Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2014
Publication Title
International Review of Law and Economics
Publication Title (Abbreviation)
37 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 9 (2014)
Volume
37
First Page
9
Last Page
20
Abstract
The standard two-period law enforcement model is considered in a setting where individuals usually, but not exclusively, commit crimes only after comparing expected costs and benefits. Where escalating punishment schemes are present, there is an inherent value in keeping a clean criminal record; a person with a record may unintentionally become a repeat offender if he fails to exert self-control, and be punished more severely. If the punishment for repeat offenders is sufficiently high, one may rationally forgo the opportunity of committing a profitable crime today to avoid being sanctioned as a repeat offender in the future. Therefore, partial deterrence can be achieved at a very low cost through the use of escalating penalties, providing a behavioral justification for punishing repeat offenders more severely.
DOI
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2013.10.002
Rights
Author's accepted manuscript, © 2012 Murat C. Mungan
Faculty Biography
http://law.fsu.edu/our-faculty/profiles/mungan
Recommended Citation
Murat C. Mungan,
A Behavioral Justification for Escalating Punishment Schemes, 37
37 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 9 (2014)
9
(2014),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/115
Comments
This is the author's accepted manuscript version. The version of record (© 2014 Elsevier) is available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0144818813000756 or the DOI provided above.