatives and antiabortion leaders on the one hand and lawyers who advocated impartiality on the other.

Leading this effort was Reagan advisor William French Smith. In November 1980, he worked to characterize Reagan’s interest in antiabortion judges as a desire to select only those judges who rejected what Smith saw as the judicial activism of the Warren and Burger Courts. Smith did not make clear how Reagan thought judges should interpret the Constitution, but he drew on some of the attacks made on unprincipled judging by critics like Rehnquist and Bork. He explained: “In a nutshell, [Reagan’s] political
philosophy is the laws of the country should be made by the legislature and construed by the judiciary, and, to the extent possible, not made by the judiciary.”

Given Reagan’s prior commitment to pro-life judges and his need to address legal critics, abortion opponents could easily have understood Smith’s statements as code for opposition to abortion. At the same time, though, Smith’s language was vague enough to appease abortion rights supporters, especially after October 1980, when Reagan responded to feminist demands that a woman be nominated to the Supreme Court.

In either case, with the support of grassroots conservatives, Reagan and the Republican Party were spectacularly successful in 1980. Reagan handily beat incumbent Jimmy Carter, carrying forty-four of fifty states. For the first time in twenty-five years, Republicans retook the Senate. It seemed likely that a Reagan nominee could successfully navigate the Senate on his or her way to the Supreme Court. The remaining question was what kind of judges Reagan would appoint.

1. The O’Connor Dispute, 1981

Antiabortion activists believed that they had the answer to this question in early July 1981, when Reagan announced the nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor to the Supreme Court. In her time as an Arizona legislator, O’Connor had several opportunities to weigh in on policy questions involving sex and reproduction. In the early 1970s, she had signed a statement calling for population control in the United States that had been drafted by Dick Lamm, the leader of an effort to reform Colorado’s abortion ban. O’Connor had also been an acquaintance of Dr. Carolyn Gerster, a recent president of the NRLC, the nation’s largest antiabortion group. After the nomination was announced, Gerster immediately informed the rest of the antiabortion community that, during her time in the

---

104 Elizabeth Olson, *Reagan May Have His Chance to Appoint*, BRYAN TIMES, Nov. 10, 1980.
108 CRITCHLOW, supra note 74, at 199.
109 Id.
110 JOAN BISKUPIC, *SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR: HOW THE FIRST WOMAN ON THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE* 78–79 (2005); CRITCHLOW, supra note 74, at 199.
Arizona State Legislature, O’Connor had supported the Equal Rights Amendment and had voted in favor of an abortion liberalization bill.\(^{111}\)

Members of the antiabortion movement were outraged by the nomination. Representative Henry Hyde informed Edwin Meese III, a longtime Reagan advisor and then-Counselor to the President, that he would oppose the selection.\(^{112}\) Dr. John Willke, then-President of the NRLC, threatened to attack O’Connor in the press if her nomination were not withdrawn.\(^{113}\) Harold O. J. Brown, the head of the Christian Action Council, an evangelical Protestant antiabortion group, wrote Meese that the nomination would have a “disastrous effect . . . on the enthusiasm of the evangelical community for President Reagan.”\(^{114}\)

Publicly, before the confirmation hearings began, the Reagan Administration paid little attention to the antiabortion attacks. In August 1981, Reagan himself described Carolyn Gerster as “vindictive.”\(^{115}\) An anonymous aide told the *New York Times*: “[T]here’s going to be a lot of sound and fury, but in the end, it’s going to end up signifying little or nothing . . . .”\(^{116}\) Less publicly, however, as we shall see, Edwin Meese argued to Reagan and the rest of the Administration that more had to be done to convince both the movement and the general public of the problems with judicial activism.

During Reagan’s first term, Meese had become an unofficial go-between for social conservatives, and the O’Connor nomination proved to be no exception. In a memorandum to Meese, one of his aides claimed that antiabortion advocates believed that the courts had “been engaged in a systematic effort to prevent the public from working its will on the subject of abortion.”\(^{117}\) In fact, movement members had never emphasized such an argument—the White House, not activists, had stressed the subject of judicial overreaching.\(^{118}\)

---

\(^{111}\) See Biskupic, supra note 110, at 84–86

\(^{112}\) See Memorandum from Max Friedersdorf to Jim Baker et al. (July 6, 1981), in The Edwin Meese III Papers (on file with Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Cal., OA 2408).

\(^{113}\) Memorandum from Marilee Melvin to Ed Meese (July 6, 1981), in The Edwin Meese III Papers, supra note 112.

\(^{114}\) Memorandum from Michael Uhlmann to Edwin Meese (July 6, 1981), in The Edwin Meese III Papers, supra note 112.


\(^{117}\) Memorandum from Michael Uhlmann to Edwin Meese (July 6, 1981), in The Edwin Meese III Papers, supra note 112.

\(^{118}\) Some anti-activism arguments circulated within the antiabortion movement in the early 1970s. For example, the Board of Directors for the National Right to Life Committee passed a resolution condemning the *Roe* Court for its “irresponsible exercise of raw judicial powers . . . .” Nat’l Right to
The memorandum continued: “Whatever one may think of that argument, or of the merits of abortion itself, the intensity of right-to-lifers on the issue of judicial power should not be underestimated.” The memorandum proposed a nomination strategy that would cater to antiabortion advocates without appearing to be partisan: “It does not follow that a pro-lifer must be nominated. It does follow, I think, that the nominee’s record on the issue be examined with special scrutiny and that the nominee regard *Roe v. Wade* and its progeny as most unwise assertions of judicial power.” Although several years would pass before the Reagan Administration would be in a position to implement the ideas set forth in the memorandum, the basic outline of a strategy was in place. The antiabortion movement could be won over not by criticizing legal abortion but rather by condemning the *Roe* Court’s activism. Nonetheless, the Grassroots Right would play a more complex role than might have been predicted, creating as well as responding to claims about judicial activism.

2. Reworking the Argument

During the O’Connor confirmation hearings, leaders of the NRLC and other antiabortion groups challenged the connection between rejecting judicial activism and banning abortion. In congressional testimony, Father Charles Fiore, a member of the National Pro-Life Action Committee, the nation’s largest direct-action protest antiabortion organization, rejected the idea of judicial restraint and demanded open hostility to *Roe*.

As he explained: “I find [O’Connor’s] philosophy as exemplified in her record as a legislator and leader in the State Senate of Arizona [to be] clearly proabortion, and so on the basis of criteria set forth by the platform of the majority party in the Senate . . . she would appear to be unqualified.” A beleaguered Carolyn Gerster also expressed doubt about Reagan’s promise

---

119 Memorandum from Michael Uhlmann to Edwin Meese, *supra* note 117.
120 *Id.*
122 *Nomination of Sandra Day O’Connor, supra* note 121 (statement of Father Charles Fiore).
to select “strict constructionists,” accusing the Administration of “misrepresentation, evasion, and distortion of fact . . .”123

Other advocates opposed to O’Connor, however, offered novel claims about the justifications for rejecting judicial activism. For example, Gordon Jones of United Families for America, a socially conservative grassroots lobbying group, explained that O’Connor’s supposed approval of Roe proved her judicial philosophy to be irrevocably flawed.124 As he asserted: “[T]he issue is not abortion but judicial activism. Roe v. Wade happens to be the worst example of judicial activism in this century . . .”125 He even addressed the Supreme Court, suggesting that the justices should be concerned about the “seriousness of the loss of faith experienced by the federal courts in recent years.”126

In his congressional testimony, Dr. John Willke elaborated further on this argument. As Willke stated, “The Supreme Court’s 1973 abortion decision had no authentic basis in the Constitution. Rather, they constituted the most extreme examples of ‘judicial activism’ . . . in this century . . .”127 He contended that O’Connor was, by definition, an activist if she regarded “the 1973 abortion decisions as constitutional . . . .”128

Willke also developed a set of social and political justifications for undoing Roe. He first argued: “We exist as a movement because of . . . Roe . . . .”129 Although he himself had been involved in antiabortion activism before Roe was decided,130 he asserted that Roe had created and sustained a movement against abortion.131 Next, he claimed that Roe had destroyed any possibility of political compromise: “[W]e live in a Nation that is totally polarized on this issue. Unlike other issues in the body politic, there is no midground, there is no compromise. A baby is either a baby or not . . . .”132 Willke played on public anxiety about the emotion and intensity of the abortion debate. As he framed it, the best way to produce a cooler, more
rational debate was to overrule Roe. Willke was not yet making an argument for originalism as such. Instead, his consequence-based claim was made primarily against Roe and what he understood to be judicial activism.

Significantly, first-generation originalist scholars or other members of the elite had not yet used such consequence-based arguments, either in criticizing Roe or in defending originalism. The dominant defense instead was a theoretical one: originalism was portrayed as the only principled, law-like philosophy and the only one consistent with democratic principles. Bork had suggested that judicial activism was illegitimate regardless of its consequences, although admitting that the public might no longer support judicial review if a judge made “explicit the imposition of his own will . . . .”133

Raoul Berger and William Rehnquist specifically addressed the consequences of judicial activism. Berger presented the Court’s usurpation of self-government as the only relevant “consequence” of judicial activism.134 No decision, even Brown v. Board of Education, was enough to offset “countenancing undeniable judicial arrogations of power . . . .”135 Moreover, Berger did not offer the effects of judicial activism as a stand-alone argument for originalism. Instead, he brought up the issue only in response to those who had argued for living constitutionalism by pointing to its beneficial results (and in particular to the decision in Brown).136

Rehnquist went one step further, looking at historical examples of activist decision-making.137 If living constitutionalism had given the public Brown, as Rehnquist reasoned, it had also led to the Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford, a notoriously racist decision striking down the Missouri Compromise on slavery.138 Rehnquist did offer some explanation as to why the Dred Scott Court’s activism was so disastrous, highlighting the “injury [it caused] to the reputation of the Supreme Court . . . .”139 Just the same, Rehnquist did not yet offer the negative consequences of activist decision-making as an affirmative justification for his own philosophy.140

---

133 Bork, supra note 2, at 4.
134 See, e.g., Berger, supra note 44, at 392–93.
135 Id.
137 See generally Rehnquist, supra note 44.
138 See id. at 700–04. For the decision in Dred Scott, see 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
139 Rehnquist, supra note 44, at 702.
140 See id. at 700–02. There were hints of a consequence-based argument against Roe before Willke gave his testimony. First, writing in dissent in Roe, Justice Byron White explained that Roe would deprive the states and the people of the opportunity “to weigh the relative importance of the continued existence and development of the fetus, on one hand, against a spectrum of possible impacts on the
Of course, Willke was offering only arguments against judicial activism, not justifications for originalism as such. Just the same, his arguments made an important contribution to conversation about judicial legitimacy and judicial activism. He pointed to social and political consequences that followed from activism instead of merely asserting that it was undemocratic. He also suggested that the consequences of activism were one of the main reasons for forsaking it. Why avoid judicial overreaching? As Willke framed it, to answer this question, one needed only look at the aftermath of *Roe v. Wade*.


In the early 1980s, as we shall see, not all grassroots activists were convinced of the utility of Willke’s claims about judicial activism. In the fall of 1981, in the aftermath of the confirmation, antiabortion leaders believed that it would be more effective to restructure the courts than it would be to try to change the interpretive method most judges employed or to focus on the issue of judicial nominations. In September 1981, at a Religious Right convention, Phyllis Schlafly instead argued for the abolition of lifetime tenure for federal judges.141 In November, Weyrich’s Free Congress Foundation put out a book entitled *A Blueprint for Judicial Reform*, a volume partly focused on proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction.142 That fall, as many as thirty jurisdiction-stripping bills were circulating in Congress.143

mother, on the other hand.” *Doe v. Bolton*, 410 U.S. 179, 222 (1973) (White, J., dissenting). However, White was primarily establishing why *Roe* was undemocratic. See id. at 221–23. He was not predicting or describing the consequences of the opinion. See id. Nor was he using those consequences as a justification for a different method of constitutional interpretation. See id. Similarly, in 1975, Professor Joseph Witherspoon of the University of Texas Law School, a leading member of the antiabortion movement and the National Right to Life Committee, did formulate some kind of consequence-based criticism of *Roe*. See *S.J. Res. 6, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States for Guaranteeing the Right of Life to the Unborn; S.J. Res. 10 and S.J. 11, Proposing an Amendment to the Constitution of the United States for the Protection of Unborn Children and Other Persons*: *Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary*, 94th Cong. 523–37 (1975) (statement of Joseph P. Witherspoon, Professor of Law, Univ. of Tex. Sch. of Law). Witherspoon contended that *Roe* "stirred the American populace as have few decisions of the Supreme Court since that institution came into being.” Id. at 549. However, Witherspoon invoked these consequences only as evidence that the American people shared a commonsense judgment “that the unborn human child is a human being who from conception to birth is indistinguishable in any essential way from any other human being after birth . . . .” Id. at 540.

Another option was the ratification of a human life amendment. Indeed, Orrin Hatch presented his proposed amendment as a solution to the kind of judicial activism highlighted by the White House.\footnote{Mary Thornton, Catholics Back Hatch Bill to Curb Abortion, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 1981, at A3.} In campaigning for the proposal, he stressed that the Supreme Court justices had, in \textit{Roe}, “impose[d] their personal standards on 230 million Americans,” mistakenly intervening in “moral and social issues.”\footnote{Id.}

In spite of a somewhat belated campaign by President Reagan in support of the amendment, antiabortion members of Congress could not muster the votes to end a filibuster on the proposal that began in September 1982.\footnote{Bill Peterson, Senate, Despite Appeals by Reagan, Refuses to Break Abortion Filibuster, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 1982, at A10.} Some in the movement despised the amendment, since it did not announce the personhood of the fetus and made it possible to force individual states to deny the humanity of the unborn child.\footnote{For examples of this view, see Abortion—Part IV: Hearings on S.J. Res. 6, S.J. Res. 10 and 11, and S.J. Res. 91 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 106–08 (1974) (statement of Robert M. Byrn, Professor, Fordham Univ. Law School) (criticizing a states’ rights amendment as putting “the right to live at the perpetual mercy of shifting legislative majorities”). Byrn went so far as to argue that, if a states’ rights amendment were passed, it might be the “worst” outcome yet seen in the debate, for it would “expound the principle that some human beings are not human persons . . . .” Id. at 108; see also Proposed Constitutional Amendments on Abortion: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 304 (1976) (statement of Humberto Cardinal Medeiros) (arguing that a states rights amendment would be inadequate because “[p]rotection of human life should not depend on geographical boundaries”).} Because some advocates viewed it as a betrayal of the movement’s guiding philosophy, it seemed that the Hatch proposal had cast serious doubt on the connection between discouraging judicial activism and banning abortion.

In the fall of 1981, when the Reagan Justice Department again stressed arguments about judicial activism, Administration officials borrowed from and modified the antiabortion movement’s political justifications for avoiding activist decision-making and overruling \textit{Roe}. For example, beginning in October 1981, Attorney General French Smith gave a series of speeches outlining the priorities of the Justice Department.\footnote{Excerpts from Attorney General’s Remarks on Plans of Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1981, at A22.} Without mentioning or defining a jurisprudence of original intent, he explained that the Justice Department would “focus upon the doctrines that have led to the courts’ activism.”\footnote{Id.} He singled out “the right to marry, the right to procreate, the right of interstate travel, and the right of sexual privacy that, among other things, may have spawned a right, with certain limitations, to
have an abortion.” While not explicitly condemning any of the Court’s decisions on these subjects, he labeled them arbitrary and “constitutionally dubious and unwise intrusions upon the legislative domain.”

Nevertheless, he put as much emphasis on political reasons for rejecting judicial activism. In issuing decisions like Roe, as he explained, the Court risked losing its own independence and prestige because of “subjective judicial policy-making as opposed to reasoned legal interpretation.” Like Dr. John Willke, he attributed both antiabortion outrage and the 1980 election to dismay with decisions like Roe. As he put it: “We believe that the groundswell of conservatism evidenced by the 1980 election makes this an especially appropriate time to urge upon the courts more principled bases [of decision-making] that would diminish judicial activism.”

Together, Smith’s speeches and the O’Connor confirmation hearings also helped to increase the prominence of judicial activism arguments in mainstream antiabortion advocacy. In 1982, Reverend Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority and Richard Viguerie put out books on Roe v. Wade and judicial activism, stressing that Roe was “made against the tide of public opinion” and had earned “condemnation by large segments of the public as well as legal scholars . . . .”

The new prominence of activism arguments was even more apparent in June 1983, after the Supreme Court decided City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health. The Court invalidated several abortion restrictions introduced by the city of Akron, including a twenty-four hour waiting period and an informed consent provision.

Instead of simply condemning the morality of the decision or speaking out in favor of the personhood of fetuses, antiabortion leaders also emphasized the issue of judicial activism. Senator Roger Jepsen, an avowed opponent of legal abortion, contended that, in Akron, “the Supreme Court [was] completely out of their jurisdiction.” Gary Curran, a leading member of the American Life Lobby, added: “The Supreme Court thinks

150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 Id.
156 Id. at 446–51.
they are a super legislature for every city, town, county and state in America.”158


In 1984, several political events again made antiabortion activists downplay claims about judicial activism, including the consequentialist claims created at the grassroots level. As historian Daniel K. Williams has shown, in 1984 social conservatives made apparent that abortion was their leading issue, not simply one among many.159 In trying to win back the disillusioned Religious Right, Reagan adopted the more overtly moral arguments that the movement had publicized in the 1970s. As part of his effort to solidify support among social conservatives, Reagan even published a book in 1984, Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation.160 The book did restate judicial activism arguments against Roe, contending “abortion-on-demand is not a right granted by the Constitution” and calling Roe an act of “raw judicial power.”161 Much of the book focused, however, on moral and medical claims: arguments that “[m]odern medicine treats the unborn child as a patient” or that “[w]e cannot diminish the value of one category of human life—the unborn—without diminishing the value of all human life.”162

For their part, advocates on both sides of the debate primarily addressed a prominent film, Silent Scream.163 The film was narrated by one of the most controversial antiabortion activists, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, a man who had once been a leading member of the abortion rights movement and a founding member of NARAL (originally the National Association for the Repeal of Abortion Laws and, later, the National Abortion Rights Action League).164 Narrated by Nathanson, the film depicted the abortion of a twelve-week-old fetus.165 The film energized the movement, which spent millions of dollars to screen the film on television news programs and in schools.166 In a January 1985 conversation with Nellie Gray of March for

158 Id.
159 See Williams, supra note 57, at 207.
161 Id. at 16.
162 Id. at 18, 21.
164 Id.
166 See, e.g., Betty Cuniberti & Elizabeth Mehren, “Silent Scream”: Abortion Film Stirs Friend,
Life, Reagan expressed hope that the film would sway Congress to pass legislation limiting abortion.167

The film prompted a strong response from the abortion rights movement, one framed in the same moral terms used by the opposition. In 1985, NARAL began a campaign entitled “Abortion Rights: Silent No More,” in which the group rounded up 40,000 letters from Americans who had benefited from the availability of legal abortion.168 In August 1985, Planned Parenthood planned to spend approximately $900,000 on newspaper and magazine ads in support of the campaign, showing the faces and names of women who had had abortions.169

By the summer of 1985, the abortion debate had shifted again, raising interest in the issue of judicial activism. By June 1985, Douglas Johnson of the NRLC concluded that there would not likely be a dramatic change in Congress leading to passage of legislation that would overrule Roe.170 The best strategy for the antiabortion movement was to abandon the doomed human life amendment and take up a more productive project. Johnson predicted a new focal point for debate: “The president has said he believes [Roe v. Wade was] unconstitutional and we expect his nominees to reflect that.”171

As leading studies suggest, Edwin Meese, Reagan’s second Attorney General, also brought new attention to the issues of judicial activism and originalism.172 By the summer of 1985, Meese began a campaign to reach the broader legal community, an effort he launched with a July speech before the American Bar Association.173 The July speech was considerably more detailed than the Administration’s previous analyses of judicial philosophy. Under French Smith, the Justice Department had primarily condemned “legislating from the bench” without fully explaining what restrained judges would do.174 By contrast, in the July speech, Meese endorsed an “endeavor to resurrect the original meaning of [the Constitution] . . . .”175 He urged courts to focus on discerning the motives of

---

168 See Cuniberti & Mehren, supra note 166.
169 Id.
171 Id.
172 See, e.g., Post & Siegel, supra note 3, at 550–51.
174 See Excerpts from Attorney General’s Remarks, supra note 148.
175 See Editorial, supra note 173.
the Constitution’s framers and, if necessary, looking to the history and context of particular constitutional provisions.\textsuperscript{176} He also borrowed heavily from the political justifications for overruling 

\textit{Roe} that the antiabortion movement had created in the early 1980s.\textsuperscript{177} As Meese presented them, however, these were arguments not just for undoing \textit{Roe} but also for adopting originalist interpretive methods.\textsuperscript{178} The Court’s decisions, like \textit{Roe}, had generated controversy and popular anger, producing “intense feelings” on subjects about which “the public [was] widely divided.”\textsuperscript{179} As he argued, originalism would allow the Court to avoid “the charge of being either too conservative or too liberal.”\textsuperscript{180}

At the same time, in the mid-1980s, consequence-based claims slowly began to feature in the work of originalist scholars. For example, in 1985, in discussing the Supreme Court’s opinion in \textit{Dred Scott}, Graglia mentioned the social and political impact of this decision: “Preventing political settlement . . . and apparently making the Civil War inevitable. . . .”\textsuperscript{181} He also made clear that “[t]he consequences of that decision . . . must weigh heavily in any overall assessment [of it].”\textsuperscript{182} For the most part, however, in 1987, when Robert Bork was nominated to the Supreme Court, consequentialist arguments against \textit{Roe} or for originalism had not become prominent in the academy or in the courts.\textsuperscript{183} As we have seen, many antiabortion activists were not yet convinced of the relevance of the issue of judicial activism to their cause.

By the end of Bork’s confirmation hearings, as we shall see, members of the Grassroots Right had begun to emphasize the issue of judicial activism to a much greater extent, convinced as they were that originalism would lead to the undoing of \textit{Roe}. In turn, by the early 1990s, to a greater

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{176} Id.
\item \textsuperscript{177} See id.
\item \textsuperscript{178} Meese Says Justices Heed Policy Instead of Principle, \textsc{L.A. Times}, July 9, 1985, at 1, available at 1985 WLNR 984844.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Aaron Epstein, Meese: I Didn’t Mean to Attack High Court, \textsc{Miami Herald}, July 11, 1985.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Meese Says Justices Heed Policy Instead of Principle, supra note 178.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Graglia, supra note 6, at 439–40.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Id.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
extent, scholars and jurists had begun to stress the consequence-based claims developed at the grassroots level.

5. The Meaning of Robert Bork

By 1987, Robert Bork had become the best known judicial and academic defender of originalism, as well as an outspoken critic of *Roe v. Wade*, primarily citing his opposition to substantive due process. In introducing Bork to the American public in July 1987, the Reagan Administration—led by Chief of Staff Jim Baker—wanted to downplay Bork’s views on *Roe* and present him as an apolitical figure. For example, a talking points memorandum issued by the White House framed the issue as “whether the judges and the courts are called upon . . . to interpret the laws . . . or whether judges and the courts should write orders and opinions which are, in effect, new laws—the ‘activist’ view.” Since 1986, the Administration had been concerned about what one Reagan aide described as “opposition efforts to position the federal courts as ‘the tool of the far right’ under Reagan.” In September 1987, the Administration responded that “[i]deology should have no role” in Bork’s hearings. The only interest groups shaping the process, the Administration suggested, were those opposed to Bork—what the Administration called “individuals and groups who have long demonstrated [that] they are outside the American political mainstream.”

It was abortion rights groups that fought back most effectively against this portrayal of Bork. At the head of these efforts was an alliance of left-wing advocacy groups known as the Block Bork Coalition. The organization was formed by the groups that had previously comprised Ralph Neas’s Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, a union of labor, civil-rights, women’s-rights, disability-rights, and elderly-rights groups, and

---


185 Judge Robert H. Bork, The President’s Nominee to the Supreme Court, Overview (July 28, 1987), in White House Papers, Series III (on file with Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Cal.).

186 Memorandum from Tom Gibson to Pat Buchanan, Judicial Appointments Theme (Feb. 24, 1986), in Bork Subject File, Series III (on file with Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, Cal.).


Nan Aron’s Alliance for Justice, a smaller collection of groups that specialized in judicial nominations and in litigation.¹⁹⁰

After conducting extensive focus group research, in August 1987 the Coalition developed “themes” and “talking points” memos that offered the broad outlines of a strategy to defeat Bork. The August “Themes Memo” contended that, if Bork succeeded, particular political results would be guaranteed.¹⁹¹ He would “provide the decisive vote to turn back the clock for a number of decisions,” including those on abortion.¹⁹² As the Coalition described it, the current Supreme Court was relatively apolitical, and most citizens “accept[ed] and want[ed] to put behind them rulings on issues like abortion.”¹⁹³ A political crusader, Bork would introduce change and instability into the law.

As we shall see, Bork helped to confirm the view of him presented by both the antiabortion and abortion rights movements. In his opening statements before Congress, Bork insisted that he had a healthy respect for precedent, especially because judging required more circumspection than did life in the legal academy.¹⁹⁴ When pressed on his views about Roe, however, Bork described the privacy decisions leading to it as “utterly inadequate.”¹⁹⁵ He deemed Roe itself to be a decision “contain[ing] almost no legal reasoning.”¹⁹⁶ Under questioning, he admitted to thinking that Roe had been wrongly decided but proposed that the opinion might be “so deeply embedded” in the precedent and practice of the country that it could not be overturned.¹⁹⁷

To many antiabortion activists, the Bork confirmation hearings made clear that originalism did produce desirable results: Bork himself had suggested that an originalist Court would not have created Roe v. Wade.¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁰ See generally id. at 36–61 (summarizing the founding of the Coalition).
¹⁹¹ See id. at 137–39.
¹⁹² Id. at 138.
¹⁹³ Id.
¹⁹⁵ GARROW, supra note 184, at 669.
¹⁹⁶ Id.
¹⁹⁷ Lauter, supra note 194.
¹⁹⁸ Judicial activism rhetoric became a staple of antiabortion advocacy. When George H. W. Bush announced the nomination of David Souter to the Supreme Court, Coalitions for America, a Paul Weyrich-headed alliance of antiabortion groups that included Concerned Women for America, stressed the nominee’s record approvingly as one of “interpreting, not legislating.” Jason DeParle, Souter Approval Urged by Conservative Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1990, at A20, available at 1990 WLNR 2984733. In June 1991, when Thurgood Marshall announced his retirement from the Supreme Court, Douglas Scott, then-Vice President of the Christian Action Council, an evangelical Protestant antiabortion group, stated: “Marshall is the most activist jurist of this century, and his resignation is good news for the country and the pro-life movement.” Andrew Rosenthal, Marshall Retires from High
In time, as will become clear, these activists argued not only against <em>Roe</em> but also for originalism. In turn, consequence-based arguments against <em>Roe</em> seemed more salient to the originalist scholars, jurists, and sympathizers dismayed by the tenor and outcome of Bork’s nomination hearings.

Consequence-based arguments figured centrally in originalist scholarship and jurisprudence in the aftermath of the Bork hearings. In 1990, Bork himself took up these claims. He attributed antiabortion “demonstrations, marches, television advertisements, and mass mailings” to the <em>Roe</em> Court’s activism.1999 Because the Court had not relied on constitutional text or history, as Bork portrayed it, the <em>Roe</em> Court was “perceived, correctly, as political.”200 He described a threat to the Supreme Court’s legitimacy and “integrity” that was no longer abstract but evident in social and political changes.201

A similar argument featured in Justice Scalia’s 1992 dissent in <em>Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey</em>,202 the opinion in which a divided Supreme Court preserved but narrowed <em>Roe</em>.203 Like the <em>Casey</em> majority, Scalia focused on the “political pressure” that <em>Roe</em> had produced.204 However, Scalia urged the Court to pay “more attention to the cause” of the unrest.205 In Scalia’s view, that cause was a “mode of constitutional adjudication that relies not upon text and traditional practice to determine the law, but upon what the Court calls ‘reasoned judgment,’ which turns out to be nothing but philosophical predilection . . . .”206

---

199  Bork, supra note 6, at 116.
200  Id.
201  See id.
203  See id. at 845–46 (plurality opinion).
204  Id. at 999–1001 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part).
205  Id. at 1000.
206  Id. (citation omitted).
What were the consequences of the *Roe* Court’s activism? Here again, Scalia echoed the arguments honed by activists like Willke: “[B]y foreclosing all democratic outlet for the deep passions this issue arouses, by banishing the issue from the political forum that gives all participants, even the losers, the satisfaction of a fair hearing and an honest fight, . . . the Court merely prolongs and intensifies the anguish.”\(^{207}\) Like Willke, Scalia offered an account of the social and political consequences of *Roe*.\(^{208}\) Moreover, like Willke, he presented the impact of the decision as a reason to undo it.\(^{209}\)

Following the decision of *Casey*, scholars adopted arguments similar to Scalia’s.\(^{210}\) Scalia himself made such arguments a centerpiece of his dissent in *Stenberg v. Carhart*, a decision striking down federal bans on partial-birth abortion.\(^{211}\) Scalia invoked the political and social consequences of both *Roe* and *Casey*. In his view, *Roe* “fanned into life an issue that has inflamed our national politics in general, and has obscured with its smoke the selection of Justices to this Court in particular . . . .”\(^{212}\) *Casey*, too, in Scalia’s words would lead to “the perpetuation of that disruption . . . .”\(^{213}\) In the end, as Scalia presented it, this political turmoil was an argument for decision-making based on “constitutional text [or] accepted tradition . . . .”\(^{214}\) The consequences of activism were a powerful argument for originalism, at least if the Court was interested in “its own preservation . . . .”\(^{215}\)

Consequence-based arguments against *Roe* and for originalism have become so prominent that many defending non-originalist interpretive methods have had to explain the impact of their own approaches.\(^{216}\) For example, in setting out a minimalist approach to constitutional

---

\(^{207}\) *Id.* at 1002.

\(^{208}\) *See id.* at 995 (“*Roe*’s mandate for abortion on demand destroyed the compromises of the past, rendered compromise impossible for the future, and required the entire issue to be resolved uniformly, at the national level.”).

\(^{209}\) *See id.* at 1002.


\(^{212}\) *Id.* at 956 (quoting *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 995–96 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part)).

\(^{213}\) *Id.* (quoting *Casey*, 505 U.S. at 996 (Scalia, J., dissenting in part)).

\(^{214}\) *Id.*

\(^{215}\) *Id.*

interpretation, Cass Sunstein argues that the consequences highlighted by Bork and Scalia emerged not because of a failure to adopt originalist methods but because the Court decided too much too soon. 217 Ruth Bader Ginsburg has argued that the consequences Scalia describes occurred because the Court did not offer an adequately convincing constitutional rationale for abortion rights, especially one based on sex equality. 218

Consequence-based arguments against Roe have become a central part of debate about the decision and about the best methods of constitutional interpretation. To a greater extent than is acknowledged in prior studies, many grassroots activists and social-movement members created important popular claims about judicial activism, claims that have become a meaningful part of first-generation originalist scholarship and jurisprudence.

C. Rethinking the Politics of Originalism

What more can the history considered here tell us about the politics of originalism? As we have seen, the appeal of originalism figures in studies on popular constitutionalism. 219 It is at the center of discussion about the jurisprudential merits of originalism. 220 Other studies look at the attraction of originalism in assessing why and how an interpretive method sustains public interest. 221 A common question runs through these debates: How do judges, professors, and politicians successfully popularize a judicial philosophy?

Scholars like Siegel and Greene envision the popularization of originalism as a dialogic process, in which elites and grassroots both participate. 222 Nevertheless, scholars analyzing the attraction of originalism often focus on the elites’ role in creating or explaining originalism and its justifications. 223 If we change the focal point of our analysis, we can better appreciate the importance of studying what kinds of exchanges have produced a politically successful judicial philosophy. As was the case with crucial arguments for overruling Roe, grassroots activists and social-movement members may well have played a central role in reshaping,

217 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 216, at 114–15.
219 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
220 See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
221 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
222 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
223 See supra notes 2 and 3 and accompanying text.
creating, or reinterpreting judicial activism claims that play an important part in justifying originalism.

As importantly, by stressing the role of elite actors, current scholarship has often assumed that the justifications for originalism offered by lay activists and government officials are one and the same. Indeed, grassroots advocates formulated and popularized their own definitions of judicial activism and judicial restraint.

1. Judicial Activism and the Radicals

One powerful example of this mode of reinterpretation can be seen in the claims made by the direct-action branch of the antiabortion movement in the 1980s. The radical wing of the movement was diverse and complex, especially by the late 1980s. For example, in 1981, Father Paul Marx founded one direct-action protest organization, Human Life International, in Gaithersburg, Maryland, focusing on clinic protests, while Mark Crutcher’s Life Dynamics sought to harass abortion providers by tying up their phone lines and suing for malpractice. Moreover, the line between the direct-action organizations and the older, generally more moderate groups was fluid. The American Life League, a mainstream conservative Catholic group, supported Operation Rescue, a direct-action protest unit, and adopted tactics similar to those of the Pro-Life Action League, another similar group.

Operation Rescue and the Pro-Life Action League were the largest and most influential direct-action protest groups. Although these organizations did not explicitly mention originalism or define restrained judging, they heavily emphasized the issue of judicial activism. Moreover, as this Article contends, these organizations also pioneered important claims on the subject.

---

224 On Marx and Human Life International, see, for example, MICHAEL W. CUNEO, THE SMOKE OF SATAN: CONSERVATIVE AND TRADITIONALIST DISSENT IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN CATHOLICISM 63 (1997). On Life Dynamics, see GARRON, supra note 184, at 715.


The most influential such group early in the 1980s, the Pro-Life Action League, was sustained largely because of the efforts of Joseph Scheidler.\(^{228}\) Born in Indiana to a prominent Roman Catholic family, Scheidler attended the University of Notre Dame, became a journalist, considered but ultimately decided not to join a Catholic religious order, and began teaching at journalism school.\(^{229}\) In 1974, he convinced the Illinois branch of the NRLC to hire him as director.\(^{230}\) In 1978, after he publicized a protest at the Concord Clinic in Chicago, he lost his job at Illinois Right to Life, but he and his remaining supporters within the group, including former Quaker Oats Vice President Tom Roeser, formed a new organization, Friends for Life (“FFL”).\(^{231}\) FFL established its reputation as the most radical organization of its kind—the “Green Berets of the right-to-life movement,” in the words of columnist Patrick Buchanan.\(^{232}\) In 1980, after a bitter internal battle, Scheidler left FFL, founding the Pro-Life Action League (“PLAL”) with his wife and one close ally.\(^{233}\)

Scheidler began publicizing claims about judicial activism in 1984, when he was building Pro-Life Action Network (“PLAN”), a network of direct-action protestors.\(^{234}\) At a Fort Lauderdale, Florida, meeting that attracted 600 activists, Scheidler relied on the illegality of Roe and on the existence of a more important moral law in justifying his own tactics and those of his supporters.\(^{235}\) However, Scheidler used his arguments against judicial activism in favor of the kind of natural law reasoning rejected by many first-generation originalists.\(^{236}\) As he explained in the New York Times in December 1984: “I consider sit-ins obedience to a higher law. I’ll stay after I’m told to leave as an act of desperation because I’m trying to save a life.”\(^{237}\)

Scheidler’s fame grew in 1985 when he published *Closed: 99 Ways to Stop Abortion*, a strategy manual for clinic protestors.\(^{238}\) That year, in responding to an increase in clinic bombings and other abortion-related

---

\(^{228}\) See generally CUNEO, supra note 224, at 59–61.

\(^{229}\) For a brief summary of Scheidler’s background, see generally id.

\(^{230}\) See, e.g., RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 121, at 108.

\(^{231}\) Id. at 110.

\(^{232}\) Id. at 111.

\(^{233}\) Id.


\(^{235}\) RISEN & THOMAS, supra note 121, at 113.

\(^{236}\) See supra note 6 and accompanying text.

\(^{237}\) Barron, supra note 234.

violence, Scheidler reiterated his claims about judicial activism and said he “neither condone[d] nor encourage[d] violence . . . . While perpetrators of vandalism must be willing to accept the consequences of their act, in a real sense their actions may be more than an option. For many, these actions constitute a moral obligation.”

As Scheidler became more prominent, he brought more attention to his claims about judicial tyranny in *Roe*. Moreover, as he explained to the *Chicago Tribune* in 1985, the Supreme Court had no authority “to force a [moral] view” on the public. The only consequence of this raw judicial power was obvious: the Court had “engender[ed] disrespect for the law . . . .”

Scheidler did echo some of the conventional claims made by first-generation originalists. But as we have seen, he also infused conventional judicial activism arguments with religious and natural law principles. These claims reworked and refracted conventional arguments against judicial activism.

An organization similar to Scheidler’s, Operation Rescue, became the most prominent such group in the late 1980s. At the beginning, Operation Rescue was the brainchild of Randall Terry. Like many evangelical Protestants of his generation, Terry was first exposed to arguments condemning abortion and judicial activism when reading the works of Francis Schaeffer. A pastor in the Reformed Presbyterian Church, a fundamentalist sect, Schaeffer had moved with his family in 1948 to L’Abri, Switzerland. He began his career in religious publishing in 1976 with *How Shall We Then Live?: The Rise and Decline of Western Thought and Culture*. In 1979, Schaeffer’s son, Frank, made the book into a film series. Appearing as the narrator of the film, Schaeffer described the erosion of American culture that had resulted from the abandonment of Biblical principles and the rule of God.
Judicial activism was both a cause and a symptom of secular humanism. Schaeffer argued that, in decisions like *Roe v. Wade*, “the Constitution of the United States can be made to say what the courts of the present want it to say—based a court’s decision as to what the court feels is sociologically helpful at the moment.” The justification for judicial activism—in Schaeffer’s words, the belief that “[l]aw has only a variable content”—came directly from man’s disastrous desire to be autonomous from God’s revelation.

In 1981, in *A Christian Manifesto*, Schaeffer elaborated on this theory. There, he identified *Roe* as a key example of judicial activism. He echoed academic arguments that *Roe* had no constitutional foundation and that the Court had made an essentially political decision that should have been left to the elected representatives of the people. He also asserted that the *Roe* Court’s activism was ungodly. *Roe* had made secular humanism into a constitutional principle, holding that “[o]ne choice is as valid as another.”

Influenced by Schaeffer, in 1984 Terry and his wife began protesting outside a local provider in Binghamton, New York, eventually leading boycotts. By 1986, he had made contact with Joseph Scheidler and the network of radical organizations he was in the process of building. A year later, Terry was well on his way to forming Operation Rescue.

Operation Rescue specialized in large protests and attracted substantial media attention: for example, between 1987 and 1988, 211 protestors were arrested in front of a Cherry Hill, New Jersey, clinic, 503 in New York, and 753 in Atlanta. The controversy made Terry himself something of a celebrity and brought attention to Terry’s arguments about judicial tyranny.

In February 1989, for example, when Operation Rescue was sponsoring a four-day protest predicted to draw several thousand participants, Reverend Randy Aller, an ally of Terry’s, explained: “Abortion is legal, but it’s not

---

249 *Id.* at 142, 176.
250 *Id.* at 142, 176.
251 *Id.* at 142, 176.
252 *Id.* at 142, 176.
253 *Id.* at 142, 176.
254 *Id.* at 142, 176.
255 *Id.* at 142, 176.
256 *Id.* at 142, 176.
257 *Id.* at 142, 176.
258 *Id.* at 142, 176.
259 *Id.* at 142, 176.
260 *Id.* at 142, 176.
261 *Id.* at 142, 176.
262 *Id.* at 142, 176.
263 *Id.* at 142, 176.
264 *Id.* at 142, 176.
265 *Id.* at 142, 176.
266 *Id.* at 142, 176.
267 *Id.* at 142, 176.
268 *Id.* at 142, 176.
269 *Id.* at 142, 176.
lawful—there’s a higher law.” In March, while fighting an injunction designed to block another protest, another ally echoed Terry’s claims that “[n]o judge . . . has the right to make it legal to kill children.” Later in 1989, when Operation Rescue had scheduled ninety protests, Terry and several colleagues were arrested for violating state trespass laws. Terry used the trial as a platform for his arguments about judicial overreaching.

In September 1989, when facing a California jury, Terry defended himself by condemning Roe. In rejecting the Court’s illegitimate decision, he had been “[standing] up to . . . tyranny.” Condemning Roe was compatible with both the Constitution and with biblical principles. As he explained to the jury, voting against Roe was not voting for anarchy. It was “calling for . . . justice.” Like Scheidler, Terry combined conventional arguments against judicial activism with natural law claims about the natural or divine law.

Terry, Scheidler, and their organizations meant something very different by judicial activism or judicial restraint than did Edwin Meese or Robert Bork. In criticizing the sweeping decision of the Roe Court, Terry and Scheidler marshaled not only constitutional but also explicitly religious and moral arguments. They saw no tension between the two and even argued that judges and juries should respect the “higher law.”

Moreover, concern about the democratic legitimacy of Roe or decisions like it was, for Terry and Scheidler, only one issue among many. Each activist assumed that the “higher law” always dictated the right answer. In decisions like Roe, the Court could be faulted for ignoring the will of the people. However, if “the people” had themselves come up with the wrong answer on abortion, Terry and Scheidler would have been no less likely to protest.

These activists make clear that judicial activism arguments used by grassroots activists can mean something quite different than the contentions that are prominent in the academy. We have mostly missed these rich,

263 See, e.g., Jones, supra note 262.
264 See, e.g., id.
265 Id.
266 Id.
267 See id.; Witt, supra note 239.
alternative understandings because we have assumed that grassroots actors simply adopted the claims pioneered by academics and judges. The truth is much more complex.

III. CONCLUSION

Why has originalism acquired so much popular momentum? In the academy, studies have focused on the role of law professors, judges, and members of recent Republican presidential administrations.

The history of consequence-based justifications for overruling *Roe* offers a different perspective on important, legitimacy-based arguments for originalism. This history has several important implications. First, this Article raises questions about scholarship suggesting that *Roe* created the kind of crisis of legitimacy described by abortion opponents. Social-movement members, many of whom were active before *Roe*, popularized claims that the decision created the antiabortion movement and precipitated a crisis of judicial legitimacy. We should be careful about assuming the historical truth of claims that have so obvious a political and instrumental purpose.

Second, this Article highlights the extent to which important justifications for originalism were forged in a dialogue between social-movement members, elite and grassroots actors. Significantly, lay activists added arguments of their own to the discussion. This suggests that ordinary citizens are not simply consumers, students, or members of an audience. At least in the abortion context, they are also contributors and creators. This Article shows that too little is known about how grassroots actors understand and deploy the rhetoric of judicial restraint. To the extent that the history considered here is an example, lay advocates have been more influential, active, and inventive in this process than is currently thought.

Finally, studies asking how any judicial philosophy gains political currency may have obscured the history of important justifications for originalism and important arguments about judicial legitimacy. If we focus primarily on the ways that the elites inspire, educate, and mobilize citizens behind any interpretive method, we might miss important contributions made by grassroots actors. How will the politics of originalism evolve? In answering these questions, we would be wrong to deemphasize the role played by grassroots activists. As in the past, their influence may be hard to ignore.