Reinventing Eugenics: Reproductive Choice and Law Reform After World War II

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REINVENTING EUGENICS: REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE AND LAW REFORM AFTER WORLD WAR II

MARY ZIEGLER

Many feel that it is inconsistent to require both that the client consent and be feebleminded. One county specifically asks: “Could some of the ‘red tape’ be cut in regard to the consent of the feebleminded adult? We are thinking of a mother of four children, born out of wedlock, who is definitely feebleminded and who will not give consent for sterilization....”

Many surveyed felt compulsory powers should be available.... [B]ut if compulsory powers were exercised, a great deal of hostility might be stirred up which could jeopardize the whole existence of the law.¹

When the United States Supreme Court decided Skinner v. United States, some observers saw the case as the beginning of the end of the movement for eugenic legal reform.² The term eugenic, coined in 1883 by the British geneticist Francis Galton, described a belief that law could be used to improve the quality of the population.³ When the Court had last considered a Due Process or Equal Protection challenge to compulsory eugenic sterilization law in 1927, only one justice dissented from the Court’s decision to uphold the statute.⁴ Only fifteen years after the Buck Court stated that “three generations of imbeciles are enough,”⁵ the Skinner Court described the right to reproduce as “one of the basic civil rights of man.”⁶

Many scholars have seen this apparently dramatic shift in the Court’s position as evidence of the influence of World War II on American reproductive law.⁷ During the war, widespread revulsion to the Nazi political program provoked

¹ Moya Woodside, Sterilization in North Carolina 71 (Univ. of North Carolina Press 1950).
³ See generally Francis Galton, Inquiries Into Human Faculty and Its Development (Dent & Dutton 1907)(1883).
⁵ Id. at 207.
⁶ Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
serious criticism of American sterilization laws similar to those enforced in Germany. As a result of this disapproval, the eugenic reform movement is seen to have no longer influenced American reproductive law after the War.

A close examination of pro-eugenic organizations after the War tells a significantly different story. Rather than disappearing from the political scene, these organizations appear to have transformed both themselves and the very idea of eugenic law.

When originally formed, these organizations reflected ideas that had first been discussed in Europe by scholars like Galton. He proposed that law could improve the quality of the population primarily by preventing physically, mentally, and morally flawed persons from reproducing. When Galton was first writing in the nineteenth century, eugenic writings often reflected concern among the upper classes about the rising influence of the popular classes on politics, finance, and culture. At the same time, those eugenic advocates like Galton rejected what German theorist Max Nordau termed pessimism, a belief that nothing could be done to prevent perceived cultural decline, and proposed instead that the law be used to help improve eugenic stock.

As eugenic theory became influential in the United States in the 1890s, leading eugenic proponents increasingly adopted August Weismann’s theory that all defects were, in some way, irreversible. It was possible that living in a poor environment or engaging in a moral indiscretion could deform a person’s genetic matter, Weismann theorized, but a better environment could not remedy the defect. Once created, a defect would be passed on indefinitely from generation to generation.

Given the perceived urgency of the threat Weismann described, many lawmakers were primarily interested in devising legal solutions to the problem presented by the multiplication of the “unfit.” In the middle decades of the nineteenth century, several states experimented with homes for the mentally impaired to address this concern.
However, by the 1890s, many critics had become convinced that administrative segregation was ineffective and unnecessarily stigmatizing. Indeed, several states adopted so-called eugenic marriage laws, which allowed only those who could pass a battery of blood tests to obtain a marriage license.

For a variety of reasons, eugenic marriage laws proved to be a spectacular failure. Because the laws required equipment that was often too rare and too expensive for most local physicians to acquire, the laws were unpopular as they prevented so many people from obtaining marriage licenses. More importantly, the laws were seen to be ineffective from a eugenic standpoint: morally unfit persons were widely believed to have sexual intercourse outside of marriage and so would be unaffected by the denial of a marriage license. To some observers, the need for a more coercive law was apparent.

Between 1915 and 1940, several states responded by introducing compulsory eugenic sterilization laws. Focused on people housed in state institutions, the laws authorized the sterilization of a loosely defined group that included those individuals thought to be insane, handicapped, or sexually promiscuous.

The rise of such laws in the 1910s can be partly explained by the emergence of Progressive politics. Many Progressives shared with eugenic theorists a belief in the superior knowledge of experts, a suspicion of rights-based arguments made by the federal courts, and a conviction that the needs of individuals had to be subordinated to those of the community.

Eugenic compulsory sterilization laws were still frequently applied following the decline of Progressive politics. After the Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s compulsory sterilization law in *Buck v. Bell* in 1927, a significant number of states introduced sterilization laws of their own. The decade before the beginning of World War II was, for the most part, a successful one for proponents of eugenic legal reform.

It was not until the middle of World War II, that eugenic sterilization laws

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16 Pickens, *supra* note 11, at 84.
17 *Id.*
21 See *id*.
23 See *id*.
24 See, e.g., Willrich, *supra* note 7.
25 See Pickens, *supra* note 11, at 268-275.
26 See *Buck v. Bell*, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927)
27 See O’Hara, *supra* note 2, at 40-41
came under attack. Newspapers in the 1940s increasingly mentioned sterilization laws only in the context of the Nazi regime.\textsuperscript{28} Many major American newspapers provided extensive, often scathing criticism of Nazi sterilization laws.\textsuperscript{29} Nazi sterilization policies were seen to be totalitarian and American eugenicists often had trouble arguing that their own sterilization laws were any different. Writing to the \textit{Washington Post}, the Reverend F. J. Connell responded to a letter that had advocated the sterilization of the unfit:

In his letter of January 10, Dr. H. Curtiss Wood recommends the sterilization of persons regarded as unfit for parenthood, particularly the mentally defective. . . . The argument of Dr. Wood is very similar to that [argument] presented to the Reichstag in support of the sterilization policy which was put into operation in Nazi Germany on Jan. 1, 1934.... It would be interesting to know if Dr. Wood favors the entire Nazi policy or just this feature.\textsuperscript{30}

Many American eugenicists had trouble responding to critiques like the one framed by Reverend Connell, and popular support for eugenics declined accordingly.

Yet the association with Nazism did not spell the end of eugenic influence on reproductive law. Traditional histories of eugenics often conclude that World War II effectively marked the end of eugenic regulation of reproduction and sexual behavior.\textsuperscript{31} This article will argue instead that, in some cases, proponents of eugenic sterilization laws modernized eugenic legislation to reflect the changing norms of the post-war era.

Public awareness of Nazi racial policies changed but did not end laws allowing the government to control parenthood. Nazi sterilization policy had been condemned by many for being totalitarian, overbroad, racially motivated, and entirely compulsory.\textsuperscript{32} Yet, despite a potentially damning connection to Nazi practices, some social workers and legislators invoked a recent crisis in the number of out-of-wedlock births to justify an expansion of laws designed to deter those seen to be morally unfit from having children.\textsuperscript{33}

\textsuperscript{28} Sterilization of Criminals and Insane Favored, 8-2, \textit{THE ATLANTA CONST.}, May 23, 1937.


\textsuperscript{31} See Willrich, supra note 7, at 98; but cf LINDA GORDON, THE MORAL PROPERTY OF WOMEN: A HISTORY OF BIRTH CONTROL POLITICS IN AMERICA 196-212 (Univ. of Illinois Press 2002) (arguing that the influence of eugenics in law declined but that eugenic thought influenced the evolution of Planned Parenthood and the birth control movement).

\textsuperscript{32} See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 71.

\textsuperscript{33} See RICKIE SOLLINGER, \textit{WAKE UP LITTLE SUSIE; SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE} 13 (Routledge 1992); WINIFRED BELL, \textit{AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN} 211 (Univ. of California Press 1965).
A spike in out-of-wedlock births made the compulsory sterilization of “unfit” unwed mothers appear a more attractive legislative option. Between 1950 and 1967, more than 12 states considered a measure to compulsorily sterilize unwed mothers, and yet all of these bills failed to pass.\(^\text{34}\) Similarly, there is evidence that some important members of the Senate seriously considered introducing compulsory sterilization legislation but decided against such a strategy because of the perceived unpopularity of compulsory sterilization laws.\(^\text{35}\) Even North Carolina, a state still widely applying its compulsory eugenic sterilization law from 1950 to 1965, was unable to expand its law.\(^\text{36}\)

If there was widespread support for such a eugenic law, then why did the attempts to pass a compulsory law universally fail? Moya Woodside, a British sociologist and commentator on North Carolina’s law, argued that an effective eugenic law could not be compulsory but would instead have to respect free choice.\(^\text{37}\) “[The] preservation of individual liberty does more in the long run to encourage sterilization as a measure of social betterment.”\(^\text{38}\)

The laws that developed from 1950-1967 confirmed that Woodside’s intuition was insightful. As noted, a traditional history of eugenics often concludes that World War II spelled the end of eugenic influence on the law. This article will argue instead that World War II required eugenic laws, at least in appearance, to respect some form of reproductive choice.

The new emphasis on choice forced pro-eugenic organizations to transform their strategies and rhetoric. Because eugenic legal theory had been criticized for being political rather than scientific, some pro-eugenic organizations began, in the 1950s, to renounce lobbying in order to focus on funding research that demonstrated the benefits of improving the “quality” of the population. The leaders of other organizations identified less controversial programs of legal reform that they believed would have the same effects as would an openly eugenic program. Between 1950 and 1966, pro-eugenic organizations increasingly saw population control reform as an ideal program of this sort. The platform that resulted from these changes appeared to better account for individual choice but was also more openly racist than earlier eugenic legal reform projects had been.

Perhaps most importantly, the new reform efforts offered their own definitions of reproductive choice. Many people thought to be socially inadequate were seen as unable to make the right reproductive decisions themselves, and pro-eugenic organizations advised their volunteers to omit or favorably characterize the


\(^{36}\) \textit{Woodside, supra} note 1, at 24.

\(^{37}\) \textit{Id.}

\(^{38}\) \textit{Id.}\n
facts about birth control or sterilization and to take advantage of emotional or physical weakness in order to assure that the “right choice” was made.

Thus, it is not the case that eugenics was no longer a significant influence on American reproductive law after World War II. Rather, pro-eugenic organizations adapted to the new political climate that emerged after 1945. Instead of defending the merits of state coercion in reproductive matters, pro-eugenic organizations themselves now sought to define reproductive choice.

By studying the introduction and failure of expanded compulsory sterilization laws in the 1950s and 1960s, Part I examines the political rejection of governmental coercion in reproductive matters. Part II studies the alternative strategies adopted by two of the most influential post-war pro-eugenic organizations, Human Betterment and the Population Council. By evaluating the workings of a post-war compulsory sterilization statute, Part III demonstrates the effects of the new political emphasis on reproductive choice on existing laws. Part IV is a brief conclusion.

I. COMPULSORY STERILIZATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES

A traditional account of eugenics in law often concludes that anti-Nazi ideology doomed eugenic sterilization laws that were themselves similar to laws used by the Nazis. The anti-Nazi ideology theory is in many ways a sensible one. Eugenics was a much less high profile issue in the 1950s and 1960s. Between 1950 and 1960, the term eugenic or any version of it appeared 774 times in the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Washington Post, or the Los Angeles Times, compared to 1,744 times between 1930 and 1940.\(^{39}\) The New York Times and the Chicago Tribune covered Nazi sterilization policies extensively and often negatively.\(^{40}\) From the perspective of a current observer, it might seem inevitable that American sterilization policies would be condemned if Nazi sterilization policies were.

The Supreme Court opinion in *Skinner v. Oklahoma* plausibly supports an anti-Nazi ideology argument. In *Skinner*, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statute that provided for the sterilization of specified groups of repeat offenders.\(^{41}\) Although *Skinner* has come to stand for the existence of a substantive Due Process right to procreation,\(^{42}\) the decision was made on Equal Protection grounds. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, concluded that the distinctions drawn by the statute

\(^{39}\) Proquest Historical Newspapers search by the author (June 28, 2006) (receiving over 1,700 hits in search for term eugenic in above-mentioned newspapers).

\(^{40}\) See text accompanying supra notes 26-29 (discussing problems associated with Nazi sterilization programs).


between offenders who committed similar and equally serious crimes could not survive rational basis review.43

In spite of the limited scope of the holding, there is evidence to support a contention that *Skinner* was an anti-Nazi decision. Press coverage of Nazi sterilization policy peaked in 1941,44 a year before *Skinner* came out. The Court used rhetoric that could support an anti-Nazi reading, condemning Oklahoma’s law as interfering too much with “a sensitive and important area of human rights...” and depriving “individuals of a right which is basic to the... race—the right to have offspring.”45

But those who supported eugenic sterilization laws had powerful motivations, often believing intensely in the rightness of eugenics whether or not the Nazis were associated with it. These motivations might have made it easier to see distinctions between Nazi sterilization policies and American sterilization laws.

*Skinner* does not preclude the drawing of such a distinction. Significantly, *Skinner* struck down a law providing for the forcible sterilization of felons who had offended more than three times.46 The statute in question was punitive in nature. In fact, openly punitive sterilization laws had been struck down by state courts in the 1910s and condemned by eugenicists in the 1930s.47 *Skinner* can be read as a continuation of this trend as opposed to a change in course. It is notable that the *Skinner* Court did not strike down *Buck v. Bell*.48 Indeed, in 1942, the Court might not have been willing to strike down sterilization laws of the sort upheld in *Buck*.

Moreover, *Skinner* had a narrow holding. Oklahoma’s sterilization law was struck down on Equal Protection grounds, mostly because the law targeted some felons while leaving alone felons who had committed crimes that were just as serious.49 In fact, the Court explicitly upheld and distinguished *Buck v. Bell*, which it saw as involving a sufficiently rational law. Only Justice Jackson, writing in concurrence, raised the possibility that there might be something wrong with any compulsory sterilization law.50 It is likely that the *Skinner* Court had considered the evils of Nazi sterilization laws, but the Court was not ready to condemn more popular eugenic policies. For the Court, some eugenic policies were acceptable and some were not. Some laws had been tainted by Nazism and some had not.

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43 *Id.*
44 Proquest Historical Newspapers search by the author (September 14, 2006) (search hits for Nazi sterilization in period between 1940 and 1943).
45 *Skinner*, 316 U.S. at 536.
46 *Skinner*, 316 U.S. at 536.
47 See *Mickel v. Heinrichs*, 262 Fed. 688 (D.C. Nevada 1918); *see also Davis v. Berry*, 216 Fed. 413 (Iowa 1914); *see also Woodside*, supra note 1, at 160 (“It is unfortunate that some states in the U.S. still sanction sterilization or castration for certain classes of criminals and sexual offenders. This creates the impression that sterilization is a punitive measure [which creates] distrust.”).
48 See especially *Skinner*, 316 U.S. at 540-541, 544-555.
49 *Id.* at 542.
50 *Id.* at 545 (Stone, J., Concurring).
The laws passed between 1950 and 1967 to address the illegitimacy problem help explain what was considered objectionable about Nazi reproductive policy. For various reasons, eugenic laws had long targeted unwed mothers on public assistance. Some legislators and theorists emphasized the “unnecessary” costs of paying relief to unwed mothers and their children. Other eugenic theorists stressed that women who repeatedly had sexual intercourse outside of wedlock were necessarily defective and would have defective children. Following the theory of August Weismann, these theorists argued that immoral sexual behavior could deform a woman’s germ plasm and, in turn, produce defects in her children.

By the 1950s, many no longer believed that unwed mothers were always hereditarily defective, but it was still often thought that the children of unwed mothers themselves had social problems, either because of bad heredity, exposure to a bad environment, or both. In the 1950s, a variety of newspapers suggested that America was experiencing an illegitimacy crisis. A greater proportion of unwed mothers were reported to be white, and a greater proportion of those on welfare were believed to be unwed mothers.

Elyce Ferster wrote in 1966 that the new explanations and “arguments advanced in favor [of such compulsory sterilization] are the same as those used by proponents of eugenic sterilization. Society has the right to prevent itself from being swamped by mental illness, mental retardation, crime, poverty, etc.” In Ferster’s view, only the rhetoric of lawmakers had changed. Ferster stated that “eugenicists argued that the prevention of procreation was necessary because children of parents having these defects would have the same defects by reason of heredity. Now the claim is that children will have the same defects because the parents are too socially inadequate.”

As Ferster predicted, between 1950 and 1967, many state legislatures were attracted to these arguments, but they ultimately rejected a compulsory sterilization
law for unwed mothers. It is important to consider what led to the rejection of sterilization programs some legislators so obviously found appealing.

Part of the attraction was related to the limits placed on existing sterilization laws. Although many states still had compulsory sterilization statutes on the books in 1957, most of these laws were rarely applied.\(^{60}\) Almost all of them were ultimately repealed between 1968 and 1975.\(^{61}\) The states that applied their compulsory sterilization laws more vigorously could often do so only after clearing several procedural hurdles.\(^{62}\) In 1950, then, it was difficult for almost all of the thirty states with compulsory sterilization laws on the books to sterilize “morally unfit” women. States that still wanted to reduce the number of unfit children had to find other legal means to discourage women perceived to be socially inadequate from having more children.

Nonetheless, these states continued to consider expanding or adopting new compulsory sterilization legislation. Many passed alternatives to compulsory sterilization shortly after the defeat of such legislation or public outcry at its introduction. The experience of these states helps to illustrate both that eugenics still influenced American reproductive law and that laws reflecting this influence had to respect reproductive choice.

A. Virginia, North Carolina, and “Voluntary” Sterilization

Both Virginia and North Carolina faced proposals to compulsorily sterilize unwed mothers irrespective of whether they qualified as feebleminded or insane under the state’s eugenic sterilization law.

In 1956, Representative E. Ralph James of Hampton, Virginia, introduced a proposal that would have allowed the superintendent of public welfare in any county to petition a local judge to order mothers of more than one illegitimate child to be sterilized unless they could show that they should not be sterilized.\(^{63}\) This bill was defeated, but three further sterilization proposals were introduced in 1960, including two compulsory sterilization proposals.\(^{64}\) These proposals were again defeated. In 1962, another compulsory sterilization bill was introduced, but this time, the state passed a voluntary sterilization bill.\(^{65}\)

North Carolina followed a similar path. Representative W. M. Jolly introduced bills in 1956, 1958, and 1963 that would have expanded compulsory sterilization laws for unwed mothers. In 1956, Representative Jolly introduced a bill that would have allowed the superintendent of public welfare in any county to petition a local judge to order mothers of more than one illegitimate child to be sterilized unless they could show that they should not be sterilized.\(^{66}\) This bill was defeated, but two further sterilization proposals were introduced in 1960, including one compulsory sterilization proposal.\(^{67}\) These proposals were again defeated. In 1962, another compulsory sterilization bill was introduced, but this time, the state passed a voluntary sterilization bill.\(^{68}\)
sterilization legislation to cover “grossly sexually delinquent persons.” The Jolly bill provided that mothers of unwed children be brought before the State Eugenics board and be required to demonstrate why they should not be sterilized. After the birth of a third illegitimate child, there would be a rebuttable presumption in favor of sterilization. North Carolina rejected these proposals not because state legislators believed that unwed mothers could produce fit children, but rather because they believed that compulsory sterilization was an ineffective means of stemming the tide of unfit parents. Dr. John C. Burwell, a member of the neo-eugenic Human Betterment League of North Carolina, wrote:

Recent legislative attempts in North Carolina to ameliorate the problem of illegitimacy by some form of compulsory legislation may be... detrimental... to those of us interested in voluntary sterilization. Detrimental in that these attempts leave an implication in the public mind that any consideration of sterilization is on a compulsory basis.

B. Penalties and Wrong Choices

At one point, other states considered compulsory sterilization in addition to legislation that would impose a short prison term and a fine on unwed mothers. In Illinois, for example, state Senator George M. Brydia proposed a compulsory sterilization provision for unwed mothers. Several alternative bills were met with greater approval, including Senate Bill No. 1066, which provided for a one-year prison sentence and a fine for women who had a second illegitimate child and a three to five-year sentence for mothers of three or more illegitimate children, and House Bill No. 1561, which allowed the Family Court to remove existing children from the custody of an unwed mother.

Similar proposals passed in other states after related compulsory sterilization measures failed. In Louisiana, a 1958 commission charged with addressing the state’s illegitimacy problem considered, but ultimately rejected, a compulsory sterilization measure on the grounds that such laws were “intrinsically evil, completely immoral and violative of all concepts of Christianity.” The commission recommended, and the state eventually adopted, Act 75, which instead provided for a one-year prison sentence and a fine designed to deter unfit parents from having children.

66 Id. at 92; see also Ellen Key Blunt, Sterilization Bill, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 1965, at C1.
67 Paul, supra note 63, at 92-93.
68 Id. at 93.
69 Id. at 93-94
70 Id. at 94.
71 Sterilization Urged to Cut Costs of ADC, supra note 55, at 26.
72 Paul, supra note 63, at 81-82.
73 Id. at 83 (quoting Report of the Committee (Rep. Walter Chachere, Chairman)).
74 Id. at 84.
Similarly, Maryland first considered compulsory sterilization as a way to limit unfit parenthood and only later resorted to criminal penalty legislation. Senator John L. Sanford, Jr. introduced a bill in 1960 which provided for a one thousand dollar fine or three-year prison sentence, a permanent loss of child custody, and a bar on receipt of welfare funds, as well as compulsory sterilization of unwed mothers who continued to have illegitimate children. The bill easily passed in the Senate but was defeated in the House of Delegates. Delegate Russell Hickman introduced a bill in 1963 which provided for voluntary sterilization and compulsory eugenic sterilization of the mentally deficient. Ultimately, neither of these bills passed. Delaware introduced legislation in the 1950s and again in the 1960s, under which an unwed mother would have to be sterilized in order to be eligible for welfare payments. Similarly, in Iowa, in December of 1963, state Senator Howard Buck proposed to a legislative committee that the state sterilize all unwed mothers who received welfare payments.

The lesson taken from the failure of these laws is that a criminal penalty divorced from a sterilization provision, would be more likely to pass. It had become clear that a compulsory sterilization law was no longer politically feasible. In Mississippi, lawmakers learned a similar lesson. Representative David Glass introduced a bill in 1958 which would require mothers of two or more illegitimate children to be sterilized if a Chancery Court determined that the “immorality of said female [was] detrimental to the state or the community.” Although this bill died on the House Calendar, a related bill was introduced in 1964 by W. B. Meek, which allowed unwed mothers to submit to compulsory sterilization or a prison term.

Apparently, this bill still did not appear to confer real choice on sterilization candidates: the bill generated considerable backlash from local civil rights organizations and voluntary sterilization advocates. Letters to the editor published in *Newsweek* magazine similarly condemned the coercive aspects of the law. A student advocacy group began an influential campaign against the bill that played up connections between compulsory sterilization in Mississippi and the Nazi

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75 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF ILLE GITIMACY, STATE OF MARYLAND 26 (1961).
76 Paul, supra note 63, at 84-86.
77 Id. at 85.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 85-86.
80 See Paul, supra note 63, at 80.
81 Id. at 82.
82 Id. at 88.
83 Id. at 89.
84 Id. at 90; see also Brief for Planned Parenthood Federation of America et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants at 20, n.5, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (No. 496).
85 See Paul, supra note 63, at 90.
regime. Were Mississippi to seek to achieve the same eugenic purpose without resorting to compulsory sterilization, it seemed likely that such legislation would not create the same resistance. This appears to have been an accurate prediction: Mississippi was able to pass a bill that provided for a fine and prison sentence for mothers of two or more illegitimate children.

It is worth noting that, in the same period, several states hardened their criminal penalties regarding illegitimacy, and perhaps for the same reasons. Between 1950 and 1961, Maryland, Georgia, Mississippi, Delaware, Alabama, and Massachusetts passed new laws punishing illegitimacy, expanded existing criminal laws, or made the penalties under existing law harsher. Illinois also considered passing a law criminalizing unwed motherhood for AFDC recipients. As noted, Maryland and Mississippi imposed fines and prison terms on any woman who had more than two illegitimate children. In 1956, Georgia made abandonment of children a misdemeanor only if the children were illegitimate.

Unlike a sterilization law, a criminal illegitimacy law was more often seen to respect choice. Nazi sterilization laws had been condemned for being compulsory. In contrast, criminal illegitimacy laws gave notice of condemned conduct and then punished wrong choices after they were made. Maryland’s law punished only women who had continued to make “bad choices” by having more than a certain number of illegitimate children. Criminal neglect or abandonment laws also framed penalties in terms of reproductive choice: either a person could make the right choice, or she would choose to be punished. Lawmakers could create incentives to make the right choices without compelling anyone not to have a child. Thus, an illegitimacy law could accomplish indirectly what compulsory sterilization laws had accomplished.

Moreover, the political ramifications of a compulsory sterilization law were now clear. When several states introduced compulsory sterilization laws, many observers condemned the use of governmental coercion in private reproductive matters. Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that the organizations and programs in place after World War II no longer reflected a eugenic influence. Julius Paul, an authority on the campaign for compulsory sterilization between 1950 and 1967,

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86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See Bill Subjecting Unwed Mothers to 2 Yrs Prison Ok’d, CHI DEF., May 2, 1959, at 2; BELL, supra note 33, at 210-215; Ga. L. 1956 §74-9901 (1956); Bill to Curb Illegitimacy is Signed in Miss., N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1964, at 28; Mass. G.L. c. 273 §15 (1963); Ward v. State, 170 So. 2d 500, 502 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964) (evaluating a statutory increase in the abandonment penalty regarding illegitimate children to $100 per incident).
89 Sterilization Urged, supra note 55, at 26.
90 See text accompanying supra note 79, 87 (discussing use of criminal penalties for mothers of illegitimate children).
91 See Williams v. State, 98 S.E. 2d 373 (Ga. 1957).
92 See Bill Subjecting, supra note 88, at 2.
93 See, e.g., text accompanying supra notes 77, 83 (discussing failure of sterilization bills for unwed mothers).
explained in 1968 that the effort to pass such laws or equivalents to them represented only a slight change in the focus of eugenic legal reformers: “[w]hereas earlier eugenic efforts were aimed at cutting off the ‘defective germ plasm’ before it ‘drowns us,’ current efforts would be aimed at cutting off the defective germ plasm and welfare payments.”

In the wake of the perceived illegitimacy crisis, legislators interested in improving the “quality” of the population were forced to find alternatives to the use of overt coercion. The definition of choice that emerged in alternative proposals was a narrow one, but it was the goal of pro-eugenic organizations active in the 1950s and 1960s to change this definition. Part II of this note considers the work of two of the most influential pro-eugenic organizations in order to clarify the changes in the debates that shaped American reproductive law.

II. THE REINVENTION OF EUGENIC ADVOCACY

A. The Population Council and Contraceptive Incompetence

Founded in 1952, the Population Council was formed partly by leaders of the eugenic legal reform movement who intended to create a new kind of organization in response to post-war politics: an organization that would prevent overall population growth and preserve the “quality” of the population. At the organization’s founding conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, members emphasized a broad range of potential goals, including research on world food supply, alternative energy sources, and alternative methods of contraception. Nonetheless, a significant number of founding members, including Frederick Osborn, Kingsley Davis, and Frank Notestein, maintained their ties with the eugenic legal reform movement.

Not surprisingly, these members continued to endorse eugenic goals, but they now characterized those goals as matters of population control. The Council’s evolution offers a powerful example of how pro-eugenic groups redefined themselves and their programs in order to ensure their political survival. Members of the organization worked to achieve this goal in three ways. First, the leaders of the Council deemphasized openly eugenic projects. Relying on a theory that the poorest and least eugenically fit individuals were often the most fertile, leaders of the Council believed that the quality of the population would be improved if overall population growth was checked. Second, instead of disavowing the idea that the law could be used to improve the quality of the population, leaders of the organization argued in favor of a kind of voluntary eugenics. They asserted that the

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94 See Paul, supra note 63, at 101.
96 Id. at 495-496.
97 See id.
quality of the population could be improved if otherwise “incompetent” people were assisted in making the right choices. Finally, the organization’s leaders concluded that the Council could campaign for eugenic legal reform only after convincing the public that the organization focused on objective scientific research rather than on lobbying.

These ideas first emerged at a meeting sponsored by the National Academy of Science in the summer of 1952. The demographers, biologists, and geneticists present agreed that a potential decline in the quality of the population was integrally related to the overall population growth. The organization’s founder, John D. Rockefeller III, explained: “[t]here was a brief discussion of the problem of ‘quality.’ It was felt that this was part of the background of the questions to which the committee devoted its time. Modern civilization has reduced natural selection, saving more ‘weak’ lives and allowing them to reproduce.” Among other goals, Council members agreed to pursue research in both the qualitative and quantitative aspects of population in the United States.

Recognizing the connection between eugenic goals and issues of population control was politically significant for the Council. Although founded largely by eugenicists, the organization was openly identified only with population control. The reasons for this were straightforward. Without paying the same significant political costs, the Council could accomplish eugenic goals by promoting legal reforms designed to limit population.

Between 1952 and 1960, members of the Council realized that they would also need to change the structure and image of their pro-eugenic organization. Those in the organization who considered themselves to be scientists or social scientists, like Davis and Osborn, were particularly sensitive to frequent comments that eugenicists had no expertise and that eugenics was not a valid science. During and after World War II, critics of eugenic legal reforms increasingly argued that, like the Nazis in Germany, American eugenicists were politically motivated and interested only in pseudosciences that would support their own biases. Following the publication of a study overseen by the American Neurological Association in 1936, a growing number of critics asserted that there was no scientific evidence that compulsory sterilization laws had a eugenic effect. Taking up an argument from the published report, critics also questioned the

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98 See generally Id.
99 Id. at 496, 501.
100 See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 496.
101 Id. at 501.
102 See, e.g., Frank Notestein, Frederick Osborn: Demography’s Statesman on His Eightieth Spring, 35 POPULATION INDEX 367, 367-371 (1969) (Notestein and Osborn both frequently referred to themselves and to one another as scientists or demographers).
validity of the very categories used in various sterilization statutes.\textsuperscript{105} For some, the necessary conclusion appeared to be that American eugenics, like Nazi eugenics, was the product of ideology and political compromise rather than scientific research.\textsuperscript{106}

In response, the leaders of the Council decided that, for a period of several years, the organization would refrain from political lobbying and concentrate instead on funding research.\textsuperscript{107} By selectively sponsoring and shaping research projects, the Council’s leaders hoped to collect seemingly objective data that could later be shown to local administrators and lawmakers. In the early 1950s, leaders of the organization also decided to emphasize programs that appeared to have different focuses.\textsuperscript{108} Arguably, some of these programs were genuinely unrelated to the Council’s population quality program, especially those involving environmental preservation, world hunger, and alternative food and fuel sources.\textsuperscript{109} In other cases, projects were population quality measures in everything but name, especially proposed “maternal health” initiatives that often focused on discouraging poor women from having more children.\textsuperscript{110} In either case, it was important to members of the Council that the organization appear to be politically neutral and involved in diverse scientific studies.

By the mid-1950s, several members of the Council also became convinced that the idea of eugenic reform needed to be reshaped.\textsuperscript{111} Frederick Osborn, a prominent member of the Council, was especially interested in the damaged reputation of eugenic legal reform, because he served as the president of the American Eugenic Society in the same period.\textsuperscript{112} In eugenic circles, Osborn had long considered himself a moderating influence, because he rejected the racist and racialist accounts of eugenic defects set forth by many eugenicists between 1910 and 1940.\textsuperscript{113} In the mid-1950s, the response that followed proposals to expand compulsory sterilization laws was instructive. Few critics of the law defended unwed mothers on welfare or rejected the idea that a deterrent was needed to

\textsuperscript{105} March of Science, WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1955, at E5.

\textsuperscript{106} Rap Outmoded Laws Aimed at Epileptics; Neurologists Demand Revisions, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 1954, at 12.

\textsuperscript{107} For examples of the kind of research project the Council later funded, see, e.g., Victor Wilson, Science Group Urges World Birth Control, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1963, at 14; see also Jacques Nevard, India Trying Loop to Reduce Births, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1965, at 12; see also Peter Prugh, Patching Up Families: Varied New Programs Aim to Curb Breakdown in Negro Home Life, WALL ST. J., November 30, 1965, at 1.

\textsuperscript{108} See Rockefeller, supra note 95 at 494-496 (describing early agenda of Population Council from founding conference).

\textsuperscript{109} Many of these concerns were articulated by the organization’s founding members as early as 1952. See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 493.

\textsuperscript{110} For an example of a similar, but later program, see Jane Brody, Population Group Offers Care Plan, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 1971, at 36.

\textsuperscript{111} See GORDON, supra note 31, at 281-282 (evaluating involvement of eugenicists in nascent population control movement).

\textsuperscript{112} See id.

\textsuperscript{113} See Notestein, supra note 102, at 369(explaining Osborn’s role as a moderate in eugenic circles).
prevent out-of-wedlock births. Most often, critics objected only to the fact that the sterilizations would be compulsory. In 1954, Osborn drew on this interest in voluntary sterilization in giving a new definition of eugenics. Osborn explained,

[the largest families should not be found as a characteristic of particular racial or social or economic groups but among all couples who give evidence of socially valuable qualities.... There can be no arbitrary decisions on who should or should not have children. The parents themselves must make that choice.

Improving the quality of the population had been described as a separate but related goal. Later in the decade, several influential politicians expressed interest in measures to achieve international and domestic population control. At the same time, Council leaders became convinced that it would be difficult to rehabilitate openly eugenic programs or research studies. Efforts to study and propose ways to improve the quality of the population would have to be more closely connected than ever to the idea of population control.

The ground for doing so had been laid in the 1930s by demographers like Notestein and Osborn, who belonged to the eugenic legal reform coalition. Both Notestein and Osborn had played an important role in the study of so-called differential fertility. It had long been assumed that state governments developing compulsory sterilization laws wanted to know what measures had to be taken to ensure that more fit people than unfit people were having children. As a general matter, eugenicists believed that the unfit were more fertile than the fit. As early as 1933, Osborn had posited that low intelligence was closely correlated with social class. He argued that the unfit tended to be poor, and the poor tended to have more children.

In the late 1950s, Osborn, Notestein, and other members of the Council revived the idea of differential fertility in order to repackage the Council’s pro-

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114 See Paul, supra note 63 at 90.
115 See id.
116 Frederick Osborn, Population Problems and the American Eugenics Society, SCL, May 1954, at 3A.
117 Ernest Gruening, a Senator from Alaska, was the most vocal supporter of population control efforts in the early 1960s. See Letter by Eisenhower on Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1965, at 25. By the middle of the decade, however, population control politics had become less controversial and more prominent. See THE POLITICS OF ABORTION AND BIRTH CONTROL IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, 7-16 (Donald T. Critchlow ed., 2002).
118 Rockefeller and the other founding members carefully avoided the use of the term eugenic, or any rhetoric associated with it. See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 496.
119 See, e.g., FRANK LORIMER AND FREDERICK OSBORN, DYNAMICS OF POPULATION: SOCIAL AND BIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CHANGING BIRTH RATES IN THE UNITED STATES (Macmillan 1934).
121 See id.
122 See id.
eugenic reforms. If it was widely agreed that population control was desirable, Osborn argued, one had to check the growth of especially fertile people, and exceptionally fertile people tended to be “the socially inadequate—those families who are perennially on relief rolls, the constant problem of the social worker.”

Thus, if an overall reduction in world and domestic population growth inevitably improved the quality of population, those interested in eugenics could achieve the same goals by studying and campaigning for less controversial population control reforms.

However, the Population Council’s new focus on population control issues had a surprising consequence. As Council research emphasized ways to reduce rates of reproduction among “high fertility groups,” the Council’s research interests and policy proposals displayed a more overt racial bias. In the early 1960s, the Council began sponsoring research on ways to reduce growth rates in urban and rural African-American areas. This new research focus reflected two ideas that were then becoming common among members of the Council. First, the new research suggested that it would be desirable to reduce the size of the African-American population. Second, the research focus demonstrated that a growing number of Council members believed that the “socially inadequate” were rarely white.

It may seem counterintuitive that some aspects of reproductive law and politics were more openly racist in the 1950s and 1960s than they had been before World War II. This is especially the case because a good deal of current scholarship on the eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth century justifiably emphasizes the anti-immigrant or racist character of the movement. There is truth in this argument. Eugenic legal reformers sponsored successful race-based immigration quotas, anti-miscegenation laws, and sterilization programs for those in segregated hospitals.

However, for a variety of reasons, compulsory eugenic sterilization laws were not, for the most part, disproportionately applied to members of racial minorities before World War II. First, in southern states where racial prejudice was the strongest, non-white hospitals did not have the equipment or staff to perform a

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123 See, e.g., Osborn, supra note 115, at 3A.
125 See id.
128 See Albert Ernest Jenks, The Legal Status of Negro-White Amalgamation in the United States, 21 AM. J. OF SOC. 666 (1916); W. A. Plecker, Shall We All Be Mulattoes?, LITERARY DIG., March 27, 1925.
large number of sterilizations. For example, a study of North Carolina’s compulsory eugenic sterilization law reported that such hospitals were poorly equipped and performed only a token number of sterilizations.\textsuperscript{129} Moreover, the operations that were performed were mostly considered punitive rather than eugenic measures.\textsuperscript{130}

Second, in the North, sterilizations were still performed primarily on those in state institutions, regardless of race.\textsuperscript{131} It is true that some of the “conditions” that could justify a eugenic sterilization, including alcoholism and unwed motherhood, were likely to be associated with poverty.\textsuperscript{132} To the extent that race was correlated with poverty, members of racial minorities might have been exposed to compulsory sterilization more often than were Caucasians.

Nonetheless, there is evidence that members of racial minorities were not disproportionately subjected to sterilization in the North. This was the case for several reasons. First, many prominent eugenicists were concerned that sterilization laws would be considered unscientific if the laws were openly racist.\textsuperscript{133} Additionally, African-Americans and Hispanics were sometimes less likely to be placed in mental institutions.\textsuperscript{134}

In the later 1950s, as evolving eugenic ideology focused on those who actually had more children, groups like the Council increasingly targeted members of racial minorities. The new eugenic agenda required the appearance of more rigorous scientific study and respect for reproductive choice, but that agenda also produced a more overtly racist set of studies and proposals.

This shift becomes apparent from a study of the work of Donald Bogue that was sponsored and shaped by the leaders of the Council. A member of the University of Chicago’s Population Research and Training Center, Bogue began to receive most of his funding from the Council after 1960.\textsuperscript{135} The definition of “high fertility” groups given by Bogue in a request for grant funding was largely based on race: Bogue listed African-Americans, Puerto-Ricans, Native Americans and white immigrants as groups with high fertility rates.\textsuperscript{136} Bogue argued that members of these groups continued to make wrong choices with respect to family planning because they were incompetent, unmotivated, or influenced by their own or their family’s culture.\textsuperscript{137} What was needed was a program that used all measures short

\begin{footnotes}
\item[129] \textsc{Woodside}, supra note 1, at 29, 33.
\item[130] \textit{Id.} at 32.
\item[131] See \textit{Kills Wisconsin Bill to Sterilize Insane}, \textsc{N.Y. Times}, Jun. 28, 1925, at 3 (Wisconsin governor vetoing bill because sterilization applied only to those in institutions).
\item[132] See, e.g., \textsc{Popenoe, supra} note 52, at 268.
\item[133] See, e.g., \textit{The Scientist Speaks to Us}, \textsc{N.Y. Times}, Feb. 11, 1912, at BR72.
\item[134] See, e.g., \textsc{Woodside, supra} note 1, at 38.
\item[135] See \textit{Research Proposal, supra} note 126 (Bogue’s 1960 proposal reflects the tone and strategies of several earlier proposals).
\item[136] See \textit{id.} at 1.
\item[137] \textit{Id.} at 2.
\end{footnotes}
of force in order to assure that members of high fertility groups made the right choices.\textsuperscript{138}

Nonetheless, it is a mistake to think that Bogue and his sponsors were uniformly uninterested in the lives of the poor or non-white people being studied. Indeed, Bogue worked throughout the 1960s on projects designed to study and prevent poverty.\textsuperscript{139} Nonetheless, Bogue stated that the people he studied were culturally or genetically dysfunctional and incompetent to make their own reproductive choices.\textsuperscript{140}

Similar beliefs colored the research and legal reforms outlined by Bogue for the Council between 1960 and 1968. Beginning with his pilot program in poor, African-American areas of Chicago, the Council sponsored research on how to get the contraceptively incompetent to make the choice to have fewer children. A number of strategies were adopted to increase the probability that the right choices would be made. Bogue’s assistants sent targeted mailings to people living in housing projects and advertised in what Bogue called “ethnic newspapers,” like the \textit{Chicago Defender}.\textsuperscript{141} Frequently, he used volunteers who appeared to be objective or even friendly to dispense advice. African-American volunteers were instructed to befriend people in the neighborhoods studied before advising them to stop having children.\textsuperscript{142} Those with medical training were supposed to characterize their recommendations as objective medical advice rather than as propaganda put out by the Council.\textsuperscript{143}

By 1963, Bogue had better articulated his research objectives for the Council. First, his assistants developed a manual that could be used to get any person in any region to make the “right” reproductive choice.\textsuperscript{144} Second, Bogue’s group collected data on “Negro” fertility and on general correlations between race, class, and fertility, so that the Population Council would have more concrete findings to show potential supporters in the government.\textsuperscript{145}

Between 1963 and 1966, the Executive Board of the Council began to agree with Bogue that a reduction in the size of high fertility groups could be achieved only through formal legal reform and government financial support and a

\textsuperscript{138} See id.

\textsuperscript{139} See Minutes of a Meeting of the Rockefeller Council Executive Board (May 9, 1966) in The Rockefeller Archive, Rockefeller University, \textit{Population Council Papers}, Box 56, Folder 903.


\textsuperscript{142} See Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 25.

\textsuperscript{143} See, e.g., Research Proposal, supra note 126, at 26-27.


\textsuperscript{145} See Research Proposal, supra note 126, at *1, *7-8.
redefinition of reproductive choice.\(^{146}\) By 1966, Bogue had become deeply critical of the existing strategies of researchers financed by the Ford Foundation and the Milbank Fund.\(^{147}\) Instead, Bogue argued, a more “large-scale effort” was needed, which would require “a great deal of technical assistance from sponsoring agencies” in government.\(^{148}\)

By 1966, many members of the Executive Board of the Council had been persuaded by Bogue’s arguments. A number of proposals were considered in that year to maximize governmental funding and involvement at both the state and federal level, including grants to welfare and health departments to start contraception programs among high fertility groups, to create federal agencies to fund research on contraceptive incompetence, and to disseminate pamphlets to the poor on the benefits of contraception.\(^{149}\)

Through working with Bogue and similar researchers, the Council developed an effective new legal strategy to achieve improvements in the quality of the population.\(^{150}\) By the late 1960s, none of the Council’s proposals was labeled eugenic or invoked the use of governmental coercion that had been the hallmark of earlier eugenic law reforms.\(^{151}\) Indeed, the Council’s new strategy required the organization’s activists to avoid all overt political lobbying before research on a particular subject had been carried out.\(^{152}\)

It would be a mistake, however, to think that the leaders of the Council were no longer interested in legal reform. Instead, by collecting seemingly legitimate academic research results and using private funding, the leaders of the Council hoped to show governmental agencies and leaders the benefits of enacting the measures supported by the Council.

Many of the benefits emphasized by members of the Council were thought to be related to population control, including an improvement in the quality of the population if the overall rate of growth were reduced.\(^{153}\) However, because of the organization’s new emphasis on reproductive choice, the leaders of the Council wanted to avoid any overt reference to quality population or eugenic reform. Research sponsored by the Council bolstered the theory that the quality of the population would necessarily be improved if population growth were checked. This was the case, researchers argued, because the most socially inadequate people often had the most children. In the eyes of some leaders of the Council, a population control reform would necessarily have eugenic benefits, and the Council

\(^{146}\) See Minutes, supra note 139, at 1-3.
\(^{147}\) See id. at 1.
\(^{148}\) See id. at 2.
\(^{149}\) See id. at 1.
\(^{150}\) See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 495.
\(^{151}\) See Minutes, supra note 139, at 1-3.
\(^{152}\) See id.
\(^{153}\) See Rockefeller, supra note 95, at 495.
would profit from invoking reproductive choice rather than the need for quality population or eugenic reform.

After focusing on what the Council now called population control, the organization’s members consistently stressed that they respected an individual’s reproductive choices. However, what it meant to respect reproductive choice was itself becoming a subject of debate. Those volunteering in projects for the Council were to ensure that members of high fertility groups made the right choices. To accomplish this task, volunteers were told to approach women who had recently delivered children, because those women were then physically weak and emotionally vulnerable.154 Similarly, Council volunteers were told to assume roles that would make their advice more influential.155 Increasingly, these activities reflected a belief that particular individuals were intrinsically unable to make the right choice for themselves.

In several years’ worth of research sponsored by the Council, a definition of contraceptive incompetence emerged that was connected to both race and class. Thus, in the later 1960s, as the Council began openly to lobby for its preferred reforms, a new debate had emerged about the future of American reproductive law. Instead of questioning whether individual choice should be an important factor in the debate, the discussion now centered on what the meaning of choice should be.

B. Human Betterment and Selling Sterilization

In many ways, the transformation of the Council into an organization purportedly interested only in population control was easy: as early as the 1930s, Osborn and Notestein had written about the eugenic and humanitarian problems that would follow from unchecked population growth.156 The Human Betterment Association for Voluntary Sterilization was a different kind of organization.157 Formed in the 1920s by California eugenicists Paul Popenoe and E. S. Gosney, Human Betterment was founded primarily to promote compulsory eugenic sterilization laws.158 The leaders of Human Betterment were particularly committed to the use of compulsory sterilization laws as a eugenic solution.159 After World War II, members of the public were suspicious of the use of such

155 See, e.g., id.
156 See text accompanying supra notes 119-120.
157 See, e.g., Fred Hogue, Social Eugenics, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1936, at 31 (referring to organization as Human Betterment Foundation)(The Human Betterment Association for Voluntary Sterilization, as it was later called, had a dizzying array of names in the years between 1940 and 1966); see also Fred Hogue, Social Eugenics, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 16, 1939, at 119 (referring to organization as Human Betterment Association). For ease of understanding, this article will refer to the organization as Human Betterment.
158 See generally, Hogue, Social Eugenics (1939) supra note 157.
sterilization laws.\textsuperscript{160} Human Betterment’s commitment to the use of coercion and to sterilization in particular put the organization’s continuing political viability in doubt.

The reception of proposals to expand compulsory sterilization laws made apparent the political obstacles Human Betterment’s leaders faced in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{161} Human Betterment activists remained convinced that only sterilization would improve the quality of the population, because sterilization required less day-to-day attention on the part of the individual and was a more permanent contraceptive solution.\textsuperscript{162} A majority of the members of Human Betterment also believed that existing sterilization laws were too narrow: there were socially inadequate persons who they believed should be sterilized and who did not qualify as insane or feebleminded under the new, narrow interpretations of eugenic sterilization laws.\textsuperscript{163}

The fate of Human Betterment between 1945 and 1955 might seem to suggest that World War II did mark the effective end of eugenic legal reform. In that period, the organization cycled through a series of names and images, all the while struggling to find adequate funding.\textsuperscript{164} By 1955, the leadership of Human Betterment had concluded that eugenic legal reform was no longer a realistic solution. Instead, members sought to fund so-called voluntary sterilizations for people who were not covered by existing sterilization laws but who were still considered inadequate.\textsuperscript{165}

However, the evolution of Human Betterment tells a story about the relationship between eugenics and law after World War II that differs from the traditional account. Without ever changing their goals or preferred methods, the leaders of Human Betterment effectively campaigned for the removal of state and federal bans on the use of family planning aid for voluntary sterilization. Instead of changing the substance of their agenda, members of Human Betterment changed only their rhetoric. The organization’s leaders concluded that eugenic sterilization could still be realistically supported so long as the organization advocated reproductive choice.

Human Betterment’s emphasis on choice grew out of a long correspondence between its leaders and Hugh Moore, the founder of the Dixie Cup Company. A

\textsuperscript{160} See text accompanying supra notes 28-30.
\textsuperscript{161} See id.
\textsuperscript{162} See, e.g., Clinic Defended on Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1962, at A1. Ruth Proskauer Smith, the chairman of the organization’s executive board, explained, “for the poor and uneducated, . . . surgical birth control is the only answer.” Id.
\textsuperscript{163} See text accompanying supra notes 60-61.
\textsuperscript{165} See Letter from Ruth Proskauer Smith to Hugh Moore (Apr. 4, 1956) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
longtime donor to the organization, Moore believed that Human Betterment could not improve the quality of the population solely by funding private sterilization of the socially inadequate. In 1961, Moore wrote to Ruth Proskauer Smith, the executive director of Human Betterment, and suggested a related change of course. Moore recommended that less money be used for actual sterilizations, so that more could be spent to rehabilitate the image of sterilization. If this were done, Moore asserted, it would be easier to convince people to be sterilized and to persuade state and federal agencies to support voluntary sterilization. It was hoped that sterilization might be associated not with Nazism but with human rights and personal choice.

In 1961, the controversy surrounding a new Virginia voluntary sterilization law that Human Betterment had advocated made apparent the need to change the image of sterilization as well as its legal status. As a primary goal, the leaders of Human Betterment had long campaigned for the introduction of statutory protections for doctors performing voluntary sterilizations. Although only three states explicitly provided for penalties for physicians and patients involved in voluntary sterilizations, physicians in a majority of states still expressed concern about potential common law or statutory liability. In response, a number of hospitals restricted the availability of these surgeries. In order to increase the number of voluntary sterilizations, leaders of Human Betterment believed they would first have to clarify the legal status of the procedure.

The response to the Fauquier County Project, as Human Betterment activists termed the Virginia statute, made clear that no more states would adopt similar laws unless the public was first convinced that the sterilizations were truly voluntary. At first, the Fauquier County Project appeared to be a victory for Human Betterment. In March 1961, the Virginia state legislature passed a law formally authorizing a voluntary sterilization program for “medically indigent” women. Several legislators who favored the bill professed their belief that the bill would function like a bill that had died in committee, which provided for the

166 See id.
168 See id.
169 See id.
171 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
172 See Linda Champlin and Mark Winslow, Elective Sterilization, 113 U.P.A.L.REV. 415, 425 (1965) (A contemporary study indicated that doctors would most likely be found liable under either a common-law or statutory theory of assault and battery or mayhem).
173 Id. at 419.
174 See id.
175 See Windle, supra note 170, at 306-307.
compulsory sterilization of unwed mothers: it would reduce the number of children born to women on relief.  

Those trained by Human Betterment were instructed to ensure that indigent patients made the right reproductive choice. First, Human Betterment volunteers were advised to approach women immediately after they had delivered children, a time when the women were thought most likely to agree to sterilization. In explaining the procedure, volunteers were similarly advised to emphasize the advantages of the procedure and to explain its effects in abstract, simple language.

By 1962, however, the drawbacks of the procedure were apparent. Hospital officials, like leaders of Human Betterment, were accused of being racist and of maintaining ties to the eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth century. Defending her organization in the face of attacks by Catholic and African-American leaders, Smith argued that the program benefited “the poor and uneducated... for whom surgical birth control is the only answer.” Privately, however, other leaders of Human Betterment recognized that state governments, health departments, welfare agencies, and hospitals would not expand the availability of sterilization unless the procedure was first made less controversial.

In the spring of 1962, when Moore and Smith began working with a public relations agency to rehabilitate the idea of sterilization laws, both Moore and Smith were convinced that reproductive choice would have to be emphasized. Their goal was straightforward: the leaders Human Betterment could use sterilization as a eugenic tool only if they changed the political meaning of sterilization. After working through several drafts with the agency, Smith crafted a statement of purpose emphasizing human rights, individual choice, and humanitarian concerns raised by the rate of world population growth.

Even Moore was surprised by the shift in tone seen in the memorandum. He wrote, “[t]he only question I have on first reading is that HBA is unalterably opposed to compulsory sterilization. I thought we favored the sterilization of imbeciles and the like in public institutions.”

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176 See id. at 313, 318.
177 See Gerald Grant, Birth Control Clinic “Amazed” at Sterilization, WASH. POST, Sep. 9, 1962, at B1.
179 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
180 See id.; see also Nate Haseltine, Only the Wealthy or Ill Are Sterilized Here, WASH. POST, Sep. 12, 1962, at A1.
181 See Clinic Defended, supra note 162, at A1.
184 See id.
Moore soon came to believe that the organization could more effectively improve the quality of the population if members praised voluntary procedures and individual choice. In accepting the position of President of Human Betterment, Moore explained, “I had become convinced... that sterilization is one of the most likely means of saving civilization and that the public should be made aware of it—and understand what it is. As a businessman, I have spent my life selling ideas, and by that means, products.” What was needed, Moore explained, was a better effort in “selling sterilization.”

Between 1961 and 1966, the organization worked to “sell sterilization” by emphasizing that it was voluntarily chosen. Whenever the organization received a substantial grant, Human Betterment created a “plan” whereby indigent people in a particular geographic area would be encouraged to “choose” sterilization. The rest of the organization’s funding went to publicity and “education” programs, including conferences on voluntary sterilization as a human right or as a matter of population control.

Since 1963, Moore had believed that concern about world population control would help Human Betterment to promote sterilization as much as would an emphasis on reproductive choice. Invoking the threat of world population growth, Human Betterment pamphlets produced in the mid-1960s argued that sterilization helped the poor by improving their economic position. Sterilization would not only reduce the number of undesirable persons, but would also help the poor by reducing overall population growth. In practice, Human Betterment conducted no research and provided no funding for population control measures. Although Human Betterment pamphlets consistently mentioned an International Advisory Committee on Population Control, that committee did not meet once or

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186 Hugh Moore, Chairman, Human Betterment Ass’n for Voluntary Sterilization, Speech Made in Acceptance of Position as Chairman (November 20, 1964) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See, e.g., Letter from Ruth Proskauer Smith to Jesse Hartman (July 15, 1964) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (establishing a new Hartman Fund to provide sterilizations for the indigent in Palm Beach and Broward County and confirming donation for a similar fund for work in Kentucky); Letter from John Rague, Treasurer of Human Betterment, to Hugh Moore (June 5, 1965) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 7, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (announcing the establishment of a fund named after donor).
190 See Hugh Moore, Fundraising Statement (December 1965) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University.
191 See, e.g., Letter from Hugh Moore to Admiral Lewis Strauss (Oct. 23, 1963) in THE HUGH MOORE PAPERS, MC 313, Box 15, Folder 6, Seeley Mudd Library, Princeton University (“The present rapidly growing interest in the population explosion is gaining many converts for the idea of sterilization.”).
192 See, e.g., id.
193 See id.
receive any funding before 1967. Human Betterment’s leaders remained committed to using sterilization to improve the quality of the population. The idea of population control, like the idea of reproductive choice, was simply an effective tool in doing so.

By 1967, the organization highlighted issues of reproductive choice in its ultimately successful campaign to remove a ban on the use of federal OEO family planning funds for voluntary sterilizations. A variety of public health and welfare officials joined leaders of the organization in calling for the lifting of the OEO ban.

The strategy of emphasizing reproductive choice had been effective: by 1971, the OEO removed the ban on the use of federal funds for voluntary sterilizations. Although Human Betterment had changed its message in order to accomplish this task, the organization had not fundamentally changed its goals. Consider the organization’s fundraising letter of 1966: “[o]vercrowded cities, polluted air and water, countless unwanted and suffering children, skyrocketing taxes for welfare! Half of the babies now born from some cities are from indigent families on relief. Need we say more?”

Well into the 1960s, Human Betterment remained committed to using reform to reduce the number of “babies [...] born [...] to indigent families on relief.” Leaders of the organization were happy to invoke the idea of reproductive choice in order to achieve their goals, especially when members of the organization could define choice for themselves.

III. NORTH CAROLINA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF COMPULSORY STERILIZATION LEGISLATION

In 1933, North Carolina became one of the last states to adopt a eugenic sterilization statute. Before the decision of Buck v. Bell in 1927, there was considerable uncertainty about the constitutionality of existing sterilization laws.
but the decision in Buck provided a template for states, including North Carolina, that wanted to enact sterilization laws of their own.\footnote{203 See \textit{Woodside}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 20.}

Over the next fifteen years, however, North Carolina emerged as one of the states that most vigorously applied its sterilization policy. A 1957 study of eugenic sterilization law that was published in the \textit{Georgetown Law Review} found that only four states consistently sterilized more than one hundred people a year: California, Georgia, Virginia, and North Carolina.\footnote{204 See O’Hara, \textit{supra} note 2, at 35.} According to reports published by North Carolina’s own Eugenics Board, the number of sterilizations per year between 1947 and 1957 was between four hundred and seven hundred.\footnote{205 See \textit{Biennial Rep. of the Eugenics Board of North Carolina}, 1968, \textit{Summary Statistics} (1968).} The biennial report from 1950-1952 noted a record high of 704 sterilizations, up from the prior record of 468 in the period between 1948-1950.\footnote{206 \textit{Biennial Report of the Eugenics Board of North Carolina, 1950-1952} 14 (1952).} If an identification with Nazism spelled an end for American sterilization laws, it did not do so immediately, at least not in North Carolina.

An association with Nazism did mean that North Carolina’s law had to change. After World War II, North Carolina restricted the application of its compulsory law, limiting it strictly to the mentally ill and clearly handicapped.\footnote{207 EUGENICS BOARD OF NORTH CAROLINA \textit{MANUAL} § 50 at 2, 5 (1960).} For the first time, the state published a manual intending to ensure certain procedural protections. No longer could sterilizations occur without the consent of a family member or, in the case of mental retardation, without the patient’s consent to an intelligence test.\footnote{208 \textit{Id.} at § 80.}

These changes reflected the influence of World War II. Nazism was associated with coercion and broad laws applied to members of the general population.\footnote{209 See \textit{Woodside}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 23-24.} Physicians and eugenics boards found to have gone beyond sterilizing the clearly mentally ill or handicapped had sometimes been subject to devastating lawsuits.\footnote{210 See, e.g. \textit{Heiress Sues Her Mother}, \textit{L.A. Times}, Jan. 7, 1936, at 12; see also Joanna Schoen, \textit{Between Choice and Coercion: Women and the Politics of Sterilization in North Carolina}, 1929-1975, 13 J. WOMEN’S HIST. 132, 132 (2001).} These lawsuits also showed that a sterilization law that appeared too broad or compulsory would draw considerable criticism.

However, World War II had not changed the motivations behind North Carolina’s compulsory sterilization law. Indeed, North Carolina did not repeal its compulsory sterilization law until 1975.\footnote{211 See \textit{Woodside}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 71.} Strangely, however, it was pro-eugenic activists who opposed a broader use of compulsory sterilization. Woodside and other supporters of eugenic policies in North Carolina argued instead that choice and consent were necessary to the survival of eugenics in law.\footnote{212 See \textit{Woodside}, \textit{supra} note 1, at 71.} If force were
used against unwed mothers, Woodside predicted that “a great deal of hostility might be stirred up which could jeopardize the whole existence of the law.”213 In contrast, a law that appeared voluntary would rarely be scrutinized and could be used more broadly. Woodside argued that “persuasion and argument are legitimately used [to elicit consent for a sterilization], but compulsion never.”214 This was because only a voluntary law could win popular support in the long term. She predicted that a voluntary law could even “eliminate the organized opposition of religious bodies.”215 If officials could convince the public that North Carolina’s sterilization law was voluntary, Woodside suggested, they would have a freer hand in coercing unwed mothers into being sterilized.216

It seems paradoxical for a compulsory sterilization statute to be administered as a voluntary law. Woodside suggested two interpretations of how such a statute could function.217 Under one interpretation, the law would be compulsory only as a formal legal matter, but would in fact be used by doctors willing to help women otherwise unable to obtain birth control.218 Under the other interpretation, the doctors and social workers administering the law would claim that they were sterilizing only those who wanted to be sterilized, because by making such a claim, the people who administered sterilization statutes could avoid the public scrutiny and procedural safeguards associated with compulsory sterilization laws. Between 1950 and 1968, the North Carolina statute was applied to women who were less severely mentally ill, and the argument was made that the women who were sterilized consented to the operations. The critical question is whether these sterilizations were voluntary in fact or only in appearance. Answering this question involves considering the ways in which doctors secured the consent of individuals who did not understand or request sterilization.

At the outset, it is important to note that many sterilization decisions were made by doctors and social workers ignoring the formal procedures required by the Eugenics Board. Between 1945 and 1950, there had already been 200 sterilizations in a single North Carolina hospital, not all of which were authorized by the Eugenics Board.219 In one county, 23 of 59 sterilizations performed in one year were unauthorized.220 Second, by 1950, these doctors had begun to claim that the sterilizations they administered were chosen voluntarily by the nominally feebleminded women they approached.221 The transfer of authority to doctors and social workers changed the administration of North Carolina’s law, especially because doctors could choose to perform sterilizations without outside attention.

213 See id.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 24.
216 See id.
217 Id. at 58, 103.
218 See Schoen, supra note 210, at 134.
219 WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 49.
220 Id.
221 Id.
and could thus afford to pay less attention to the formal rules set forth by the Eugenics Board. As doctors and social workers took greater responsibility for the administration of sterilization statutes, the enforcement of North Carolina’s law became more informal and was more likely in violation of procedural protections specified in state regulations.

Two trends confirm that this was the case. First, a much larger proportion of sterilizations took place outside state institutions and involved women too healthy to be confined in those institutions. Two trends confirm that this was the case. First, a much larger proportion of sterilizations took place outside state institutions and involved women too healthy to be confined in those institutions.222 Because these sterilizations were argued to be voluntary, administrators in the state could sterilize people not sick enough to be institutionalized—those often characterized as feebleminded—at a greater rate.223 In 1954-56, for example, 219 of the women sterilized were already confined in state institutions, and only 175 of the women sterilized were outside of state institutions.224 By 1962-64, as many as 378 women were sterilized outside state institutions, with only 112 women in state institutions being sterilized.225 This trend signaled two things. First, it confirmed that sterilization candidates did not need to be clearly mentally ill. Second, the trend suggests that sterilizations were more often administered informally and outside the institutions in which operations were meant to take place.

A second trend makes clear that mental illness was no longer the primary reason a woman was singled out for sterilization. Of the people sterilized between 1950 and 1968, a growing proportion were women deemed to be feebleminded. In 1954-56, 111 sterilized women had been diagnosed as mentally diseased and 392 as feebleminded.226 By 1966-68, when as many as 250 sterilized women were still characterized as feebleminded, only sixteen were diagnosed with a mental illness.227 Even in the 1920s, many eugenicists acknowledged that feeblemindedness was not a biological concept but rather a catchall term applied to behaviors seen to be antisocial or immoral.228 By the 1950s, the scientific validity of “feeblemindedness” would have been even more in doubt.229 The feebleminded women sterilized in North Carolina between 1950 and 1968 were less and less likely to be mentally ill or handicapped.

Instead, they were increasingly likely to be single women who were sexually active or who were feared to become so in the future.230 In 1954-1956, there were

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222 See id. at 15.
223 See id.
227 See id.
228 See, e.g., POPENO, supra note 52, at 323.
229 See Henry Nelson, Genetic Experts Split on Controlled Breeding, L.A. TIMES, Sep. 11, 1966, at A2 (Advances in genetics might not have cast the same doubt on eugenic thinking that it cast on the terminology of eugenic science).
139 married sterilization patients in North Carolina and 364 unmarried patients.\textsuperscript{231} By 1966-68, there were only 27 female married patients, and the number of unmarried female patients remained as high as 244.\textsuperscript{232} Doctors could sterilize a disproportionate number of unmarried women who were not obviously handicapped or ill by claiming that the women themselves wanted to be sterilized.

It is worth asking whether these sterilizations were truly voluntary. There are three reasons to be skeptical. First, many advocates of sterilization as a birth control method argued that it was married women with large families and little money who frequently demanded birth control.\textsuperscript{233} Similarly, the voluntary sterilization program operating in Virginia publicized the fact that it primarily served married women.\textsuperscript{234} Yet in the period between 1950 and 1968, a smaller and smaller proportion of women sterilized in North Carolina were married.\textsuperscript{235}

A second reason to be suspicious of claims that North Carolina’s sterilization patients chose sterilization is the hostility directed towards unwed mothers. In fact, North Carolina tried several times to pass a criminal law prescribing sterilization as a punishment for all women who had had more than a certain number of children out of wedlock.\textsuperscript{236} Legislators supporting bills designed to punish unwed mothers argued that the bills showed “compassion for the persons who [were] unable to control their sexual desires.”\textsuperscript{237}

In addition, one must consider the racial prejudice openly expressed by some of the legislators and doctors who discussed so-called voluntary sterilization policy in the state. Before 1965, most hospitals were segregated and many black hospitals had neither the equipment nor the staff to perform a large number of operations.\textsuperscript{238} After \textit{Brown v. Board of Education} and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, hospitals were gradually desegregated and there was an increase in the proportion of sterilizations administered to black women.\textsuperscript{239} These sterilizations reflected eugenic as well as racial concerns. Throughout the 1950s, politicians, sociologists, and psychiatrists argued that black women did not have the same morals as did other women.\textsuperscript{240}

But why, if North Carolina’s Eugenics Board provided more procedural protections in 1950 than it had before, were doctors more able to circumvent those

\textsuperscript{231} See id.
\textsuperscript{232} See id.
\textsuperscript{233} See Clinic Offers Aid by Sterilization, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 9, 1962, at 60; see also Haseltine, supra note 180, at A1.
\textsuperscript{234} See Clinic Offers Aid, supra note 232, at 60.
\textsuperscript{235} See BIENNIAL REP., 1968, supra note 205, at 12-15.
\textsuperscript{236} See Harry Golden, Dealing with Illegitimacy, Letters to the Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1961, at 22.
\textsuperscript{237} Hearing Argues Sterilization, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 1959, at A21
\textsuperscript{238} See WOODSIDE, supra note 1, at 32-33.
\textsuperscript{239} See Kohlmeier, supra note 197 (Most notoriously, the only women subjected to government-funded involuntary sterilizations in the 1970s were African-American).
\textsuperscript{240} See SOLLINGER, supra note 33, at 95-105.
protections between 1950 and 1968? For the most part, it was because doctors claimed that these sterilizations were voluntarily chosen.

Woodside’s study reveals some of the techniques used to elicit “consent” from women who did not or would not want to be sterilized. Many social workers believed that “immoral” women could not reliably make the “right” choice. Woodside agreed that “no great success would be expected from the introduction of birth control to the unintelligent and the socially irresponsible.”

Under the North Carolina law, Woodside explained, women did not need to be fully informed about what sterilization meant. At the State Hospital at Raleigh, patients qualified as feebleminded were not informed about the effect of sterilization, even though the “feebleminded” included women who had “a history or likelihood of sexual misdemeanor in the community” who were thought otherwise to be capable of intelligent choice about sterilization. Second, North Carolina officials accepted the “consent” of a family member even if a sterilization candidate herself objected. At Goldsboro, as at Raleigh, “patients were not considered to be intelligent [enough] to consent, and the permission of relatives was considered to be sufficient.” But if a family objected and the candidate consented, the candidate was almost certainly considered competent to consent, even if she had been diagnosed as feebleminded.

Another technique involved tricks used to secure the consent of the candidate herself. At Morgantown Hospital, social workers proposed sterilization as close as possible to admission to the hospital, when relatives would be most distressed and likely to consent. At Samarcand, an institution for white juvenile delinquents, social workers pressured minors to consent, since family members of Samarcand girls often objected to sterilization. Other social workers pressured men to be sterilized. The men proposed instead that their wives be sterilized.

These techniques reflected a new idea of choice. Although “voluntary” choice proved central to the survival of North Carolina’s eugenic law, “voluntary” choices included those choices made for unwed mothers by other people or by women who had not been informed about what they had chosen. One North Carolina social worker summarized this view about “immoral” women and sterilization: “[y]ou can’t expect them... to be any more sensible about this than about other things...” Those applying North Carolina’s sterilization law often acted on similar views. As the image of compulsory sterilization law in North

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241 Woodside, supra note 1, at 105.
242 Id. at 27, 29.
243 Id. at 37, 71.
244 Id. at 33, 29.
245 Id.
246 Woodside, supra note 1, at 30-31.
247 Id. at 37-38.
249 Woodside, supra note 1, at 106.
Carolina changed, pro-eugenic volunteers in the state also worked to redefine reproductive choice.

IV. CONCLUSION

Eugenic legal reformers had achieved great success by the 1930s. Eugenic laws used various means to weed out the physically, mentally, or morally defective. World War II heavily influenced the fate of eugenic law but did not eliminate eugenics from law altogether. An association with Nazism meant the decline and ultimate disappearance of compulsory sterilization laws, but not of all of the eugenic motivations behind those laws.

If anything, a number of factors made the moral element of eugenics seem more pressing. Calls for integration, the influence of the Cold War, a long-term increase in national prosperity, a short-term spike in the number of illegitimate births, and the number of white unwed mothers might have made moral concerns more central than they had been in prior decades. Many legislators still held beliefs that immoral parents inevitably had immoral children. In order to prevent immorality, one had to decrease the number of children born to immoral parents. This result could be accomplished by reducing the number of children born to unfit parents or by making immoral parents reform.

If the moral element of eugenics still influenced law, World War II required eugenic laws to take a different form. Nazism was too much associated with compulsory sterilization. Legislators considering compulsory sterilization for unwed mothers instead had to adopt a range of legal alternatives that better reflected the importance of reproductive choice.

Pro-eugenic organizations similarly had to adapt to the new political climate by distancing themselves from the openly political groups that dominated the eugenic legal reform movement of the earlier twentieth century. As importantly, the organizations had to reshape the very idea of eugenic reform. To a large extent, activists working for those organizations did so by invoking and redefining the idea of reproductive choice.

It is a mistake to believe that eugenics disappeared as an important legal influence. Eugenic rhetoric might have declined, but eugenic motivations and eugenic laws did not. What made these laws successful was the ability of lawmakers and organizations to repackage eugenic laws as something more palatable. The persistence of eugenics in American law shows how an ideology may be most effective when it is the most subtle. Eugenics proved to be a subtle legal ideology indeed, capable of disguising itself in many ways, even in the language of free choice.