Document Type
Article
Publication Date
2023
Publication Title
Drake Law Review
Publication Title (Abbreviation)
Drake L. Rev.
Volume
70
First Page
605
Abstract
This Article contrasts two different models for protecting democracy. The first model, which is common globally, relies on insulated, apex-level independent institutions to protect sensitive democratic functions like administering elections and prosecuting wrongdoing by high level governmental officials. The United States largely eschews this approach and instead relies much more heavily on a second approach, which decentralizes sensitive functions among a large number of state and local officials, who are often not very insulated from politics. This Article describes the benefits and costs of each model in light of recent attacks on electoral administration in the United States. Moreover, it suggests two possible syntheses of interest in the United States: one which seeks to create apex-level institutions such as a strong, national electoral commission alongside decentralized institutions, and the other which seeks to provide better insulation of local institutions so that they are harder to capture.
Recommended Citation
David Landau,
Two Models of Protecting Democracy: Federalism and the U.S. Deviation, 70
Drake L. Rev.
605
(2023),
Available at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/articles/825