•  
  •  
 

Florida State University Journal of Transnational Law & Policy

Luke Nottage

Abstract

Asian companies' equity offerings and securities markets have grown significantly, including in Southeast Asia (Part I). Yet corporate governance is undergoing only a gradual transformation, especially where government and family-linked listed companies remain common. Foreign investors and international organizations (including ASEAN) have therefore been pressing for further reforms, including independent director (ID) requirements to monitor executives and others. Part II examines Thailand, building on recent comparisons of mostly larger Asian markets. Part II.A explores when and why ID requirements were introduced-as early as 1993. Part II.B examines how they were introduced-mandatory regulation, supplemented by comply-or-explain requirements, then encouragement through annual surveys. Part II.C examines what the ID requirements are-noting understandable disqualifications for substantial shareholders, but also an unusual ex ante disqualification if involved in a competing company. Part II.D explores who make up the now large group of Thai IDs. Original empirical analysis finds accounting and other business backgrounds but also engineering and military connections. Part II.E then explores where impacts arise from these IDs, now or potentially. Part III concludes that Thai IDs have made a growing difference especially over the last two decades but face ongoing challenges for effective monitoring and other roles, and deserve ongoing research.

Download

Included in

Law Commons

Share

COinS