Mark Seidenfeld

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

2011

Publication Title

Notre Dame Law Review

Publication Title (Abbreviation)

Notre Dame L. Rev.

Volume

86

First Page

273

Last Page

312

Abstract

This Article addresses the question of how a court can justify deferring to an administrative agency interpretation of a statute under the Chevron doctrine given the accepted understanding that Article III of the Constitution makes the judiciary the ultimate decider of the meaning of law in any case or controversy that is properly before a court. It further considers the ramifications of the answer to that question on the potential forms that any doctrine of interpretive deference may assume.

This Article first rejects congressional intent to delegate interpretive primacy to agencies as the basis for Chevron. It argues that such intent is an unsupportablef iction that distracts attentionf rom judicial responsibilityf or the Chevron doctrine. Instead, it posits that Chevron is better viewed as a doctrine of judicial self-restraint under the courts' Article III responsibilities. It then analyzes how this view of Chevron might influence when and how the doctrine should operate.

Rights

© 2011 Mark Seidenfeld

Comments

First published in Notre Dame Law Review.

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